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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Ways in the Studies of Words:
The Methodology and Epistemology of Linguistic Science
by
Gabriel Gagnier Dupre
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Samuel John Cumming, Chair
The goal of linguistic science is to understand the nature of the psychological system responsi-
ble for our linguistic capacities. The complexity of this system, and of the larger psychological
system of which it is a constituent, makes achieving this goal very difficult. In particular, such
complexities in the target system result in patterns of observations that do not lend themselves to
neat generalizations. One central difficulty in linguistic theory is thus determining just how far
our theorizing is allowed to stray from these complex data. I will examine case studies from three
branches of linguistic theory: syntax, semantics, and language acquisition. In each case, we will
see advocates of opposing stances on this question. One side will argue that our theories ought
stick very closely to the observed data, and thus produce complex and particularized theories ca-
pable of doing so. The other will argue for more abstract theories, which suggest explanatory
depth and unification, but at the cost of apparent empirical adequacy. In all three cases, I shall
argue that neither extreme position is appropriate, when understood as excluding the other. I shall
instead develop a variety of pluralist strategies, attempting to integrate the two approaches by de-
veloping a battery of different representations of target systems which are individually insufficient
in various ways, but collectively capable of accounting for the phenomena. The overall aim is to
develop a clear understanding, drawn from contemporary work in the philosophy of science, of the
methodological foundations of linguistic theory.
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To Mum and Dad,
Who taught me how to think,
Even if they didn’t teach me how to speak.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Linguistics and the Explanatory Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Competence and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Core and Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 The Galilean Style and its Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5 A Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.6 The Explanatory Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.7 The Explanatory Economy at Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.8 Horizontal and Vertical Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.9 When Debts Go Unpaid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.10 The Explanatory Economy and the Division of Cognitive Labor . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2 Empiricism, Syntax, and Ontogeny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.1 Rationalism and Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2 The Structure of the Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3 An Example: Bayesian Grammar Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.4 Against Pure Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.5 The Possibility of Pure Rationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6 Against Pure Rationalism: Semi-Productive Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.7 Empiricism and E-Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.8 Acquisition and The Explanatory Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
v
3 Idealization in Natural Language Semantics: Truth Conditional Semantics for Radi-
cal Contextualists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2 The Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3 Standard Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.4 An Alternative Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5 Entailment: A Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.6 What is Semantic Theory About? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.7 Syntax and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4 Compositionality and Inference to the Best Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.2 The Principle of Compositionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.3 The Argument for The Principle of Compositionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.4 Merely Possible Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.5 Merely Possible Explanations in Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.6 Reconsidering the Standard Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.7 Inference to the Only Explanation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.8 Systematicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.9 PoC as a Methodological Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Center-Embedding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Unchecked Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Checking Features via Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The network of family, friends, and colleagues that has enabled me to spend the best part of a
decade trying to figure out how people figure out how human language works is too broad and
dense to specify fully. The following people represent some, but I’m sure not all, of the most
important nodes in this network. For their roles in granting me this privilege, I am eternally grate-
ful. For those whose names I have accidentally omitted, I am sincerely apologetic. This section is
long enough as it is, but including everyone who has contributed to what merits there are in this
dissertation, or to my enjoyment while writing it, would make it vastly longer still.
Thanks first and foremost to my advisor, Sam Cumming. Sam has been the perfect supervi-
sor for this project, in so many ways. His breadth of knowledge in philosophy, linguistics, and
cognitive science has made this work possible, and his relentless curiosity about how this all fits
together has been a model for how to do interdisciplinary philosophy. His presence when, and only
when, I wanted some advice or needed some encouragement has made writing this dissertation far
less taxing than it otherwise would have been. There is a running joke among the UCLA graduate
students about the ‘Sam-lag’: the amount of time between meeting with Sam and realizing that
you should have spent the intervening days or weeks doing exactly what he said. This uncanny
ability to see where a project should be heading has improved the direction of this dissertation in
countless ways.
Josh Armstrong was a co-chair for this dissertation in all but name. His research is perhaps
closest to my own of anyone I have worked with, and our discussions on these topics over the years
have been a driving force in the way I understand the study of language and mind. His encyclopedic
knowledge of so many distinct areas makes him the perfect resource, and more than a few times
my entire project has shifted, for the better, on the basis of Josh’s reading recommendations. He
has also been a steady source of counsel and support for me since he arrived at UCLA, just in time
to be on my committee.
What can I say about David Kaplan that has not already been said in the acknowledgement
sections of the works of dozens of other (official or unofficial) students of his? Since my first
meeting with him, as a 20-year old prospective student, up until the present, talking with David
viii
has never failed to be inspiring. His simultaneous appreciation for the subtleties of language and
feel for where deep theory-construction is feasible serve as a model for the kind of approach I
am here advocating for. And he exemplifies as well as anyone I know the most under-appreciated
philosophical virtue: humour.
Shel Smith has been the platonic ideal of a skeptical interlocutor, pushing me on exactly the
points of my work most in need of refinement. I always know that if I can convince him of
something, I can probably convince anyone, and my writing has benefitted enormously from my
attempts (not always successful) to do so.
While UCLA has provided an ideal situation for me to conduct my research, it has been hugely
helpful to have Michael Weisberg as my external member, reminding me that there are other ap-
proaches to philosophy. His influence has, not infrequently, alerted me to presuppositions and
assumptions in my work, the exposition of which has vastly improved this work’s quality. His
relentless attention to the messy details of both scientific theory and practice provides a model I
wish I better resembled.
As much as I have learned from these wonderful teachers, I have learned again from my fellow
students. This is especially true of the UCLA Mind and Language community. My longtime
accomplice, Gabby Johnson, has been teaching me to be a better philosopher, and a better person,
for 7 years now, and I anticipate this continuing for many years more. Bill Kowalsky is one of the
smartest, most knowledgeable, people I have ever met, and my conversations with him over the
years have taught me more about science and mind than I can convey. Kevin Lande’s acquisition
of gainful employment last year left the department in general, and the mind/language community
in particular, a less interesting and less enjoyable place. Ian Boon, my fellow linguistics geek, has
for years put up with my banging on about the competence/performance distinction when no-one
else would, and has more than once saved me when I’ve had to deal with technical material above
my pay grade. As this group of characters moves on to bigger and better things, I feel confident
that the next generation of UCLA philosophers of mind and language, Christian De Leon, Esther
Nikbin, Torsten Odland, and Tristen Cardwell, will carry on this tradition.
I am likewise indebted to all of those who have made my past seven years so enjoyable. Of
ix
special note are: John Kardosh, for always making me laugh and for his righteous anger about all
the right, and maybe a few of the wrong, things, Amber Kavka-Warren, for her years of consistent
friendship and inconsistent puns, and Ayana Samuel, for trash-TV-time, which kept me sane during
the writing of this thesis. Others who have also contributed to the fun I’ve had in LA include:
Mike Ashfield, Rima Basu, Denis Buehler, Lee-Ann Chae, Milo Crimi, Maegan Fairchild, Ashley
Feinsinger, Andrew Flynn, Laura Gillespie, Noah Gordon, Jasmine Gunkel, Laura Heida, Antti
Hiltunen, Nathan Howard, Brian Hutler, Kim Johnston, Isaac Khalaf, Tanya Kostochka, Piera
Maurizio, Elli Neufeld, Melissa Retkwa, Kyle Schultz, Vaheh Shirvanian, Andrew Stewart, Femi
Ta´ı´wo`, Eric Tracy, Jordan Wallace-Wolf, Aaron West, and Jonathan Wright.
Thanks also to my UK mates; Fred Baty, Will Bedford, John Campbell, Ali Copland, Ben
Coyle, Joel Geraets, Joe Goldman, Ed Gulliver, Nicola Lace, Joe Lyons, Oli Meadows, and Kris-
tian Scrase, who made every return home feel like I’d never left.
Over the years, I have been lucky enough to be able to discuss the issues in this dissertation,
and surrounding topics, with many wonderful people in many wonderful places. This dissertation,
if it would have been produced at all, would have been much worse without the influence of:
Emma Borg, Tyler Burge, Noam Chomsky, Adrian Currie, Guillermo Del Pinal, Ryan Doran,
Katie Elliott, Laura Franklin-Hall, Hannah Ginsborg, Michael Glanzberg, Gabe Greenberg, Mark
Greenberg, Barbara Herman, Pamela Hieronymi, Andrew Hsu, Robert May, Eliot Michaelson,
Calvin Normore, Brian Rabern, Michael Rescorla, Georges Rey, Seana Shiffrin, Rob Stainton,
Shane Steinert-Threlkeld, Una Stojnic´, Carlo Penco, Stefano Predelli, Howie Wettstein, Andrew
Young, and audiences in Boulder, Genova, Paris, and Toronto.
Thanks also to my teachers at the University of Bristol, especially Anthony Everett, James
Ladyman, Michelle Montague, Samir Okasha, and Finn Spicer, whose patience and wisdom helped
turn a naı¨ve 18-year-old into a marginally less naı¨ve 21-year-old with a position in a PhD program.
I would not have been able to do this work without the generosity of the members of the UCLA
linguistics department, who took time out of their schedules to show me around their discipline.
Thanks especially to Tim Hunter, Anoop Mahajan, Jessica Rett, Yael Sharvit, Ed Stabler, and
Tim Stowell, for putting up with my questions about possible worlds, confirmation, and other
x
philosophical paraphernalia, when they had more important things to be working on.
Thanks also to all the staff at UCLA who have done a wonderful job of keeping my life as
free as possible from the terrors of bureaucracy: Brittany Bolden, Laura Clennon, Julian Fischer,
Belen Garcia, Tanya Kim, Rachel Lee, Blake Livesay, Doug Myers, Jackie Perez, and Ryan Tran,
Thanks also to Eddy, for keeping the halls of Dodd looking spotless.
I have the unbelievable luck of having not one, but two, brilliant academics as parents. I could
not possibly convey, even if I took the whole of this dissertation, how much I owe to my Mum,
Regenia, and my Dad, John. Everything I have ever written is informed by what I have learned
from them. It would be easy to say that I learned from my father, a philosopher of biology, to
appreciate the philosophical puzzles generated by the complex sciences, and from my mother, a
literary theorist, an appreciation for the beauty and power of language. However, this would be to
sell them short, and to rely on tidy dichotomies instead of complex dialectics, in exactly the way
I have learned from them not to. From the both of them I have acquired an appreciation for the
virtues of rigor, clarity, style, and humanity in one’s research. More important than all this though
is the love they have surrounded me with for the past 27 years.
I am also infinitely thankful for the 23 years of solidarity, compassion, and banter I have had
with my brother, Julian, who has bucked the academic trend in the family to pursue the nobler
pursuit of culinary perfection.
Finally, I can only hope to convey the smallest fraction of the appreciation I have for my partner,
Emily Mayhew. Emily, you are my confidant, my linguistic informant, and my best friend. Thank
you so much for sticking with me as I have drawn out my time in Los Angeles, and for the constant
support and encouragement. How I ended up with someone so smart, funny, beautiful, and kind I
will never know. I hope the submission of this document signals the beginning of the end of the
long-distance part of our relationship. Love you, babe.
xi
VITA
2016 C.Phil in Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles.
2014 M.A. in Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles.
2012 B.A. in Philosophy, University of Bristol.
PRESENTATIONS
“Linguistics and the Explanatory Economy,” Understanding Defectiveness in the Sciences, UNAM;
June 2019
“Truth and Idealization in Natural Language Semantics,” FINO Seminar on Context Sensitivity,
University of Genoa; May 2018
“Compositionality and Inference to the Best Explanation,” Canadian Philosophical Association
Annual Congress, Ryerson University; May 2017
“Truth and Idealization in Natural Language Semantics,” Paris Workshop on Contextual Indefi-
niteness and Semantic Theory, Institut D‘Etudes Avence´es; April 2017
xii
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental puzzle to which this dissertation is addressed is: how is a science of human
language possible? Calling this a puzzle, as opposed to a mere question, is intended to convey the
fact that there are certain deep tensions that become apparent once one investigates the nature and
practice of scientific linguistics. These tensions stem from the nature of scientific inquiry on the one
hand, and the properties of human language as an object of such inquiry on the other. In particular,
I will be assuming that science is essentially connected to both explanation and generalization.
If the mere collection of facts was sufficient to count as science, this puzzle would not arise. It
is straightforward enough to merely catalogue a large class of observable facts regarding natural
language, but a scientific linguistics must go beyond this in accounting for regularities in such a
database and explaining why these facts hold. This is where the properties of natural language pose
a problem. Linguistic behavior, the primary source of evidence for linguistic theory, is the product
of a massively complex system. As a result of this, proposed linguistic generalizations, and thus
the explanations that depend on such generalizations, invariably conflict with the primary data.
The complexity of the system responsible for the observations to which our linguistic theories are
responsive thus creates a trade-off: theorizing which sticks closely to the observations is unlikely
to have a significant degree of generality, while theorizing which deviates from such observations
seems empirically unsupported. In this dissertation, I hope to analyze and evaluate some of the
techniques that linguists can use to resolve this tension.
The complexity of natural language, as an object of inquiry, is obvious to anyone who has seri-
ously attempted to study it. This is so at all levels of description. Generalizations that seem widely
applicable to the linguistic behavior of a single individual are frequently counter-exemplified by
that very speaker. For example, it is broadly true that in my idiolect of English, reflexive pronouns
such as ‘myself’ can occur only with a nearby (first-personal) pronoun. Witness: “I will pour my-
self a beer.” vs. *“Would you pour myself a beer?”. However, this generalization appears to be
falsified by so-called ‘logophoric’ uses of reflexives, such as “Californians, such as myself, put ice
in all their drinks.”, which seem to be anaphoric on informational features of the discourse, rather
than previously uttered linguistic expressions. The situation is even worse at the inter-linguistic
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level, where such apparently anodyne statements as that all languages contain nouns and verbs, or
that all languages allow for recursive structure-building, have been challenged.1 These examples
from morpho-syntax are not unique. The same problem, of counter-evidence for all linguistic gen-
eralizations, recurs in discussions of all linguistic properties. This unruliness may be expected if
one views language as largely a cultural phenomenon. Looking for universal truths about language
may be as hopeless as looking for similar generalizations about, say, fashion or etiquette. In such
cases, we may be able to provide particularized, historical explanations for why certain languages
behave in certain ways, but the hopes of a general science of language seem undermined by this
seemingly endless variation.
In this dissertation, I hope to show why this pessimistic view is not inevitable. I shall de-
velop an account, drawing on contemporary work in the philosophy of the complex sciences, of
how linguistic theories may be produced which are both general and empirically adequate. My
general strategy shall be to show how the complexity of the target can be matched by a similarly
complex mode of strategizing. In particular, I shall argue that the plurality of influences on the
observational evidence can be managed by adopting a pluralist methodology which stresses the
need for a multiplicity of different scientific representations (theories and models) complementing
one another in their coverage of different aspects of the target. The aforementioned tension can
thus be dissolved by recognizing that our theoretical desiderata for scientific representations can be
distributed between multiple such representations. The causal complexity of the target makes the
construction of a unique model/theory capable of both generality and empirical adequacy impossi-
ble. But, these desiderata may be promoted by developing multiple non-competing models which
can together capture both the regularities and the specificities of human language. To this end,
I develop a collectivist account of the methodology of linguistics, which views the confirmation
of a theory as itself dependent on the confirmation of distinct theories, as opposed to traditional
competitive understandings of scientific theory confirmation, which aim to determine which theory
in a collection is uniquely best confirmed.
Underlying this methodological approach is a picture of the relationship between psychology
1See e.g. Kinkade (1983) and Everett (2005), respectively.
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and behavior. Linguistic theory has produced detailed and precise theories of the psychological
systems underlying our linguistic competence. However, this competence is just one determinant
of linguistic behavior. Speaking is a rational behavior, dependent on an agent’s overall psycho-
logical state, including beliefs, desires, previous experiences, etc. The way in which poetic and
creative uses of language often violate apparent linguistic rules is perhaps the clearest case of this.
Likewise, interpretation of language seems influenced by our prior experience with other expres-
sions, norms of polite and appropriate language, attribution of conversational goals to the speaker,
etc. For this reason, it would in fact be a mark against a linguistic theory if it perfectly corre-
sponded to linguistic performance. This would indicate that the theory was tracking more than
the psychological systems which linguistic theory properly targets. The methodological puzzle, to
which this dissertation is addressed, is thus: how do, and how ought, linguists determine which
subset of the massive database of linguistic observations their models/theories are responsible for?
The bulk of this dissertation will involve applying this pluralistic, collectivist, methodology
to a variety of central debates in the linguistic disciplines of syntax, developmental linguistics,
and semantics. In each case, we can identify two classes of theorist who appear to be moved
by competing theoretical desiderata: one camp aims to produce highly general theories, but in
doing so appears to ignore the messy empirical data posing prima facie problems for their view,
the other is impressed by the messiness of this data and so produces much more specific theories
which stick closely to these observations and thus fail to provide the tools for deep explanation
and generalization. In each case, I shall argue that a middle-ground is possible. Highly general,
explanatory theories are possible, but only in virtue of being complemented by a variety of distinct
models/theories capable of explaining the subtleties and particularities that seem to pose empirical
problems for these more general approaches.
In Chapter 1, Linguistics and the Explanatory Economy, I develop my general collectivist
methodology, and show how it can resolve one of the most fundamental debates in syntactic the-
ory. Generativists, following Chomsky’s seminal work, aim to produce highly general theories of
human linguistic competence. In particular, they aim to uncover Universal Grammar: those aspects
of human psychology which are language-specific, species-universal, and account for the ability of
every human to acquire a natural language. The difficulty with such a self-consciously generalist
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approach is just the one described above: any proposed universal properties of natural language
seem easily falsifiable when compared with the intricacies of observed linguistic behavior. This
fact has led a wide range of theorists, including linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and com-
puter scientists, to reject the pretensions of universality central to this Chomskian approach, and
instead focus on classifying and taxonomizing the variety of languages and dialects in all their
messy detail.
One central battleground in this debate is methodological. Generativists, in order to retain
their general analyses in the face of apparent counter-examples, rely on a number of related dis-
tinctions: competence vs. performance, acceptability vs. grammaticality, and the core vs. the
periphery. Each of these, in slightly different ways, functions to distinguish between the target
of linguistic theory and the observable evidence. For example, generativists claim that they are
aiming to account for speakers’ linguistic competence, the structural properties of an underlying
psychological capacity. Performance, or linguistic behavior, is causally responsive to this compe-
tence, but also many other factors, such as restrictions on memory, the properties of production and
comprehension systems, the knowledge and intentions of speakers, etc. In this way, many apparent
counter-examples to their proposals can be brushed aside as not properly reflective of competence,
the true target of linguistic theorizing. This move has seemed to many opposing this tradition to be
unscientific. Immunizing one’s theories from apparently contradictory observational data seems to
be exactly what degenerating scientific research programs do.
Many traditional pictures of scientific progress are squarely on the side of the anti-generativists.
Talk of ‘degenerating research programs’ is a reference to Lakatos’ picture of scientific rational-
ity, according to which a scientific theory makes progress by opening itself up to a wider range
of observational data, not by restricting its scope as these various methodological maneuvers on
behalf of the generativist seem to. Likewise, it is a common refrain that such techniques make
generative theories ‘unfalsifiable’, echoing Popper’s picture of scientific progress. However, I de-
velop a novel picture of scientific confirmation, what I call the explanatory economy, which aims
to show that these techniques are empirically legitimate. The central idea of this framework is that
scientific theories are evaluated as a collective, not as individuals, and so reducing the scope of
one theory can be legitimate when it thereby increases the explanatory scope of another, consis-
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tent theory. On this account, when a generativist denies that some apparent counter-example to
her theory is sufficient grounds for rejecting or revising this theory, she thereby becomes commit-
ted to this observation being explained by some other theory, of something other than linguistic
competence. For example, I discuss the historically important example of the unacceptability of
multiply center-embedded sentences (e.g. *“The mouse the cat the dog hated chased squeaked.”).
Standard generative theories predict that these sentences are grammatical, but they sound bad to
almost every native English speaker. Prima facie it may seem that these grammatical theories
ought be revised in light of this mismatch, but in fact, the overall success of our psychological
theories, taken together, is not furthered in this way. Instead, such a fact is excluded from the
purview of linguistic theory, and instead explained by a non-competing psycholinguistic theory of
sentence recognition. In this way, while the scope of grammatical theory was reduced, the overall
explanatory power of psychology was increased due to a corresponding increase in the explana-
tory power of this psycholinguistic theory. This case study, and several others, display the power of
the explanatory economy model, while showing a way forward in these perennial meta-theoretical
linguistic disputes.
In Chapter 2, Empiricism, Syntax, and Ontogeny, I discuss perhaps the central debate in de-
velopmental linguistics, over the extent to which language acquisition involves the extrapolation
of environmental linguistic patterns. Empiricist models of language acquisition typically explain
the structure of a developed linguistic competence with reference to these environmental patterns,
which the developing mind identifies and projects from. Rationalist models, on the other hand,
view language acquisition as the development of an internally driven psychological faculty, which
may be causally dependent on the learner’s linguistic environment, but does not function to re-
produce observed environmental patterns. One can see again in this debate the differing attitudes
towards linguistic diversity. While empiricists typically stress how varied natural languages are,
and infer from this that fairly general learning mechanisms are needed to account for the range of
languages that children can acquire, rationalists typically underplay this diversity and argue that
languages are in some deep sense highly similar and thus suitably explained without substantial
reliance on these environmental differences.
One central goal of this chapter is developing an understanding of what it means for a trait to be
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‘innate’ or ‘non-innate’ such that it is not a priori that no trait will be purely innate or purely non-
innate. Innateness must therefore not be a causal notion, according to which innate traits are caused
by one’s biology, while non-innate traits are caused by the environment. As is commonplace in
all theories of development, all developed traits are causally dependent on both the environment
and the organism’s biology. I shall instead argue that this distinction is best cashed out in terms
of reflection of the environment. Innate traits are structured in ways that do not (function to)
reflect patterns in the environment, whereas non-innate traits do (function to) reflect patterns in the
environment. This is a graded notion: traits can be more or less innate, as they can partially reflect
environmental patterns.
After getting clear on the distinction between empiricist (viewing language as non-innate) and
rationalist (viewing language as innate) models of language acquisition, I will argue that language
acquisition cannot be viewed as purely empiricist or purely rationalist. I shall argue, in keeping
with the general theme of this dissertation, that a full account of natural language acquisition will
likely require the development of complementary models, some describing the innate factors in
language acquisition, with other empiricist models providing accounts for the learned irregularities
that do seem to depend strongly on one’s linguistic environment. Frequently made claims about
the irrelevance of one kind of model, whether empiricist accusations that Universal Grammar is
empty or rationalist claims that linguistic theory need make no reference to the learner’s linguistic
environment, will thus be shown to be false. As in the previous case, the answer is somewhere in
the middle, and a pluralist strategy seems best suited for finding it.
In Chapter 3, Idealization in Natural Language Semantics: Truth-Conditional Semantics for
Radical Contextualists, I switch my focus to semantic theory. One of the most studied questions in
the philosophy of language and semantic theory is the extent to which natural language meaning
depends on features of the context in which linguistic expressions are used. While all parties
agree that some expressions contribute to the meaning of our utterances in a context-sensitive way,
there is a deep disagreement about just how far this phenomenon goes. On one side of this debate
are Semantic Minimalists and Moderate Contextualists, who argue that very special conditions
on lexical entries must be in place for the context of utterance to influence the meanings of our
utterances. In particular, they argue that such contextual effects are pre-determined by mastery of
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these special expressions. It is part of our competence with indexical terms like ‘I’ and ‘here’, and
perhaps other expressions like ‘tall’, that we understand, in advance of any actual use, that their
contribution to meaning varies in specific ways. On the other side are Radical Contextualists, who
argue that just about any expression can express different meanings in different contexts, depending
on our conversational goals. We can again view this debate as following roughly along the lines
of the previous two: one camp of theorists aims to produce generally applicable theories, denying
the import of apparent counter-exemplifying evidence, while the rival camp is impressed by the
range of such counter-examples, and so posits a more particularized theory incapable of producing
high-level generalizations.
In this chapter, I motivate a slightly different strategy than that proposed in chapter 1. In that
chapter, I focused on the ways in which non-competing theories of different targets could be used
to complement one another and thus explain away one another’s anomalies. In my discussion of
semantic theory, I argue instead for an approach which focuses on the ways in which different
models of the same target, pitched at different levels of generality, can serve this same function.
In particular, I argue that, unlike syntax for which I take the observed complexity to result from
the interaction between a wide range of different systems, semantics should be viewed as itself
a highly complex system, influenced by a wide range of causal factors. I agree that whether or
not a particular predicate expression truly applies to a given entity may depend on an indefinite
variety of contextual factors, especially my communicative goals. However, I do not follow these
theorists in denying the possibility or fruitfulness of truth-conditional semantics. Instead, I argue
that particular semantic models can be viewed as capturing some degree of the complex structure of
our semantic competence, and that thus semantic theory ought posit a variety of different models,
each capturing different amounts of this complexity. At one end of this scale are the models of
the minimalist, which eschew (almost) all context-sensitivity. These models will be well-suited for
capturing linguistic regularities governing the abstract structure of meaning. However, they will
fail to capture precisely those cases in which utterance context does influence meaning, for which
contextualist models will be better suited.
In this way, while the interdependence of scientific representations takes a different form in that
models at one level of description have their anomalies explained away by models at a more fine-
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grained level incorporating a greater degree of the causal structure of the underlying systems, the
overall structure of the approach is the same as that described in the earlier chapters. A scientific
representation is put forward, but it seems to face certain empirical difficulties. However, rather
than rejecting or revising this representation, it is shown that these empirical difficulties can be
handled by a distinct representation. Given the indefinite range of contextual phenomena to which
our utterance meanings appear sensitive, I believe that no finite model will be able to capture all
of this context-sensitivity, but by producing a range of more-or-less idealized models, as needed
by the data, we can collectively account for it, without precluding the possibility of capturing
high-level generalizations.
In the final chapter, Compositionality and Inference to the Best Explanation, I respond to an
important possible objection to my proposal: the objection from compositionality. My discussion
of modeling practice within semantics assumed the radical contextualist proposal that utterance
meaning is sensitive to an indefinite range of contextual influences. It was this assumption that
motivated the need for my pluralist, model-based approach. However, it is often argued that such
a picture of meaning is inconsistent with one of the guiding assumptions of semantic theory: the
Principle of Compositionality (PoC). This principle posits a tight restriction on determinants of
meaning. In particular, it states that the meaning of complex expressions are entirely determined
by the meanings of their simpler constituents (their lexical semantics) and the way in which such
constituents are combined (their syntactic organization). While there are ways of construing radical
contextualism as consistent with the letter of PoC (primarily by arguing that all context-sensitivity
goes by way of the meanings of constituent expressions), it is certainly against the spirit of it. The
empirical and theoretical value of PoC is provided by the strong constraint it places on semantic
theory. The ‘anything-goes’ flavour of radical contextualism seems to undermine this restriction.
So, in this chapter I aim to undermine the motivation for accepting PoC, and so defend the need
for my pluralist approach to semantics.
PoC is typically motivated by an inference to the best explanation. In particular, it is argued that
certain essential properties of natural language, productivity and systematicity, are best explained
by viewing language as compositional. A language is productive when its competent speakers are
able to produce and interpret indefinitely many expressions of it. That natural languages are pro-
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ductive is exemplified by the presence in such languages of recursive operations like conjunction,
adjunction, and the formation of relative clauses. For such operations, there seems to be no limit
to how many times we can apply them, and thus no upper-bound on how many expressions we can
understand. Systematicity is a property of languages for which there are certain relations between
expressions which can be interpreted. In particular, expressions of a systematic language remain
interpretable given certain permutations of constituent elements: if a speaker is able to understand
the sentence “Mikhail loves Leela”, she can likewise understand “Leela loves Mikhail”. Both such
properties appear to be well explained by PoC. If all that goes into the meaning of an expression
is the meanings of its constituents and their syntactic combination, then by mastering a finite set
of simple meanings and a finite set of combinatorial rules, a speaker will be able to produce and
understand indefinitely many expressions. Likewise, if this is all that is needed for comprehension,
then comprehension of expressions containing one set of constituents will entail the comprehen-
sion of different sentences containing that same set. For these reasons, it is typically argued that
we ought accept PoC in line with the widely accepted principle of scientific inference that one is
entitled to accept those claims that provide the best explanation of the phenomena.
I argue, however, that this methodological principle is not legitimate. Drawing on work in the
philosophy of biology, I argue that inferences to the best explanation do not play the justificatory
role they are often presumed to. In particular, I argue that IBE licenses theorists to pursue a theory,
but acceptance requires independent empirical evidence. I draw an analogy to an important debate
in the history of evolutionary theory involving the capability of Darwinian theory of evolution by
natural selection to account for ‘Organs of Extreme Perfection and Complication’. These are traits
which appear to provide adaptive benefit only when a number of independent, and individually
non-adaptive, traits are present. The historically central trait of this sort is the wing: if wings pro-
vide adaptive benefit by enabling their bearers to fly, it seems that many intermediate stages in the
development of the wing are non-adaptive. It is difficult to see how Darwin’s gradualist theory can
account for such useless incipient structures, and so his theory is claimed to be at best insufficient,
at worst false. However, Darwin’s response to such a challenge involved proposing a possible,
gradualist, explanation: he argued that these incipient stages were used for something other than
flying. While this claim may have been sufficient to rebut the challenge, Darwin did not view it as
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licensing his belief that these incipient wings were indeed used in the way proposed. For this he
required further empirical evidence. This appears to be a norm adopted widely in the biological
sciences: mere possible explanatory power is insufficient to ground belief, and must thus be sup-
plemented by direct empirical support. I thus conclude that likewise, PoC is not justified by these
standard arguments. I develop an alternative account of PoC as a methodological dictum: look
for compositional explanations where possible, but when doing so would undermine the elegance
of the theory we may be better off positing violations of PoC. This account of PoC thus dovetails
nicely with my multiple-models picture of semantics, which aims to produce general models, but
allows mechanisms for accounting for context-sensitive deviation.
Overall, then, I believe this dissertation demonstrates the power of adopting a pluralist, collec-
tivist, approach to linguistic methodology. I believe this approach enables plausible and method-
ologically fruitful resolutions to some of the central debates in linguistic theorizing, as demon-
strated with my case studies drawn from syntax, developmental linguistics, and semantics. I be-
lieve also that this approach is not limited in its applicability to linguistic science. The problem, of
complex systems being resistant to description by tidy generalizations, is ubiquitous in the study of
complex systems, including biology, psychology, economics, sociology etc. As seen in the differ-
ences between my accounts of syntax and semantics, however, the way in which such an approach
is applied can vary from case to case. Given this, I plan in future to apply this model to these
diverse disciplines, in order to see how similar or different such an approach must look in these
areas. I hope the account given of the linguistic sciences in this work suggests to others that this
would be a fruitful project.
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CHAPTER 1
Linguistics and the Explanatory Economy
1.1 Introduction
It is a truism that if linguistics is to be a genuine empirical science, then its proposals must be
sensitive to the observational data. Strikingly, theorists of many different stripes have claimed that
generative linguistics, the most well known and influential research program in linguistic theory,
does not meet this requirement. To see why, consider the following exchange:
A: I saw Maria proof-reading her draft.
B: What is she writing?
A: (A loud motorcycle drives by, making A’s response hard to discern.) She is writing a screen-
play.
B: She is writing what?
Standard generativist theories predict that B’s first question, in which the wh-expression ‘what’
has been raised from the position at which it receives its semantic interpretation (as the object of
‘writing’) to the beginning of the sentence, is grammatical. However, they also predict, for reasons
to be discussed in detail later, that B’s second question is ungrammatical. The displacement of
‘what’ observed in the former question is claimed to be mandatory, so that sentences in which
such movement does not occur are deemed ungrammatical.
This seems like a refutation of the theory. A grammar for English is supposed to determine, for
each expression, whether it is well-formed in English or not. Intuitively, both of B’s questions are
well-formed, but standard generative theories predict that only one of them is. One might think that
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this would lead generative grammarians to reformulate their theories so as to no longer make this
bad prediction. But this is not what they typically do. Instead, they often simply exclude such data
from the purview of their theory. Various tools in the methodological arsenal of the generativist
seem to serve exactly this function: the competence/performance, acceptability/grammaticality,
and core/periphery distinctions, to be discussed at length later, all function to distinguish between
data that are relevant to (dis-)confirming the relevant hypotheses and data that are not.
This approach, in the eyes of many, undermines the status of generative linguistics as an em-
pirical science. The ability of generativists to select, often post hoc, which data are relevant to
their theories, has been claimed to be unscientific. According to this objection, by adopting such
strategies the generativist is able to immunize her theory from the data, rendering it unfalsifiable.
In this paper, I shall propose a novel account of the methodology of linguistics, involving what
I call the ‘explanatory economy’. This methodology should make clear why the objections to the
generativist program miss the mark. This picture focuses on the ways in which, prior to inquiry,
it is not known which phenomena are to be explained by which theories. The impression that
some datum is within the purview of a particular theory is revisable, subject to a more developed
understanding of the theory in question and other nearby theories. In making such a revision, and
excluding this datum from the scope of one’s theory, a theorist is relying on this datum being expli-
cable by some other non-competing theory. I describe such a theorist, and by extension her theory,
as incurring an ‘explanatory debt’. This debt is discharged when some other non-competing theory
indeed provides such an explanation. If this debt is unlikely to be paid, this apparent counterex-
ample may be re-evaluated as indeed within the scope of the original theory and thus may count as
a genuine counterexample. In this way, the success of a theory is dependent on the success of the
other theories to which it is indebted.
The focus on this dependency differentiates my approach from traditional approaches to con-
firmation. While these approaches, from Hempel & Oppenheim (1948)’s Hypothetico-Deductivist
model, Popper (1959/2002)’s falsificationism and through to more recent Bayesian approaches1,
have produced illuminating pictures of the relationship between data and hypothesis, they have
1The locus classicus here being Earman (1992).
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all focused on the confirmation accrued to a particular theory in isolation from other proposals.
These approaches are individualistic in that the confirmation of one theory is independent of the
explanatory power of all other theories.2 My approach differs in that the extent to which one theory
is confirmed itself depends on the explanatory power of distinct theories. In particular, whether
certain data (dis-)confirm a particular theory will depend on whether these data can be accounted
for by other theories consistent with the former. I will call my approach collectivist in that it views
theories as confirmed based on how well they collectively, rather than individually, account for the
observations.
On this approach, then, confirmation is a function of both the explanatory/predictive coverage
of a theory and the degree to which the debts it has incurred are likely to be discharged. Consider
two rival theories, A and B, which provide predictions/explanations of overlapping but distinct
data sets of roughly equal size and import. From an individualistic perspective, there will be little
to choose between these two theories.3 However, this may not be so from a collectivist standpoint.
The explanatory economy may enable us to choose between these theories based on the way these
theories square with others. In particular, if the debts accrued to theory A, but not B, are plausibly
discharged by some third theory, C, (i.e. C can explain (away) apparent counter-examples to A,
but not B), then A is better confirmed than B despite having roughly similar predictive/explanatory
power.
Such a methodology is crucial for linguistic theory, as the observations (typically, the linguistic
judgements of a native speaker) are products of a wide range of cognitive systems. Specifically
linguistic capacities play an important role, but due to the importance of memory, sensory-motor
systems, speaker intentions, etc., these capacities are not directly reflected by the data. The ex-
planatory economy provides a way to factor out these influences: our theories of specifically lin-
2This is not to say that these approaches ignore alternative theories, just that each theory’s confirmation is deter-
mined independently. Discussions of the confirmation of distinct theories within these approaches are comparative.
For example, one of the most fruitful applications of Bayesian approaches to confirmation is Bayesian Model Selec-
tion, the use of Bayesian statistical tools to select between rival models of observed data (See e.g. Wasserman (2000)
for an overview). This approach involves looking at multiple models, but it does so by independently assessing each,
and then comparing these assessments, rather than treating the confirmation of one theory as itself dependent on the
successes of another.
3Let us assume that A and B are likewise roughly equivalent with respect to their extra-empirical virtues (simplicity,
elegance, etc.).
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guistic capacities are committed to explaining those observations which cannot be accounted for
by theories of other systems. This approach fits particularly nicely with, but does not presuppose,
a modular theory of mind. On a modular picture, language constitutes just one of many relatively
independent cognitive systems. As linguistic theory develops, linguists and other theorists make
guesses about which data are reflective of which systems. The explanatory economy is a tally of
which theorists have made which guesses, and the extent to which such guesses are successful.
One upshot of the explanatory economy approach is that it can enable us to re-interpret some
important debates. In particular, the individualistic view of theory confirmation suggests that al-
ternative approaches to linguistics should be evaluated on a winner-takes-all basis. Generative
linguistics and some of the popular alternative accounts, such as usage-based grammar, are treated
in this way: either linguistic competence is as described by the nativist generative theory, or by the
empiricist usage-based theory. I shall argue instead that these approaches may be better treated as
complementary. Neither can account for all of the phenomena, but this is because they each target
different aspects of our linguistic capacities. This collectivist approach enables us to get the best
of both worlds: universal properties of the linguistic faculty, as described by generative theories,
can account for similarities across languages and across speakers, while lexical and peripheral id-
iosyncrasies can be explained by empiricist theories. While this conciliatory approach may not
vindicate the most ambitious claims of either approach, hopefully it will enable both to be better
confirmed in their proprietary domains.
My explanatory economy approach bears a resemblance to the line of work focusing on the
‘division of cognitive labor’.4 At a certain relatively abstract level, my approach and that found
in this tradition are aimed at answering similar questions about the structure of scientific practice:
how to determine which projects to investigate, and how the investigation of one area influences
the investigation of others. However, at a more fine-grained level, these approaches are quite
different in their aims. In particular, traditional work in the division of cognitive labor has focused
on the questions of how the behavior of individual researchers does and should depend on that of
other researchers, whereas my interest is in the ways in which particular hypotheses or theories are
4This work originates with Kitcher (1990) and its development in Strevens (2003, 2006), but I am including under
this banner also the model-based work of e.g. Weisberg & Muldoon (2009) and Zollman (2007).
14
legitimized by work done in other areas. In fact, I take the phenomena I shall describe to present
difficulties for the modeling work produced in this tradition. I shall spell out these similarities
and differences in more detail in section 1.10, distinguishing between work which aims to uncover
science’s explanatory structure and that which aims to uncover its institutional structure.
1.2 Competence and Performance
At a very general level, confirmation of linguistic proposals involves comparing the outputs of
proposed generative systems (i.e. sets of rules and constraints which determine the ways in which
properties of simple expressions determine properties of the complex expressions into which they
are combined) with linguistic judgements and behavior. For example, if a sentence S of a natural
language L is judged by native speakers to be exactly three-ways ambiguous, then a proposed
generative system for L which allows for the generation of exactly three structures pronounced as
S, but with distinct interpretations, will be thereby (partially) confirmed. A system which produced
exactly two or four such structures would be thereby disconfirmed.
However, in many cases, this simple approach to confirmation fails to capture the practice
of generative linguistics. Structures generated by the generative systems correspond to natural
language sentences which are not deemed acceptable, and sentences deemed acceptable fail to
correspond to structures generated by these systems.5 Despite this, the generative theory is not
thereby regarded as falsified. For example, consider:
(1) The mouse the cat the dog chased caught squeaked.
(2) Tigers tigers tigers fight fight fight.
These sentences seem, at first hearing, to be word salad. They are judged unacceptable. However,
it can be shown that they are the products of the normal application of grammatical rules that in
5This rather clunky terminology of sentences ‘corresponding to’ structures and vice versa is motivated by the fact
that the linguistic system produces hierarchical structural descriptions, which must then be linearized to be pronounced
as sentences. As I will use the terms, a sentence is ambiguous when it corresponds to multiple structures.
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similar cases produce perfectly normal sentences.6 Here is a highly simplified version of the gram-
matical structure for sentence (1):
S
VP
squeaked
NP
S
VP
NP
the mouse
V
caught
NP
S
VP
NP
the cat
V
chased
NP
the dog
NP
the cat
NP
The mouse
Figure 1.1: Center-Embedding
Note that the complexity of these structures is generated by perfectly normal grammatical rules.
Starting with a sentence containing a transitive verb, we can form a complex NP headed by the
object of the verb in the way diagrammed in the tree above (e.g. the sentence “the dog chased the
cat” becomes the noun-phrase “the cat the dog chased”). Any syntactic theory must allow for such
constructions. But once this is allowed, iteration of this process leads to unacceptable results like
(1) and (2).
Linguists could, faced with examples like (1) and (2), posit more complicated grammatical
rules for English (e.g. constraints on the number of possible embeddings). However, this is not
what generativists do. Instead, they distinguish between grammaticality and acceptability. The dis-
tinction between grammaticality and acceptability, and more generally between competence and
performance, has been methodologically central to the generativist program since at least Chomsky
(1965).7 A sentence is acceptable when native speakers judge it so. Acceptability is thus a broadly
6For reasons of space, I am here restricting my attention to sentences which are generated by the proposed grammar
but not judged acceptable by native speakers. The opposite phenomenon, of sentences judged to be acceptable but not
generated by proposed grammars, is widespread as well. Examples of this sort include ‘linguistic illusions’ such
as “More people have been to Australia than I have” which seem at first hearing to be perfectly legitimate English
sentences, but for which, upon reflection, no coherent interpretation can be provided.
7Noam Chomsky (p.c.) has pointed out that the idea that certain varieties of behavior, physically similar to linguis-
tic behavior, can be excluded from linguistic theorizing was accepted by even the more empiricist-inclined structural-
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observational term. However, grammaticality is a theoretical term. That is, there is no character-
istic observable linguistic behavior indicative of grammaticality. A sentence is grammatical if and
only if it has a syntactic structure generatable by a speaker’s internalized linguistic competence.
This distinction is thus an instance of the distinction between competence, the structure of an un-
derlying capacity, and performance, the behavioral output of interaction between this and many
other cognitive systems. Acceptability is dependent, to some degree, on grammaticality, but on
numerous other properties of a speaker’s psychology as well. The generativist claims that their
goal is to describe competence (grammaticality) and not performance (acceptability). Thus, the
generativist can claim that (1) and (2) are indeed grammatical, just as their theory predicts. The
unacceptability of these expressions is then claimed to reflect limitations on performance, and so
does not provide a counterexample for a theory of competence.
1.3 Core and Periphery
Alongside the competence/performance distinction, generativists have also invoked the distinction
between language’s core and periphery.8 It is claimed that some aspects of the language system
(the core) are essential to it, while others are more or less optional (the periphery). The core
may include principles—universal constraints on natural languages—and parameters—principle-
schemas allowing for highly constrained variation (typically a selection between two options). The
periphery will include “borrowings, historical residues, inventions and so on, which we can hardly
expect to—and indeed would not want to—incorporate within a principled theory of [Universal
Grammar].” (ibid p. 8). The periphery, then, includes a wide variety of factors outside of the core
language faculty which may play a role in influencing linguistic behavior.
Peripheral elements of the language will be relatively unsystematic and idiosyncratic in com-
parison to the deep (and species-universal) properties of the core. The echo-questions mentioned
in the introduction provide a case in point. Consider the following paradigm:
ists who pre-dated the generative program. See Harris (2008) for discussion.
8This distinction dates back at least to Chomsky (1981) which is based on lectures given in 1979.
17
(3) Xian will buy a car.
(4) What will Xian buy?
(5) *Xian will buy what?
(4) is the interrogative form of (3), where the direct object is the element being questioned. The
basic story for how questions are formed says that (4) is formed on the basis of a structure like (3)
with a wh-expression in object position which is moved to the front of the sentence.9 The question
is: why in English do we ask this question with (4) rather than (5)? That is, why, given that we
are questioning the object of the verb ‘buy’, do we pronounce the wh-word at the beginning of the
sentence, rather than the end?
The standard way to explain this kind of ‘displacement’ in the generative program is in terms
of feature-driven movement.10 Some expressions are described as having certain kinds of ‘fea-
tures’, properties which call for a ‘valuation’ by other elements of the tree structures in which they
are found. Without this valuation, these expressions, and the trees in which they are found, are
uninterpretable. However, such valuation can only occur locally: elements of the tree that are too
far away cannot satisfy this constraint. For this reason, when a tree is generated in which such
features cannot be valued, it may be necessary to re-arrange some of the elements of the tree so
as to enable valuation to occur. A simplified underlying structure for sentence (4), prior to such
movement would be:
9I.e. “What1 will Xian buy [what1]?” I will use this convention of square brackets indicating the original location
of a moved element throughout this paper. Strikeout (e.g. ‘who’) will be used to indicate that this expression is not
pronounced.
10Generativist accounts which don’t make use of the machinery of features give alternative explanations. One
traditional picture claimed that wh-expressions are operators, and so may not serve as arguments of verbs. When an
operator is moved, it leaves behind a trace which is a suitable argument. So, on this account, movement serves to
ensure that each verb has the right number of arguments. For various reasons, contemporary Minimalist approaches
reject this picture. For concreteness, I will focus on the feature-driven account, but everything I say should apply
mutatis mutandis to alternative theories of displacement.
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CP
C’
IP
I’
VP
NP
what +Q
V
buy
will
NP
Xian
C +Q
SpecCP
Figure 1.2: Unchecked Features
This tree structure indicates that the underlying sentential clause is “Xian will buy what.” Two
facts matter for our purposes. Firstly, this sentential clause (IP) is attached to an unpronounced
complementizer (C). Because this is an interrogative structure, this complementizer is assumed to
contain an interrogative feature (+Q), which must be valued.11 Secondly, the wh-expression ‘what’
has an analogous feature, capable of valuing the +Q feature on the complementizer, but these fea-
tures are originally too far apart to achieve this. For this reason, this latter expression is moved:12
CP
C’
IP
I’
VP
NP
what +Q
V
buy
will
NP
Xian
C
will +Q
SpecCP
what +Q
Figure 1.3: Checking Features via Movement
11Think of C here as an unpronounced analog of ‘whether’. Unpronounced complementizers for declarative clauses
will be analogous to ‘that’, and will have non-interrogative (-Q) features.
12The expression indicating tense, ‘will’, is, for similar reasons, moved to the site of C. For simplicity, I shall not
discuss this for the purposes of this paper.
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After movement, ‘What’, originally generated lower-down in the tree than the subject ‘Xian’,
is now pronounced at the beginning of the sentence. ‘What’ has been attached to the top of
the tree, a position known as ‘SpecCP’ posited primarily as a host location (‘landing site’) for
moved elements like wh-expressions. By moving this expression into this higher location, it is
now close enough to the complementizer C that it can value the +Q feature, making the sentence
interpretable.13
By making these several assumptions (all sentential clauses are attached to Cs with illocution-
ary force features, these features require valuation for interpretation, etc.) generative grammars
are able to explain certain phenomena and account for surprising cross-linguistic regularities.14
However, such an account has prima facie counterexamples. Take sentence (5) for example. Ac-
cording to the proposal just given, this question should be uninterpretable. The explanation for
the displacement of ‘what’ in (4) relied on the assumption that the unvalued (+Q) feature of the
sentential complementizer is uninterpretable prior to this displacement. This displacement is moti-
vated solely to avoid this uninterpretability. But, assuming that (5) has exactly the structure of (4)
prior to displacement, (5) is predicted to be uninterpretable as well. But such questions are, in the
right discourse context, perfectly acceptable. These ‘echo-questions’ are acceptable in response to
examples like (3), to indicate either that the speaker didn’t hear the direct object or (perhaps) that
the direct object was surprising/inappropriate.
There are several kinds of response one can give to such apparent counterexamples. The sim-
plest is to accept that they are indeed counterexamples and thus to re-formulate the principles of our
core grammatical theory so as to avoid predicting that they are unacceptable. There are, however,
good reasons for not doing this. The grammatical principles that together make this seemingly bad
prediction play essential roles in a wide variety of linguistic explanations. Revising these rules
thus has important consequences across linguistic theory, oftentimes negative consequences. For
this reason, it is often preferable to retain the theories and deny that the observed phenomena are
genuine counterexamples. In order to see this, I will briefly look at some theoretical consequences
13See Chomsky (1995) for the details.
14See e.g. Bosˇkovic´ (1998) for an application of these proposals to account for differences between the grammar of
English and French questions.
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of revising these principles.
Sobin (1990) and Huddleston (1994) both claim that, despite appearances, echo-questions like
(5) are not necessarily interrogative, and instead inherit the C(omp)-feature (interrogative, impera-
tive, declarative etc.) from the utterances to which they are responsive. As sentence (3), to which
sentence (5) is an appropriate response, is a declarative sentence, on this account (5) is also. This
would mean that the unpronounced complementizer in sentence (5) does not have an interrogative
(+Q) feature. The feature-driven account of movement I have presented explains the movement in
(4) on the grounds that the +Q feature heading this sentence requires valuation. As, on this view,
there is no +Q feature present in (5), this theory would thus no longer predict that ‘what’ must
move in order to check this feature. So the wh-expression remaining in place is expected, and no
bad prediction is generated.15
However, this response comes at a cost. If (5) is not an interrogative, then it is a counterexample
to the ‘wh-criterion’.16 This criterion entails that wh-expressions (with a +Q feature) can only be
generated within interrogative clauses. Sentence (5), on the analysis just given, will thus be a
counterexample to this, as it is claimed that this sentence is non-interrogative despite its containing
15This would not explain the failure of movement in echo-questions that are interrogative, such as B’s response in
the following dialogue: A:“Will Xian buy a car?” B: “Will Xian buy what?”.
16See, for example, May (1985) (p.17) and Rizzi (1996). Note that such a principle also suggests that exclamatives
(“Maria will do what?!”) are syntactically interrogative.
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a wh-expression. This principle, however, does a lot of work in grammatical theory.17 If we reject
the wh-criterion, allowing for wh-expressions in the absence of interrogative complementizers as
we must if (5) is not interrogative, echo-questions are no longer problematic, but our explanations
for other sorts of grammatical phenomena are undermined, including of course the explanation for
why (5) is usually unacceptable.
Carnie (2013) (p. 382-3) gives an alternative account, according to which echo-questions in-
volve a sui generis complementizer, marked +INT (to indicate that wh-expressions within its com-
plement receive a special intonation), and the wh-expressions found in such questions do not have
their normal +Q feature. This +INT feature is does not require valuation, and so does not motivate
movement. This would avoid conflicting with the wh-criterion, as this rule applies only to wh-
expressions and complementizers which have their normal interrogative features. However, this
proposal suffers from a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it is clearly ad hoc. This complementizer is
introduced precisely and solely in order to account for these exceptional cases. This might be OK
if there were some independent predictions that such a posit could make, but there are reasons to
think this will not be the case.18 This means that as well as positing this extra complementizer, we
would need to introduce very specific constraints on when it is licensed in order to prevent over-
17Among other things, it explains the distribution of wh-expressions within attitude reports. For example, ‘believe’
and ‘wonder’ take only declarative and interrogative complements, respectively, as indicated by the explicit comple-
mentizers they may take:
(6) Abdul believes that Xian bought a car.
(7) *Abdul believes whether/if Xian bought a car.
(8) Abdul wonders whether/if Xian bought a car.
(9) *Abdul wonders that Xian bought a car.
These attitude verbs also differ in whether the complements they take may include pronounced wh-expressions:
(10) *Abdul believes who bought a car.
(11) Abdul wonders who bought a car.
The wh-criterion provides an explanation for this pattern: ‘wonder’ must combine with a clause featuring a +Q com-
plementizer, and thus this clause may include a wh-expression, while ‘believe’ cannot combine with such a clause,
and so its complements are prohibited from including wh-expressions. Two distinct distributional facts (about com-
plementizers and wh-expressions) can thus be subsumed under one generalization.
18It seems essential to the explanation that +INT complementizers may only occur in echo-questions. That echo-
questions can occur only in certain discourse situations is a datum in need of explanation. If these sentences, when
featuring this +INT complementizer, are perfectly grammatical, Carnie owes an explanation of why they cannot be
used discourse-initially.
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generation. Another worry is that there is no overt version of such a complementizer in English
(unlike +Q ‘whether/if’ and -Q ‘that’), or, as far as I know, any other language. If this comple-
mentizer were present in the grammar, we might expect to see it overtly somewhere. Relatedly, it
leaves unexplained why in English (and, as far as I know, every other language) these independent
lexical items (wh-expressions with and without a +Q feature) are pronounced in the same way.
These further facts about the strange distribution of these sui generis COMPs and wh-expressions
must themselves be explained.
Yet another proposal is that these examples do involve the normal movement of the embedded
wh-expression to the position at the beginning of the sentence (Spec-CP), but that this movement
is covert, occurring silently. On such a proposal, the difference between normal wh-questions and
echo-questions is just a matter of which copy of the wh-expression is pronounced. The underlying
structure of both expressions is the same, but in the former the higher copy of the expression is
pronounced, whereas in the latter the lower copy is. This would make the difference between these
expressions not one of syntax, but of the way that syntactic items are pronounced (or ‘spelled-out’).
This account is plausible, and fits more neatly into standard Minimalist theorizing. However, it is
insufficient in two ways. Firstly, it seems to amount simply to a stipulation that wh-expressions
are pronounced in one location in some contexts and at other locations in others, and so it leaves
the explanation for why this is the case open. It seems quite likely that such a rule will need to be
explained in the empiricist ways I will describe later on, in section 1.7. Secondly, it again provides
a counter-example to compelling linguistic generalizations. In this case, the Edge Condition on
Copy Deletion (Trinh (2011)) states that lower copies are deleted (i.e. unpronounced) when they
are the final expression of a phrase. In the case above, ‘what’ does end the embedded IP and
so is predicted to be deleted. Indeed, it is this prediction which allows us to make sense of the
usual (non-echo) wh-questions. Relaxing this rule would thus remove echo-questions as counter-
examples to our theories, but at the cost that the pronunciations of normal wh-questions are no
longer explained. As in the cases above then, we can provide theories which account for these
observations, but only at the cost of complicating our linguistic theories to the point that we lose
the ability to explain other phenomena.
Of course, these are not knock-down arguments, and there is much more that could be said
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about ways of accounting for echo-questions within the scope of generative grammar.19 Going
down all these paths would take me well away from the topic of this paper. The point of these
examples is just to show how the various explanations in syntax are entangled. Modifying the
theory to account for apparent counterexamples in one domain often undermines explanations in
others, and raises more questions than it purports to solve.
For this reason, it is often attractive, instead of coming up with a theory-internal account of
how these apparent anomalies arise, to simply exclude these phenomena from the scope of the
theory. The posits of generative grammar, such as the wh-criterion, the requirement that certain
features be valued, etc., describe the essential core of our linguistic capacities. However, learned
exceptions and relaxations of these core rules, such as the allowance of violations to mandatory
movement rules in certain specified discourse situations, can arise within the periphery. These
peripheral phenomena are thus outside of the scope of generative grammatical theory, a theory of
the linguistic core, and so cannot serve as counterexamples to these theories.20
1.4 The Galilean Style and its Critics
The strategy exemplified by these two case studies has recently been dubbed ‘The Galilean Style’.
For example, Chomsky (2002) says “[Galileo] was willing to say ‘Look, if the data refute the
theory, the data are probably wrong’.” (p. 98). The driving thought behind the Galilean style
is that the complex interactions responsible for observable phenomena preclude deep and general
theories from making accurate predictions of most data. Given the impossibility of achieving both
19There are also theorists who, in part due to such examples, reject mainstream generative theories entirely. Those
working within the framework of Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG), for example, reject the claim that
expressions (e.g. wh-expressions) move at all. Such theorists also typically view competence as a much broader
phenomenon, including context-sensitivity and appropriateness to discourse, than do those in mainstream generative
grammar. This means that the issue of echo-questions is viewed very differently. See Ginzburg & Sag (2000) for a
classic discussion, and Purver (2004) for a computational approach along these lines. Discussing the viability of this
alternative strategy would take me too far away from my goal of elucidating a move typical of mainstream generative
theory.
20I believe a wide range of more-or-less systematic linguistic phenomena fall into this class. One example is
certain semi-idiomatic uses of reflexives which occur without antecedents, as in “Politicians, such as yourself, ruin
everything” or “I hope to see Leela and yourself at the party.” Labov (1975) (p.107) describes another example of
American dialects which violate purported constraints on the distribution of ‘any’. Zwicky & Pullum (1987) suggest
a view akin to the one I am suggesting for dealing with unusual grammatical phenomena in expressive speech.
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explanatory depth and empirical adequacy, the aim is to capture one underlying system, which
plays a role in determining the observable behavior of the complex whole. Because this system will
be one of many factors contributing to the determination of observable behavior, it is to be expected
that there will be many features of this behavior that are not predictable from an understanding of
this particular system alone.21
The Galilean approach relies on both metaphysical and methodological assumptions. The
metaphysical assumption is that the underlying systems are relatively simple. But what is ob-
served is almost always an interaction effect of the operation of many different systems and so
it is typically very difficult to make good inferences from observed data to its causes (and vice
versa predictions from causes to effects). This is clearest in the case of language, where produced
utterances depend on the interaction of purely linguistic capacities (syntax, phonology, semantics),
broader psychological phenomena (memory, processing heuristics), speaker intentions, etc. For
this reason, generativist methodology proceeds largely by ignoring most of the observable data
and looking for phenomena which shed light more directly on the underlying capacities/systems of
interest. On the assumption that the observable data differentially reflect the workings of different
underlying mechanisms, with some being full-blown interaction effects but others being indicative
of the outputs of particular systems, it is thought that judicious selection of relevant data can shed
light on the underlying system of interest, the human language faculty, even though the influence
of this system on the observations is highly indirect in many cases.
The generativist tradition has long been moving in this direction, towards simple descriptions
of underlying systems. This has culminated in the Strong Minimalist Thesis (Chomsky (1995)):
that language is an optimal solution to the problem of mapping signs onto meanings. That is, the
grammatical principles of the human language faculty provide the computationally most efficient
means of mapping phonological representations onto semantic representations. In particular, the
language faculty consists of nothing but Merge, a binary structure-forming operation, which can
produce complex syntactic objects by combining simpler syntactic objects, provided that the result-
21Note that this is not equivalent to saying that the laws posited by generative linguistics hold only ceteris paribus.
The laws may themselves be perfectly strict, in their application to this underlying system. The observed behavior is
not covered by these laws, and thus cannot provide counterexamples.
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ing structure meets certain constraints of readability by the semantic and phonological interfaces
and that the processes involved are maximally computationally efficient. While the productions of
human language appear full of quirks and irregularities, these should not be seen to reflect under-
lying complexity in the language faculty, but instead to result from the interaction of this system
with all the others that are recruited in the production and interpretation of utterances, and from the
disparity between computational and communicational efficiency. Because the distance between
this faculty and behavior is so great, and the path from one to the other strewn with distorting in-
fluences, the hope is that surface complexity is consistent with deep simplicity. The difficulty with
this view is, as Chomsky notes, “All the phenomena of language appear to refute it.” (Chomsky &
McGilvray (2012) p. 124). As illustrated by the cases above, the simple rules posited appear to be
violated in a wide variety of different areas.
The various distinctions I have discussed, competence vs. performance, grammaticality vs.
acceptability, and core vs. periphery, play essential roles in justifying such simple descriptions.
Each of these distinctions aims to draw a line between the genuine target of linguistic theory and
various sorts of distorting influence. They provide space between theory and data: the theory
aims to describe competence and grammaticality, while performance and acceptability judgements
provide the data. Likewise descriptions of the core can be simplified in virtue of many of the
complexities of linguistic behavior being viewed as peripheral.
As a result of this gap between data and theory, this approach has often been viewed suspi-
ciously. Linguists, psychologists, and philosophers of quite different stripes have all argued that
the practice of ignoring apparently pertinent data undermines the empirical credentials of genera-
tive linguistics. For example:
• “It is now evident to many linguists that the primary purpose of the [competence/performance]
distinction has been to help the linguist exclude data which he finds inconvenient to handle.”
Labov (1971).
• “Since the actual linguistic conduct of any actual human language-user can be rendered
compatible with any generative grammar by a suitable invocation of ‘irrelevant performance
factors’, it becomes difficult to see how such a grammar could fail to be ‘descriptively ade-
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quate’ to a person’s ‘intrinsic competence’.” Rosenberg (1988).
• “The idea of performance masking competence is also pretty much unfalsifiable. Retreats to
this type of claim are common in declining scientific paradigms that lack a strong empirical
base.” Ibbotson & Tomasello (2016).
• “[Our] theory aspires to be accountable to all the facts, and not to be limited by a compe-
tence/performance or core/periphery distinction.” Jackendoff & Audring (2019).
Each of these quotes points to the same sort of worry: if linguistics is to be a genuine empirical
science, then it must be sensitive to observational data. But, it is argued, if the generativist is able
to decide post hoc which data count and which can be ignored, this attitude results in a kind of
confirmation bias.22 The data correctly predicted by generative theory are viewed as genuinely
relevant, while the problematic data can be dismissed as reflective of extra-linguistic influence
(performance factors, peripheral influence, etc.) and therefore outside the scope of linguistic the-
ory. The Galilean style, and the various distinctions it deploys, thus amounts to immunizing our
linguistic theories from the observational data in a way that tarnishes their empirical credentials.
If, it is argued, linguists are free to attribute any linguistic phenomena they observe to systems
other than the system they are trying to describe, it will always be open to them to treat apparent
counterexamples as irrelevant to their concerns. Successful predictions can be viewed as confirm-
ing their theories, while unsuccessful predictions can be viewed as irrelevant. The impossibility of
falsification of the generativist proposals that this practice enables results in the theory generally
being unscientific.23 In the next few sections, I shall argue that this objection is mistaken, and that,
if certain conditions are met, the Galilean style is a legitimate scientific strategy. Crucially, this
will involve placing important constraints on the conditions under which data can be dismissed as
outside of the scope of a theory.
22Nickerson (1998) provides a general discussion of confirmation bias: the tendency to look for or focus on evidence
favorable to one’s antecedently held views.
23Note that ‘falsifiability’ here needn’t be read in the strict sense according to which, due to the Quine-Duhem
thesis, no theories are falsifiable. The real objection, and thus the one I take the explanatory economy approach to
rebut, is that the various tools of the Galilean style create too great a distance between theory and data for proper
empirical evaluation.
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1.5 A Diagnosis
The problem that the Galilean style aims to solve is widespread in the sciences. It arises as a result
of tension between several widely accepted claims:
Unification: One aim of science is to uncover the ways in which apparently disparate phenomena
stem from the same sorts of processes.
Minimal Empiricism: Observations are the ultimate arbiter of the success of a scientific theory.
Complexity: Observable data are the products of the complex interaction of a number of interacting
mechanisms.
Unification (as discussed by Kitcher (1981)) is the view that one of the goals of a successful science
is to maximize the explanatory coverage of a theory while minimizing its theoretical posits.24 In
particular, explanatory depth is achieved by showing how multiple phenomena result from the
same underlying processes/principles. While I am skeptical that this could be the whole story
about scientific explanation, it does seem that such an impulse characterizes much of the history
of generative linguistics, among other disciplines, quite well.25 A recurring theme in the work of
Chomsky and those following him is that human language is far less diverse than it initially seems.
That is, that the underlying similarities between all the world’s languages are actually much more
significant than the prima facie differences. Especially within the current Minimalist Program,
generative grammar aims to show how much can be explained with very little.
Minimal Empiricism is the claim that ultimately, scientific knowledge must be grounded in
observation. Of course, exactly what it means to be ‘grounded in observation’ is a hugely fraught
24Strictly, Kitcher’s account focused on minimizing the argument patterns of a theory, not merely its theoretical
posits. However, as argument patterns are individuated partly by the non-logical terms used in their derivations,
increasing the number of theoretical posits necessarily increases the size of the explanatory store (the set of argument
patterns accepted as legitimate by the theory) and thus decreases unification. This is crucial for Kitcher’s solution to
certain problems raised with deductive accounts of explanation. For example, in order to show why explanations citing
irrelevant properties do not count as genuinely explanatory he assumes that explaining the dissolution of a sample of
salt in water with reference to its being hexed salt and with reference to its being salt use different explanatory patterns,
and that an explanatory store containing the former will necessarily be less unified than one containing the former.
25See Freidin & Vergnaud (2001) for a nice discussion of the role of unification in generative theory.
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issue, and there is no denying that the relation between confirmation and observation can be im-
mensely complex, but the driving intuition is that scientific theorizing must be responsive to our
observations. This claim has been central to all mainstream work in contemporary philosophy
of science. Even theories of scientific theory confirmation that stress the importance of factors
other than empirical adequacy (e.g. Kuhn (1962/2012) or Longino (1995)) retain a central role
for observational data. The standard picture affords these non-empirical virtues a role primarily in
adjudicating between theories which are empirically equivalent.
The puzzle arises by combining these two meta-theoretic claims about scientific inquiry with
Complexity. This is the claim that the observable data are typically the product of the interac-
tion of numerous underlying systems. The problem is that complex systems typically display
highly variable, context-sensitive behavior. In our case, despite allegedly having the same Uni-
versal Grammar, linguistic behavior varies significantly from population to population, and even
person to person. This creates a dilemma for linguists: unified theories are unlikely to capture this
variance, while empirically adequate theories are unlikely to be very unified.
The disagreement between generativists and the critics raised in the previous section stems
from different responses to this tension. Generativists typically, in line with the Galilean style,
seem to de-emphasize Minimal Empiricism, for the sake of Unification. By viewing only some of
the data as relevant, the empirical difficulties (i.e. anomalies) with unified proposals are minimized.
Opponents of the Galilean style, such as usage-based or construction grammarians (e.g. Goldberg
(2006) and Tomasello (2009)), instead hold Minimal Empiricism firm, and thus reduce the push for
unification.26 Such theorists are typically led to view language as a highly particularized aspect of
human culture, view linguistic diversity as deep-seated, and thus view the explanation of linguistic
phenomena, and their acquisition, as much more of a piecemeal project.27 The de-emphasizing of
Minimal Empiricism by the generativists is often viewed as leading them towards a purely formal
enterprise, rather than a genuinely empirical one.
26Perhaps the most extreme advocates of this position are those computational linguists heavily influenced by work
in Artificial Intelligence, such as Steven Abney, Christopher Manning, Peter Norvig, and Fernando Pereira. See e.g.
Manning (2003) for discussion.
27See Evans & Levinson (2009) for a clear statement of this position.
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1.6 The Explanatory Economy
In this section, I further explicate the notion of an explanatory economy and show how it can serve
to justify the Galilean style. By recognizing our linguistic theories as embedded in such an econ-
omy, we can adopt the Galilean style without rejecting or de-emphasizing Minimal Empiricism.
This approach thus dissolves the tension discussed in the previous section.
The thought, expressed in the quotes in section 1.4, that treating a datum as outside the scope
of one’s theory necessarily diminishes a theory’s empirical credentials stems, I believe, from an
over-emphasis on individualistic understandings of theory evaluation, and an under-emphasis on
collectivist understandings. An individualistic model of theory evaluation in the sciences treats
only those observations that a theory makes predictions about or provides explanations for as rele-
vant to confirmation. A collectivist model, however, also views the phenomena that a theory does
not cover as relevant to confirmation. In particular, if the phenomena claimed to be outside of the
scope of a theory are generally within the scope of another theory, compatible with the first, this
counts in favor of the former theory. In this way, the confirmation of one theory is dependent both
on the data it can cover and the data that other theories can cover.
No theory explains every observation. Even the best linguistic theory will tell us nothing about
why, say, storing bananas together reduces ripening time. However, some data seem prima facie
like a good linguistic theory would explain them. The distribution of wh-expressions in acceptable
English sentences seems like a prime case here. However, when a phenomenon of this sort is not
explained by linguistic theory, theorists have two options. Either they can modify the theory so as
to explain the phenomenon in question, or they can claim that our original intuition was incorrect
and that explanations of these phenomena are in fact outside of the scope of this theory.28 Moves of
this latter sort—of excluding some intuitively pertinent data as outside the scope of the theory—are
paradigmatic examples of incurring explanatory debts.
The status of observations that are claimed, contrary to our intuitions, to be outside the scope
of the theory (such as echo-questions) is not the same as that of observations that intuitively fall
28Fodor (1981) provides an early argument for the view that which data linguistic theory ought explain is itself an a
posteriori matter.
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outside the proprietary domain of a particular theory (such as the example involving bananas). In
the latter cases, there is no presumption that linguistic theory should provide explanations. How-
ever, in the former, there is such a presumption, and therefore excluding it from the purview of
one’s theory, i.e. incurring an explanatory debt, requires motivation. Linguistic theorizing begins
with some roughly identified collection of phenomena in need of an explanation. As theory devel-
ops, it becomes plausible to think that some of these data are better explained by other theories.29
Given that we’d like an explanation of our facility with echo-questions, if (generative) grammati-
cal theory is not going to provide such an explanation, some other theory, of something other than
core grammatical competence, had better be able to. This is the sense in which a debt is incurred.
Generative grammar’s immunity from the apparent counterexample provided by echo-questions is
bought at the cost of depending on some other approach to explain these phenomena.
Of course, the best reason to accept the view that some phenomenon need not be explained
by a particular theory is that it has in fact been explained by a distinct theory. In such a case I
will describe an explanatory debt as being discharged or paid. However, more frequently in actual
science, debts can be evaluated based on how likely they are to be discharged. Whether some
phenomenon is indeed profitably thought of as outside of the scope of a particular theory is itself
a question that scientists can assess. In some cases, this may seem quite plausible while in others
it may seem quite implausible. Cases can be made for the legitimacy of incurring some debt by
suggesting an area of inquiry in which it can be explained, suggesting a style of explanation along
these lines, and perhaps drawing analogies to other phenomena explained in this area, all before
this explanation has been provided.30
This collectivist approach thus provides a way of thinking about counterexamples unlike that
found in the main strand of theorizing about confirmation in philosophy of science. Rather than
indicating that the theory (or the auxiliary assumptions) must be modified, at least some counterex-
29It is also likely that data that initially seemed to be covered by another domain will be best explained by linguistic
theory. Purported examples of linguistic effects in broader cognition, such as the role of language in the development
of human Theory of Mind (see e.g. Astington & Jenkins (1999)), or in our ability to reason about mathematics or
space (see e.g. Spelke (2003)) may be examples of this.
30Very likely, the notion of ‘discharging’ a debt will be a gradable one, with debts being more or less fully discharged
by other theories. This is simply because the notion of explaining a phenomenon is similarly gradable.
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amples point to the need for a division of labour among theories.31
A proviso: I said earlier that for one theory to discharge the debts of another, these theories
must be compatible. Exactly what ‘compatibility’ here amounts to is vague. Of course, logical
consistency is required: it would do no good to defend a theory by showing that a logically in-
compatible theory is capable of explaining away the anomalies it raises. However, compatibility
in a more general sense is desirable. Very generally, two psychological theories are compatible if
they could both be true of the same cognitive system. In the cases I am focusing on, I believe an
assumption of compatibility is warranted by the fact that the two theories target distinct systems
(grammar and parsing systems in my first case study, and core and peripheral systems in my sec-
ond). I am most concerned that this condition rule out debts generated by one theory of a particular
target being discharged by distinct theories of that same target. For example, a grammatical theory
which posits only binary branching structures (e.g. Kayne (1994)) could not have any debts it in-
curred paid off by a rival theory of grammar which posits multiply branching trees (e.g. Culicover
& Jackendoff (2005)).
Beyond these ‘intra-discipline’ cases, it will typically be a difficult empirical question whether
two theories are compatible in this sense, and it is unlikely that there will be any general answers to
what compatibility requires. In some cases, there may be a clear line of inquiry that could answer
this question. For example, if two theories are of targets which interact with one another, we can
ask whether the proposed outputs of one system are ‘readable’ by the other: theories of a parser
and a grammar which output representations in completely unrelated formats are unlikely to be
true of the same system.32 But the further apart the systems are, the less we will be able to use
this heuristic: ultimately a theory of grammar may need to have its debts paid by a biophysical
theory, but as of now this provides very little in the way of guidance in determining whether
theories in these areas are compatible. Relatedly, it is often an empirical question whether two
31Note that my approach here is quite unlike that discussed under the heading ‘division of cognitive labour’. More
on these differences later.
32A further complication here is that there is a debate about the extent to which parsers utilize grammars in parsing,
or whether they utilize independent rules which produce structures broadly in-line with the rules of the grammar,
which may then be tested for grammaticality by the grammatical system. See for example Phillips (2004) and Stabler
(1991) for arguments that parsers utilize the rules of the grammar, and Ferreira & Patson (2007) and Townsend &
Bever (2001) for the opposite approach.
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theories should be viewed as competing or complementary accounts of the same phenomenon.
A famous example of this involves the debate about whether connectionist architectures should
be viewed as radical alternatives to symbolic systems (as e.g. Churchland (1996) has argued) or
implementations of these traditional systems (a` la Marcus (2001)). I take it that all of these debates
are essentially empirical issues, not suitable to a priori determination. If even the compatibility
of seemingly radically different architectures cannot be determined in advance, it seems unwise to
propose strong criteria for when theories of different cognitive domains are compatible.
Overall, the constraint that debts must be discharged by compatible theories is analogous to the
claim that successful explanations must have true premises: it is probably correct, but often will
not be of much help. We simply have to wait and see how the empirical work turns out before we
can determine whether this constraint has been met, except in the simplest of cases. Much more
could, and should, be said about the conditions under which two theories or models are compatible,
but I will leave this question here as this would take me too far afield.
There are at least two ways in which a theory can accrue a debt. Firstly, a debt is accrued when
some observation that intuitively falls within the scope of a theory is excluded from the purview
of this theory. Incurring such a debt is legitimate to the extent that another theory, compatible with
the original, is able to explain this observation. This is the case I focus on in responding to the
worries about the empirical status of generative linguistics. Secondly, a debt can be accrued by
making some assumption the truth of which is to be verified by some other theory. Incurring these
debts is legitimate to the extent that these other theories are able to provide this verification. In
section 1.9, I shall discuss such cases. In general, explanatory debts correspond to dependencies
between theories. When the success of one theory relies on the explanations of another, the first is
indebted to the second.
We can think of the confirmation of a theory as partially conditional on the set of explanatory
debts it has accrued. Thus, the more unpaid debts a theory has, the less likely it is to be correct,
but as these debts get discharged the plausibility of the theory increases. Debts will also vary in
magnitude: the accrual of some kinds of debts will put a theory in a highly precarious position and
ought thus motivate a serious effort to discharge them. On the other hand, some debts will seem
much less pressing. Just as in the case of determining how much we ought increase our confidence
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in a theory given a particular prediction/explanation, determining what makes a debt large or small
is highly impressionistic.33 In the same way that failed predictions that seemed relatively unim-
portant can eventually overturn a theory (as in the difficulties encountered explaining Mercury’s
perihelion progression by Newtonian mechanics), debts that initially seem relatively insignificant
can become highly important over time. This is just to say that judgments about the magnitude of
a debt are, like all scientific judgments, fallible.
That said, there are a few clues as to how seriously particular scientists should view the debts
their theories accrue:
Repeatability: When the same anomaly keeps arising, it is more in need of explanation. Given the
complexity and context-sensitivity of the targets of linguistics, there is always the possibility
that weird things might happen due to some unknown confluence of factors.34 However, when
the same weird thing happens in multiple different systems, or repeatedly over time in the
same system, this indicates a systematic phenomenon. As linguistic explanation involves citing
rules/generalizations, systematic phenomena are more plausibly within their purview than one-
off events. Showing that this systematic, but linguistically unexpected, phenomenon can be
explained by a distinct theory undercuts the possible need to modify our linguistic theories to
account for it.
Robustness: The magnitude of a debt is increased even further when the same kind of anomaly
arises in a wide variety of different circumstances.35 Even more strongly than repeatability, the
robustness of a phenomenon is an indication that it is systematic, and thus needs an explanation
of the sort that linguistic theory can provide. In addition, robust phenomena restrict the kinds
of explanations that can serve to discharge debts, as only systems that are uniform with respect
33Even the most widely accepted, and most successfully formalized, account of theory confirmation, Bayesianism,
is subject to certain fundamental difficulties, such as the problem of old evidence and the problem of the priors
(See Earman (1992), especially chapters 5 and 6, for discussion). It seems that fully precise accounts of scientific
justification and reasoning are liable to be perpetually stymied by the complexity of actual scientific practice. So,
while certain important features of the explanatory economy are relatively underspecified, and would benefit from
precisification, it seems likely that some degree of vagueness is irreducible.
34Wilson & Peters (1988) presents some amazing anomalies which seem to be of this kind.
35See Weisberg (2006).
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to the wide range of circumstances in which these observations have been made can be used to
explain these phenomena. For example, on the assumption that human linguistic environments
are less similar across agents than human biology is, species-universal properties are better
explained with reference to innate traits than acquisition. Linguistic universals, if there are any,
are thus suitable targets of a fairly narrow range of theories, and so if they are not explained by
a linguistic theory, the debt incurred will be quite substantial.
Entrenchment: Some of the properties of target systems are relevant to the explanation of a wide
range of observable phenomena, whereas others are relevant only to a few.36 Anomalies out
of step with the predictions of claims about these central systems are more critical than those
that suggest mistaken views about less entrenched phenomena. Entrenched properties rever-
berate throughout the system, and so mistakes in this area lead to theories that are not merely
inadequate but wrong-headed. Theorists must therefore be extra sensitive to any anomalous
predictions that stem from descriptions of entrenched systems/aspects. This makes debt col-
lection in this area particularly pressing. In linguistic theory, ‘architectural’ properties of the
grammar, such as the constraint that trees be binary branching, are relevant to all linguistic phe-
nomena, and so apparent difficulties with these properties will require more immediate solution
than more particularized issues relevant only to certain constructions.
Centrality: Theorists often view particular phenomena as particularly indicative of the system they
aim to understand. Failing to account for these phenomena creates a more pressing problem
for these theorists than failures to account for more peripheral phenomena.37
This list is of course very preliminary in both detail and range, and each factor is as vague as the
notion of debt magnitude it is intended to elucidate. I am sure there are more factors than just these
four that go into determining how serious a debt is, and much more must be said about each of
36See Wimsatt (2007b).
37Centrality is a particularly hazy notion, even more so than the others. However, I am confident that anyone who
studies scientific practice will recognize it. Some phenomena just feel like a theory in this area must account for
them, whereas others seem more marginal. Island constraints and binding principles had better be accounted for if a
linguistic theory is going to be worth its salt; heavy-NP shift and appositive relative clauses, perhaps less so.
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these four features. I mention them just to give a flavor for the kinds of factors I have in mind and
hopefully to spur future research.
In its non-extended sense, an economy consists of a system of producers and consumers. Con-
sumers have demands for certain kinds of resources, which can be supplied by the producers. The
complex structure of such a system, and the constituent members thereof, determine the distribu-
tion of these resources. Idealizing: we can treat scientific theories/programs/models as producers
of explanations.38 My claim is that traditional theories of confirmation have acted as if the suc-
cess of a particular program can be evaluated by viewing the product of this program alone, by
comparing the explanations produced with the data to be explained. However, this ignores the
interdependence of these producers. In the cases I am interested in, one producer ‘outsources’ the
production of a particular explanation to another. The assessment of the overall success of the
former program will thus depend on the success of the latter.39 Likewise, the success of the latter
program will be increased in virtue of its paying off the debt of the former. Not only does the pro-
duction of an explanation of this anomalous datum increase the predictive/explanatory coverage of
the theory, but it also shows how well this theory meshes with the others.
We can now revisit the diagnosis of the dispute between those who adopt the Galilean style
and those who reject it. I said above that the Galilean style involved de-emphasizing Minimal
Empiricism in favor of Unification. This can now be stated a little more precisely, by distinguishing
between local and global versions of Minimal Empiricism. The local version says that, for some
specified class of data, an empirically successful theory must be consistent with these data. For
example, an empirically successful grammatical theory must, among other things, successfully
predict the distributional facts about wh-expressions. From this perspective, generative grammar
38I have very little to say about the consumers in such a system, but these will include all those systems that make use
of scientific explanations, be they governments producing scientifically-informed policy, manufacturers of technology,
or members of the populace seeking knowledge. Kitcher (2011) provides an extended discussion of the demands of
such consumers.
39Terminological note: I realize that the ‘debt’ metaphor is slightly misleading, as the cases on which I focus are
all ones in which the debt incurred by one theory is paid off by another. Were it that the real economy worked in this
way. However, I believe this is a product of my focus, rather than the nature of the phenomenon itself. There is no
reason why a debt cannot by paid off by the theory that incurs the debt. This is just the normal case of a theory making
a bad prediction and then going on to resolve this issue. I focus on the case of debts being paid off by other theories
precisely because they are the less well understood case, but this should not suggest that this is the only case.
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is failing, as echo-questions provide counterexamples to its proposals. I believe the skepticism
about the empirical status of generative grammar is motivated by this local approach. However,
a global construal of Minimal Empiricism says instead that the data must be accounted for, but
doesn’t commit particular theories to accounting for any particular data. From this perspective, the
phenomenon of echo-questions (and unacceptable center-embeddings) must be explained by some
theory, but it need not be a theory of (core) grammar. The explanatory economy approach shows
how the Galilean Style is consistent with global, but not local, Minimal Empiricism. By excluding
data from the scope of generative grammar, the local version of this constraint is violated. But
by ensuring that some other theory accounts for these data, the global version is maintained. The
hope then is that a multitude of mechanisms/systems can be described in relatively simple and
general ways, enabling unifying explanations of particular phenomena, and that collectively these
can account for much of the data, although prior to actually producing such explanations it may be
difficult to discern which phenomena are to be explained by which theory.40
It is crucial here to note the differing roles that explanatory and predictive power play in eval-
uating theories.41 The aim of a theory within cognitive science is to explain the workings of
the mind and its role in behavior. Prediction, or consistency with the data more generally, pro-
vides guidance in determining which explanations are correct. For example, a linguistic theory
aims, among other things, to explain why speakers react differently to sentences like (4) and (5)
above. It does so by positing grammatical rules which make the former grammatical and the lat-
ter ungrammatical. However, this is not yet sufficient to predict behavior. Remember that it is
acceptability, not grammaticality, which is observed in linguistic judgments. On the assumption
that (un-)grammaticality leads to (un-)acceptability, these theories can then issue a prediction. It
is these predictions against which the theory is tested. However, when such a prediction fails, it
can be argued that this assumption is not met, and so the theory in fact makes no prediction at all.
40Johnson’s (2009) discussion of semantics suggests a similar picture, according to which semantic theory aims
not to account for all (or perhaps even any) observed data, but instead to provide one source of variance, which may
eventually be supplemented with other sources which can collectively account for all (or at least most) of the data.
41Of course, theories can be evaluated on many more dimensions than these, including how fruitful they are in
provoking novel and interesting ideas, how much they contribute to the production of societally beneficial technology,
etc. My aim here is to assess the purely epistemic arguments for or against generative linguistics, and so will restrict
my attention to explanation and prediction for the purposes of this paper.
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Explanatory debts function to differentiate apparent anomalies, in which no genuine prediction is
made, from genuine counter-examples, in which a prediction fails.42
One potentially counter-intuitive feature of the view here developed is that the unification of
a theory is increased by allocating observations to the explanatory purview of another theory.
This seems like it would decrease the unification of the theory, in that it decreases the theory’s
explanatory scope. And indeed, on Kitcher’s account, unification is increased by increasing the
set of observations a theory can account for. However, this is not the only thing that matters for
unification: the unification of a theory is likewise increased by reducing the number of explanatory
patterns needed for these explanations. The explanatory economy is a response to the fact that
these two criteria trade off against one another: in many cases, greater explanatory coverage is
made available only by increasing the set of explanatory patterns. In the cases described above,
one could modify the grammar so as to explain the recalcitrant phenomena (e.g. by adding rules
constraining center-embeddings), but to do so, one would have to add to the explanatory store and
thereby reduce the unifying power of the theory. The lesson of the explanatory economy is that it
is often better to develop multiple theories, each of which requires very few explanatory patterns,
capable of collectively explaining the observations, than to propose a single theory with a very large
explanatory store. This is again a reflection of the distinction between individualist and collectivist
accounts of theory confirmation. One primary motivation for this collectivist approach is the power
it provides in limiting redundancy. When solely focusing on a particular theory, it may be unclear
whether we are better off complicating the theory to increase its explanatory scope or keeping it
simple and excluding some observations from its purview. However, when we expand our focus so
as to include the successes of other theories, decisive answers to these questions can be given. If
the addition of an explanatory pattern to our theory enables us to explain certain observations, but
these observations are already explained by a distinct, compatible, theory, then we have reduced
the unification of our theory for no real gain. In the case discussed in the next section, modifying
42This is related to the claim in Cummins (2000), that the central task of cognitive science is not to capture the
behavior of an organism (by detailing various ‘effects’, such as the McGurk effect), but to provide broadly mechanistic
explanations of why these behavioral patterns are observed. Note also that the separation between what a theory
explains and what it predicts, due to the number of extra-theoretical assumptions needed for the latter, is familiar in
other special sciences, especially evolutionary theory. See e.g. Scriven (1959) and Sober (1984).
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our grammatical rules so as to explain the unacceptability of multiply center-embedded sentences
may superficially seem to increase the explanatory power of our grammatical theory, but given that
a parsing theory is able to account for this phenomenon anyway, collectively our theorizing is no
better off. This explanatory redundancy is avoided by keeping our theories’ explanatory scopes
restricted and disjoint, enabling sparser explanatory stores. In this way, I view Kitcher’s account
as closely related to that of Chomsky (2002), who argues that explanatory power is purchased by
showing how multiple distinct phenomena can be accounted for by a single mechanism.
While I take the explanatory economy to provide a defense of the generativist methodology,
it will require some re-evaluations of their strategies. Generativists tend to be fairly blase´ about
ignoring counterexamples. Cooper (1983/2013)’s claim (p. 149), in a classic textbook, that “Ac-
counting for echo-questions with the grammatical rules for questions would, I think, make it very
difficult to give a general account of questions.” is, I believe, fairly representative of the view of
many mainstream generative linguists. It may be true that modifying one’s syntactic theory so as to
account for echo-questions would indeed be unprofitable. A grammar which specified, as well as
the rules needed to explain mandatory wh-raising, all the ways in which certain discourses license
violations of these constraints would likely be too complex and specific to be illuminating. But,
this does not mean that such data can be totally ignored. The distribution of wh-expressions, unlike
the ripening rate of bananas, intuitively fits squarely within the purview of syntactic theory. If these
apparent deviations from the syntax of the language faculty cannot be explained by some other the-
ory/discipline, then the debt remains unpaid and generative theories must face the possibility that
this is a genuine counterexample. Generativists must therefore be attentive to those theories that
are applicable to other aspects of the complex system responsible for linguistic production as they
are explanatorily indebted to such approaches.
I thus take the explanatory economy picture to be partially descriptive and partially prescrip-
tive. Those in the generativist tradition do sometimes follow this methodology. That is, they
exclude some phenomena from the purview of their theory (as reflecting the influence of perfor-
mance systems or the periphery) and then go on to give reasons why these phenomena are plausi-
bly explained by theories of systems outside of the scope of linguistic theory. The discussion of
center-embeddings in the next section provides a particularly clear example of this. However, they
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sometimes shirk this duty and wield the competence/performance and core/periphery distinctions
without giving due care to whether the debts they thereby incur are likely to be discharged. In
such cases they are not following the strictures of the explanatory economy and so the charge that
they are simply immunizing their theory from apparently inconvenient data may be warranted. If
I am right, utilizing such distinctions is legitimate only when there is at least a prospect of such
alternative explanation, and it behooves generativists to establish that this is the case.
According to this picture, then, we can find a path between the hyper-sensitivity to data charac-
teristic of Popper or the Logical Empiricists, which precludes the proper development of theories,
and the hyper-insensitivity suggested by simple characterizations of the Galilean style. On my
account, all of the data are relevant, and must be accounted for.43 This global Minimal Empiricism
establishes enough of a connection to the data to rebut worries about being unscientific. But which
data are accounted for by which theory is an open question. This supplies the space between data
and theory necessary to allow deep and unifying explanatory theories to develop. Such a picture is
necessary when attempting to theorize about complex systems with multiple interacting subcom-
ponents responsible for the observable phenomena.
1.7 The Explanatory Economy at Work
Let us now see how we can apply this methodology to the case studies described earlier. It was
claimed that multiple center-embeddings were grammatical despite being unacceptable. The worry
was that this claim amounted to little more than stipulating a gap between observation and theory,
insulating our theory from the observations in a way inconsistent with the Minimal Empiricist
constraint. The explanatory economy strategy claims instead that excluding data from the purview
of our theory amounts to claiming that they are in the purview of some other theory, to which we
are now indebted. If some other theory, of a different target, is capable of explaining these data,
then this exclusion of this observation from the domain of observations for which grammatical
43Although, within certain bounds, some anomalous data (genuine noise) will remain unexplained. Crain & Thorn-
ton (2000), for example, suggest the heuristic that up to 10% of the data can be discounted as ‘noise’, while anything
greater than that which conflicts with a theory’s predictions must be accounted for by identifying the source of error
(p. 45).
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theory is responsible is legitimized. In this case, just such an explanation is available.
Miller & Chomsky (1963) provide a computational/mathematical explanation for the difficulty
generated by parsing multiple center-embeddings. To see how this explanation works, imagine
a machine which aims to determine, for a given sentence, which arguments (e.g. NPs) are as-
signed to which verbs. Such a machine, when presented with a sentence, moves from left-to-right,
identifying each word and its part of speech. When an argument is identified, a ‘file’ is opened,
only to be closed when the relevant verb has been identified, and the former assigned to the lat-
ter. In sentences like (1) and (2), when the first NP has been identified, it cannot be assigned
to the main verb until it reaches the end of the sentence. Along the way, it identifies two more
arguments, and so must open three files simultaneously. This creates too great a burden on the
memory of the device, and so the sentence cannot be parsed correctly. In shorter (e.g. “The mouse
the cat chased squeaked.”) or right-embedded sentences (e.g. “The cat chased the mouse which
squeaked.”) the arguments can be assigned to their verbs without placing this burden on memory,
and so they are interpretable. The constraints on this model (finite memory, left-to-right parsing,
etc.) are plausibly properties of the human parsing system. If the human parsing system in fact has
these properties, this explains why humans find interpreting center-embedded sentences difficult,
and it does so without claiming that center-embeddings are ungrammatical.44 Of course, it is an
empirical claim that human parsers work in these kinds of ways. In the unlikely event that it turns
out that they do not, the status of the debt created for the grammar by center-embeddings may need
to be re-evaluated.
This example shows the explanatory economy at work. A theory was proposed, but it seemed
to face counterexamples. Modifying the theory so as to avoid these counterexamples seemed
theoretically undesirable, and so the data were excluded from the purview of the theory. From
one perspective, this may seem to be a bad result: reducing the scope of a theory so as to avoid
counterexamples is supposed to be exactly what degenerating research programmes do.45 However,
44A parser is a system that takes as input a physical token, say a sound, and outputs a structural representation. So
for a sentence to be acceptable, the parser must be able to assign a structure to it. A grammar, on the other hand,
determines which structural representations are grammatical and which are not.
45See Lakatos (1976).
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this perspective stems from an overly individualistic view of confirmation. From a collectivist
perspective, this move increased the explanatory power of cognitive science overall, as it led to
the creation of a model, of a distinct aspect of the overall cognitive system, which explained the
phenomenon in question and thereby showed why a grammatical model should not be expected to
predict this sort of behavior.
The competence/performance distinction (and by extension the grammaticality/acceptability
distinction) has often been maligned by those outside of the generative tradition—as seen in the
quotes in section 1.4—as making the theory unfalsifiable. If, it is argued, any apparent counterex-
amples can be simply dismissed as performance effects, outside of the scope of the theory, then
the theory’s credentials as genuinely empirical are reduced. The explanatory economy account
shows why this worry is mistaken. By classifying a phenomenon as a mere performance datum,
generativists incur a debt, but this debt can be discharged by looking at nearby disciplines, as in
the explanation just discussed. Rejecting a counterexample as a performance effect, and thus in-
curring an explanatory debt, insulates theory from data only if this counterexample is also viewed
as outside the scope of theories of the performance systems. If this datum is plausibly explica-
ble by some other theory, and the proposed explanations of this datum by these other theories are
themselves empirically testable, then the unfalsifiability worry misses the mark.
It is interesting to note that this early recognition that these debts should be paid seems to be
in conflict with some of the recent statements of the Galilean style. For example, in his opening
remarks to Piattelli-Palmarini et al. (2009), Chomsky describes this style: “You just see that some
ideas simply look right, and then you sort of put aside the data that refute them.” (p. 36). My
argument is that the early methodological stance towards anomalies is entirely correct, and that
simply ‘putting aside’ these inconvenient data, rather than investigating ways that alternative ap-
proaches may handle them, prevents generative approaches from maximizing their confirmation
by appropriately assigning, and ultimately discharging, explanatory debts.
While generativists generally accept something like the explanatory economy picture when it
comes to the competence/performance distinction, this attitude is less frequently seen in discus-
sions of the core and the periphery. However, a justification for this categorization is likewise
needed, lest it reduce to an ad hoc immunization of theory from data. Here again the notion of
42
explanatory debts is useful. In treating echo-questions, for example, as outside of the scope of gen-
erative theory (of the linguistic core), these theorists incur a debt. If no other theory or discipline
is able to account for our ability to use echo-questions as we do, then they may be re-considered
as counterexamples to such proposals. But they may be at least temporarily discounted without
either falsifying or undermining the empirical credentials of generative theory in the hopes of some
future analysis. In this case, the situation isn’t as good for the generativist as in the example of
center-embedding. This debt has not yet, to my knowledge, been paid. But there are reasons to
think that the incurring of this debt is reasonable, in that it is likely to be payable.
There are a variety of ways such debt-collection could go. One promising source for expla-
nations of apparent counterexamples of this sort are usage-based or construction-grammar ap-
proaches.46 For our purposes, what is interesting about these approaches is that they are ‘periphery-
first’. That is, they take the aspects of language deemed peripheral by generative grammar as the
basic building blocks of language. The paradigmatic peripheral properties of a language are found
in the lexicon. While grammatical principles/parameters may be universal and innate, which words
are used is clearly neither. Chomsky (1995) goes so far as to define the lexicon as ‘a list of excep-
tions’ (p. 235). Construction grammarians, unlike generativists, view the acquisition of syntax and
of lexical items as exemplifying the same mechanisms. Learning a language involves recognizing
meaning-form correspondences of various types: first words and then larger constructions are ac-
quired via a process of generalization and abstraction. For example, through exposure to sentences
like ‘I run’ and ‘you run’, the child can learn that uttering ‘NP run’ is a way of conveying that
some object runs. Combining this with their knowledge (acquired analogously) that ‘NP walks’
is a way of expressing that some object walks, they generalize to the knowledge that ‘NP Vs’ is
a way of expressing that some object performs some action, and so on for more complex exam-
ples. These complex constructions are then stored in the same way that more traditional simple
lexical items are. In this way, linguistic competence in general can be viewed as the acquisition
of more-or-less concrete form-meaning pairs, the more abstract of which provide the basis for the
construction of novel expressions. From this perspective, the fact that the periphery is not merely a
46I will use these terms interchangeably in what follows. For paradigmatic examples, see Goldberg (2006) and
Tomasello (2009).
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list of exceptions, but in fact includes significant amounts of its own structure, is taken as central.
Perhaps the most effective explanations in such a tradition involve precisely the cases in which
the apparent violation of linguistic rules does not lead to unacceptability. For example, it appears
that learning the adicity, or argument structure, of various lexical items is one of the central tasks
of acquiring a language. Such knowledge explains why speakers treat sentences with the wrong
number of arguments (e.g. *“Mikhail sneezed Bill”) as unacceptable. However, in certain cases,
these rules can be violated. Consider “Mikhail sneezed his tooth across the room” (see Goldberg
(2006)) or “Mikhail sneezed his way through the meeting” (see Jackendoff (1992, 2010)). In such
cases, it is argued that prior exposure to expressions with these structures (“NP V NP PP” and
“NP1 V NP1’s way through NP2” respectively) gives learners the knowledge that such construc-
tions are legitimate, even when the verb that features within them cannot normally be used with
these additional arguments. In this way, the acquisition of information about complex linguistic
expressions (constructions) enables speakers to over-ride other rules/constraints that form part of
their linguistic competence.
Defenders of these approaches are typically ambitious in viewing them as sufficient to account
for our linguistic capacities. They typically run a slippery-slope argument aimed to show that the
abstract and innate grammar of the generativists is not needed, as the mechanisms by which the
periphery is acquired are sufficient to account for the grammatical knowledge traditionally located
in the core.47 Once the need to attribute significant amounts of structure to the periphery is ad-
mitted, it is argued that all linguistic structure can be accounted for in the same way. However,
I believe the methods they propose should be thought of as only part of the story about language
acquisition. In particular these processes of abstraction and generalization can be taken to be the
mechanism by which peripheral phenomena and exceptions to core rules can be learned, thus pro-
viding a way of discharging the explanatory debts of the generativist. That is, I believe we should
view the periphery and the core as both containing structure, but that these respective structures
are acquired and utilized in quite different ways. Innate constraints on acquirable grammars—as
described by the generativists—are found in the core, while linguistic patterns abstracted from the
47See e.g. Tomasello (2009) and Jackendoff (2018).
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environment—as described by construction grammarians—are found in the periphery.
From the earliest days, generative linguistics was concerned with the puzzle of how a child
can acquire a language given only the evidence made available by parents and peers in the child’s
environment. This problem is made acute by the poverty of the stimulus. The evidence available to
the learner seems to characteristically under-determine the acquired grammar. For example, adult
speakers have clear intuitions about the grammaticality of expressions which are almost never
found in the learning environment, such as parasitic gaps.48 To account for this fact, the gram-
matical principles responsible for such phenomena are posited to be innately given. If children are
born knowing the facts about grammar which determine when gaps are and are not licensed, then
there is no need for them to learn this from the available evidence, and thus no worry about the
sparsity of such evidence.49 This poses a deep problem for construction/usage-based approaches,
which view all language acquisition as extrapolation from observed environmental patterns. If the
apparent constraints on the acceptability of certain expressions are typically absent from the lin-
guistic environment of the learner, it seems that the acquisition mechanisms of these approaches
are insufficient. I do not believe these approaches have adequately countered such arguments, and
thus an adequate theory of language acquisition must include at least some reference to the innate
core.50
This suggests a relatively neat division of labour between generativists and other kinds of syn-
tactic theorists. Classical generativist arguments involving poverty of the stimulus and unification
(of disparate constructions and languages) can delimit a class of phenomena (the core) to which
generativist theories are centrally responsive. If a phenomenon is present in developed compe-
tence, despite being absent from the learning environment, then it must be at least partly a product
48Parasitic gap constructions are sentences in which an expression pronounced at one location is interpreted at
multiple other locations at which it is not pronounced and for which the (phonologically null) occurrence at one of
these other locations is licensed only when the expression also occurs unpronounced in the other. For example “Which
books did you read [which books] and tell your friends about [which books]?” vs. *“Which books did you read
[which books] and tell your friends about movies?”. Such sentences are almost never attested in adult corpora, let
alone child-directed corpora. But nonetheless, competent speakers have fairly robust intuitions about the subtle and
surprising patterns of acceptability they exemplify. See Engdahl (1983) for a classical discussion of these phenomena.
49For an excellent survey of such arguments, see Crain & Pietroski (2001).
50Much more on the notion of innateness in the next chapter.
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of the learner’s innate endowment. This makes alternative (non-generativist) explanation implau-
sible, and so such phenomena are not suitable for the invocation of an explanatory debt on behalf
of generative grammar. However, to the extent that the acquisition of linguistic phenomena seems
to be explicable via extrapolation from the learner’s environmental linguistic data, they may be
suitable targets of explanatory debts. Usage-based theorists have complex and subtle models of
acquisition via abstraction and generalization, and so a divide-and-conquer approach seems vi-
able. These alternative approaches can thus be seen as necessary benefactors of the generativist
project, underwriting the latter’s debts and showing how the Galilean style, with its focus on gen-
eral, unified explanations, is consistent with (global) Minimal Empiricism. The proposals of the
generativist can be viewed as describing the universal features of the language faculty, while em-
piricist models provide explanations for the quirks and irregularities that seem to pose empirical
problems for these general proposals. This division, between the universal and unlearned core,
and the variable and environmentally dependent periphery, provides a further guideline, specific to
linguistic theory, for determining which explanatory debts are legitimately incurred, in addition to
the very general heuristics discussed in section 1.6.
Echo-questions seem particularly amenable to a usage-based theory of acquisition. These theo-
ries focus on general, i.e. not language-specific, features of human cognition in their explanations
of acquisition phenomena. In particular, they highlight humans’ unique capacities for socializ-
ing and social reasoning, such as their unusually high capacity and desire to enter into episodes
of joint attention and their extreme ability to read the intentions of others.51 This makes for a
‘pragmatics-first’ approach to language acquisition: expressions are acquired based on mecha-
nisms for grasping what was intended by their usage. This creates puzzles about the acquisition
of structures which seem removed from pragmatic motivations, such as the constraints on para-
sitic gaps mentioned above, where there seem to be perfectly clear messages that someone could
intend to convey but these readings are unavailable. However, this approach is well-suited for the
acquisition of constructions which serve a clear pragmatic role. Echo-questions seem to fit this bill
nicely. These questions are acceptable only in certain specific discourse situations. In particular,
they are acceptable only in response to an (immediately) previous assertion, and they serve only
51See e.g. Tomasello et al. (2005).
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to question some aspect of this assertion.52 For example, take sentence (5) above (“Xian will buy
what?”). This sentence is acceptable only in response to an assertion like sentence (3) (“Xian will
buy a car.”) and is used to convey that either the asker did not hear what it was that Xian was going
to buy, or that what Xian was going to buy was in some way inappropriate. That such expressions
are used always in the same discourse role, and with broadly the same speaker intentions makes
them particularly suitable for a theory of acquisition based on intention-reading. To my knowl-
edge, there has not been a usage/construction-based account of echo-questions along these lines,
but it seems particularly plausible.53
Crucially, the claim that echo-questions are a peripheral phenomenon, to be explained by some-
thing like the usage-based theory of language acquisition, is empirically testable. In this way, the
generativist who incurs a debt here is not simply ending inquiry by rejecting an apparent coun-
terexample, but is instead proposing further avenues for research. For example, if echo-questions
are indeed peripheral phenomena, learned exceptions to the core rules of wh-movement, then they
must be learnable from the environment. Usage-based theories are empiricist in that they view
acquisition as a process of extraction of information from environmental patterns. This means that
these models can only explain the acquisition of a certain subset of linguistic phenomena: those
for which there is a suitable inductive base in the learner’s linguistic environment. So, to see if
this debt is dischargeable, we could look at something like the CHILDES corpus of child-directed
speech, and see how frequently we find echo-questions. If these are common, and occur in a variety
of forms, it is plausible that children learn how to violate innate rules of wh-movement by hearing
52I am oversimplifying slightly here. The actual range of discourse situations which license such questions is
complex and seems to include, as well as situations in which the queried claim has been uttered, situations in which
the queried claim has been made salient through other means. For example, A: “My mother and brother graduated
from Harvard.” B: “And your father graduated from WHERE?”. This complexity should not matter for my purposes,
and I shall ignore it for the remainder of the paper.
53Keep in mind that this is just one plausible story. There are others, such as Karmiloff-Smith (1995)’s theory of
representational redescription, according to which certain structures begin as informationally inaccessible subroutines
of a system, but are ‘redescribed’ so as to be available as representational objects of computational systems which
can then manipulate them. Theorists in the HPSG tradition, discussed in fn. 19, also have provided explanations
for such phenomena. However, these are less amenable to collaboration with generativist models, as they provide an
entirely novel syntactic framework. Yet another alternative is that echo-questions are an extension of certain kinds of
primitive mimicry capacities. It is, of course, an empirical question which such approach ultimately provides the best
account for this phenomenon. The point is just that such approaches are available and may potentially discharge the
generativists’ debts.
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others do so. However, if we find that echo-questions are infrequent in child-directed speech, the
claim that they are learned exceptions is made highly unlikely. That is, if there is a poverty of the
stimulus for echo-questions, then they must be located in the innate core, and generativists may
indeed have to revise their core grammatical theories to handle them. This is all, of course, quite
sketchy, but hopefully it shows how the explanatory economy can further inquiry by showing how
to determine which observations are to be handled by which theory.
Some such story must, for the core/periphery distinction to be consistent with Minimal Empiri-
cism, be in place. When behavioral outputs are prima facie inconsistent with the rules that purport
to govern the workings of the language faculty, there must, in order for the generativist theory to
remain empirically viable, be some other system responsible for these deviations. My claim is that
the empirical status of generative linguistics depends on an understanding, at least in broad outline,
of such mechanisms and systems. This intermediate position thus finds space between those, like
the usage-based theorists, who claim that the core/periphery distinction is unreal and appeals to it
are unscientific, and generativists in certain moods who deny the importance of these alternative
approaches to languages. These approaches need not be seen as rivals, but instead as targeting
different aspects of the complex system responsible for human language.
This novel view of linguistic theory, as dependent on the combination of generativist theories of
the innately-specified core and usage-based theories of the learned periphery, has, I believe, been
neglected due to too much emphasis on the individualistic model of confirmation. When these
theories are put forward, they are typically viewed as competitors: one must accurately describe the
human capacity for language to the exclusion of the other. This leads to argumentative stalemates,
as poverty of the stimulus arguments seem insurmountable for the usage-based approach, while
the large amount of data outside of the scope of the relatively sparse generativist theories seems
to provide empirical refutation of these theories. However, the collectivist, explanatory economy
approach can make perfect sense of this. Both of these theories are important, and they have
complementary domains of coverage. Each is needed to fill in the holes left by the other.
Hopefully this discussion has shown how fruitful the explanatory economy approach can be.
Superficially, the competence/performance and core/periphery distinctions seem to proliferate the
ways in which apparently relevant data are dismissible, thus making the theories utilizing them
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seem immune to counterexample. However, the explanatory economy approach systematizes these
distinctions, showing how they involve the creation of explanatory debts. As long as the payment
of these debts is taken seriously, the connection between theory and data, i.e. Minimal Empiricism,
can be maintained.
1.8 Horizontal and Vertical Dependencies
The kind of explanatory pluralism for which I am advocating here is a kind of ‘horizontal’ ana-
logue of the widely accepted division of labor in cognitive science between different levels of
explanation. The most famous example of this comes from Marr (1982). Marr argued that psy-
chology makes progress by explaining behavior at three different levels: the computational, algo-
rithmic, and implementational levels. At the highest, computational, level it is specified what the
psychological system is supposed to do. In particular, specifying this level involves determining
the function-in-extension of the system—its mapping of system inputs to system outputs— and
showing why, with reference to environmental regularities, computing such a function benefits the
system (e.g. by showing that, under certain circumstances, computing a particular mapping from
retinal stimulation to representations of edges tracks the relation between projected environmental
light intensities and objectual edges).54 At the intermediate, algorithmic, level this function-in-
extension is specified as a function-in-intension: this makes explicit the stepwise, algorithmic,
process by which the function-in-extension is computed via a series of operations applied to a
specified class of representations. Finally, at the lowest, implementational level it is specified how
this algorithm is instantiated in a physical (e.g. neurobiological) system.55
This approach to cognitive science involves a distribution of observations to be explained and
54As this makes clear, the computational level combines two different kinds of question to be answered: what does
the system do, and why does it do this. See e.g. Shagrir (2010) for a nice discussion of this point. I will largely be
focusing on the what-questions, aimed at specifying the task that the system performs.
55Newell (1982)’s Knowledge Level and Anderson (2013)’s Rational Level are akin to Marr’s computational level,
in being the locus for high-level descriptions of the task being performed, with more detailed accounts of precisely
how these tasks are implemented occurring at lower levels. I will focus on Marr’s approach, as these alternatives are
best suited for accounts of the behavior of whole organisms, whereas Marr’s account is developed precisely to account
for the behavior of subsystems. But what I say about Marr’s account should be applicable mutatis mutandis to these
alternative approaches.
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questions to be asked, just as do the examples of the explanatory economy I have described. For
example, in the linguistic case, a generative grammar provides a computational level description of
human linguistic competence.56 This is suitable for explaining which sentences are or are not part
of a given language. However, psycholinguistic data, such as measurements of the time it takes for
a subject to determine whether a sentence is well-formed or not, do not typically bear directly on
the questions at this level. Instead, such observations can be explained at lower levels. Likewise,
neurolinguistic data, such as the observation that a certain event-related potential is correlated with
certain linguistic properties most plausibly bears on questions about the implementational level.
The examples I have focused on have all involved the collaboration of psychological theories
at the same, computational, level: theories of linguistic competence having their debts paid by the-
ories of memory or parsing likewise stated at the computational level. The Marrian understanding
of cognitive science, however, points to the possibility also of ‘vertical’ debt collection: theories
stated at one level discharging debts accrued at another. Marr’s theory is most suited for under-
standing the second kind of explanatory debt, incurred when one theory relies on a claim that must
be verified by another theory. When we explain some observation with reference to a computa-
tional theory, we claim that certain computations are implemented in a human brain. That this is
so must, ultimately, be established by theories at the algorithmic and implementational level. It
is basically a presupposition of contemporary cognitive science that such theories can eventually
be provided, and so these debts are not usually viewed as particularly damaging to computational
level theories. Cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to discharge these sorts of debts.
The more interesting question is whether there are cases of vertical debt collection of the other
sort, wherein apparent exceptions to theories at one level are explained away by theories at another.
Perhaps surprisingly, according to a strict interpretation of Marr’s theory, they are not. The reason
is that Marr’s theory posits a strict alignment of levels, so that the behavior (input-output mapping)
is the same at each level. Describing the levels involves asking questions about the same system,
56Actually, fitting generativist theory into a Marrian framework is a little tricky. Generative grammars seem to
inhabit a space somewhere between Marr’s computational and algorithmic level. They do not merely specify which
expressions are grammatical and which are not (i.e. a function in extension), but specify the rules by which grammat-
ical expressions are formed. However, these rules do not determine an algorithm for performing this computation. I
will continue to speak of these theories as computational level theories, but keep in mind that they are slightly more
detailed than is typical for theories at this level.
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but at different scales, with reference to different properties, and with different purposes. This
means that if some observation seems to be anomalous from the perspective of the computational
level, it will likewise be anomalous from the lower levels, which simply show how the higher-
level function is computed. For example, if we answer the what (as opposed to the why) question
posed at the computational level by proposing some function from, say, retinal stimulation to
representation of object edges, any perceived deviation from this function (e.g. a retinal stimulation
that leads to the ‘wrong’ edge representation) cannot be explained with reference to the algorithmic
or implementational level. The reason for this is that these levels provide answers to questions
about the function computed at the computational level, such as ‘what are the representations used
by the system in computing this function?’, ‘what steps does the computing of this function take?’,
and ‘how is this algorithm implemented by a neurobiological system?’. That is, the questions
asked at this level presuppose the correctness of the computational-level description. Thus, on this
strict interpretation, deviations from the predicted input-output pattern necessitate revisions to the
answers to questions at all levels equally, and so anomalies at one level can’t be explained with
reference to another.
However, as Marr recognized, this strict interpretation is not quite accurate to scientific prac-
tice. In fact, the assumption that the levels are perfectly aligned is an idealization: a certain amount
of divergence between levels is permissible. In particular, lower-down levels may well merely ap-
proximate the behavior of those higher up. This is clearest in the case of the implementational
level at which the stochastic and analog behavior of neurobiology approximates the behavior at the
algorithmic level, which is often viewed as both deterministic and discrete. Certain kinds of per-
formance limitations, such as constraints on processing power, may also lead to disparity between
levels. When there is such a disparity, the explanatory economy approach will be appropriate.
Apparently failed predictions at one level can be explained away with reference to properties of
another level. This fact stresses the importance of the ‘why’ aspect of the computational level:
when lower levels deviate from the function specified at the computational level, we retain this
higher-level specification because it enables the best explanation of why the system should behave
(roughly) this way at all.
In many cases, determining whether a debt ought be paid vertically (by a theory at a different
51
level) or horizontally (by a theory of a different system) may be difficult. For example, failure to
grasp a sentence that is predicted to be grammatical could be accounted for either by an algorithmic
or implementational theory (vertically) or by a computational theory of a part of the mind other than
linguistic competence, such as a parsing theory (horizontally). I have focused on horizontal cases
because the relationship between level of explanation in cognitive science is such a central topic in
the philosophy of psychology, while the need to understand the complementarity of theories on the
same level but of different targets has been less frequently discussed. However, cognitive science
can and should make use of both kinds of debt collection.
1.9 When Debts Go Unpaid
While the notion of an explanatory economy is helpful in showing how a theory can reject prima
facie counterexamples without falling into unfalsifiability, it is important to avoid being too per-
missive. There must be some reasonable prospect of this debt being discharged in order for this
move to be legitimate. Without such a prospect, surface appearances are all we have to go on, and
prima facie counterexamples are just counterexamples. It is crucial that inquiry does not end with
the creation of a debt. Instead, this leads to further discussion about the prospects of such a debt
being discharged. In fact, the major shifts in the history of generative linguistics can, to a large
extent, be viewed as motivated by just such an investigation.
Recall from section 1.7 the argument from the poverty of the stimulus. This argument aimed to
show that various aspects of developed linguistic competence must be determined not by abstrac-
tion from linguistic patterns in the environment, but instead by innate (i.e. biological) principles.
By positing such innate principles, the problem of language acquisition in the face of the poverty
of the stimulus can be solved. However, this solution incurs a debt: these allegedly innate princi-
ples must themselves be explained by other theories; biological theories of cognitive development
in particular. The central developments in generative grammar can be viewed as attempts to make
these debts more suitable for payment by these biological theories.57
57I am discussing a very high-level example, in which whole generative approaches are rejected on account of
the feeling that the new theory is more likely to have its debts paid. Of course, there are hundreds of examples of
lower-level linguistic debates in which all parties agree that incurring a debt would be inappropriate. I focus on the
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Early generative theory—transformational grammar—posited language- and construction-specific
rules. For just one example, Equi-NP deletion was proposed as the mandatory rule that transforms
a construction with the underlying (‘deep’) structure ‘NP1 V NP1 VP’ (i.e. what are now called
‘control structures’) by deleting the embedded subject (becoming structures of the form ‘NP1 V
VP’).58 Knowledge of this rule was purported to explain why a sentence with the underlying struc-
ture ‘Edith loves Edith to dance’ can only be pronounced after deleting the subject of the embedded
clause ‘Edith to dance’. This approach to grammar, due to the specificity of such rules, leads very
quickly to the positing of an enormous number of rules. Any perceived grammatical relationship
between sentences leads to new transformational rules (e.g. passive transformations, question-
forming transformations, topicalization transformations, etc.).59 If, as is often the case, the envi-
ronmental data underdetermines when such rules are and are not appropriate, these rules must be
viewed as innately determined. To pay off the debt that this creates, a biological/developmental
story must be, at least plausibly, available for explaining how such rules can be innate.
The move from transformational grammar to X-bar theory, and then Government and Binding
(GB), and ultimately to the Minimalist Program, is largely motivated by the realization that such
debts are unlikely to be paid. Genomics and developmental biology/psychology don’t seem to
have the tools to account for the development of so many, and such specific, rules as part of de-
veloped cognition.60 Each successive theory therefore attempted to replace the many earlier rules
with more general and abstract principles, and this unification led to a reduction in the amount of
information assumed to be innate. This greatly increased the prospects of biology paying off this
debt. The simpler the grammatical principles posited, and the more generally applicable they were
(e.g. Government and Binding theory proposed just one transformation ‘move α’, for explaining
displacement, while the Strong Minimalist Thesis posits the sufficiency of just Merge, which ac-
counts for both displacement and recursive generation), the more plausible it was that this debt
higher-level case because I take it that the worry about the falsifiability of generative grammar is itself a fairly global
worry: by denying that certain data are relevant, the generative program is unscientific. I take it that not even the most
adamant critics of the program deny that specific generative proposals are sometimes (agreed to be) falsified.
58This example is simplified in ways that don’t matter for the purposes of this paper.
59See e.g. Ross (1986) for an early work in which many such specific transformational rules are discussed.
60In addition, it was, to say the least, puzzling how to account for such linguistic specificity evolutionarily.
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could be paid by biological theory. This is especially clearly a motivation in the current Minimalist
program, where it is hoped that the existence of, and many of the constraints on, Merge can be
explained by very general mathematical properties of complex, emergent systems.61
In this way, the idea of explanatory debts can make sense of central developments in linguistic
theory. While positing innate structure enabled transformational linguists to provide explanations
of competence and development, it did so by incurring an explanatory debt: biology had to make
good on its claims of innately determined structure. Rather than this debt simply being accepted,
it was actively debated and ultimately deemed unpayable. The response to this was to modify
the theory so that the burden placed on other disciplines seemed more reasonable. The push for
simpler and more general theories is thus explicable as the attempt to accrue only debts that have a
reasonable chance of getting discharged.62 While still very little is known about the biological basis
for language, the Minimalist Program does seem to provide the best chance for such a unification in
the history of generative grammar, and this can be explained by the need to ensure that explanatory
debts are at least plausibly payable.
We can briefly note that this approach to the history of linguistics provides a response to Lappin
et al.’s (2000) argument that the adoption of the Minimalist Program is an example of an unsci-
entific revolution. They argue argue that linguists who, following Chomsky, shifted from work
within the GB tradition to the Minimalist Program are being unscientific in virtue of the fact that
their new theory “is in no way superior [to GB] with respect to either predictive capabilities nor
explanatory power.” (p. 667). Even if this is correct from an individualistic perspective, accord-
ing to which a theory is evaluated purely on its explanations and predictions, it seems false from
the the collectivist perspective I have outlined. Even if Minimalism and GB made all the same
predictions and explained the same data, one could have an advantage over the other in that the ex-
planatory debts it accrues are more likely to be discharged. I take it that the driving motivation for
the Minimalist Program is precisely this: the burdens it places on other disciplines are significantly
less severe than those placed on these programs by prior theories, due to the relative complexity
61See Chomsky (2007) and Uriagereka (2000) for discussions of this proposal.
62This section is probably more accurate as a rational reconstruction of the history of generative grammar, rather
than a statement of the intentions of its practitioners.
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of innately determined structure posited by the latter. Of course, this does not show that the Min-
imalist Program is correct, just that the extent to which a theory cooperates with other theories in
other domains is a perfectly ‘scientific’ reason for adopting such a theory, even if it doesn’t lead to
enhanced explanatory and predictive power.
Hopefully, this section has made clearer the reciprocal relationship between theories central to
the explanatory economy. This points to a more subtle relationship between theory and observation
than one finds in standard, individualist, accounts of confirmation. A theory can be confirmed
both by explaining/predicting phenomena, and by having phenomena it fails to explain/predict
explained by distinct, but compatible, theories. However, if these anomalies cannot be explained by
these other theories, then they may be re-evaluated as problematic, perhaps even falsifying, for the
original theory. Likewise, the ability of these other theories to discharge the debts of the indebted
theory is itself confirmatory for these theories. By paying these debts, these theories indicate that
they are externally consistent, a widely accepted theoretical virtue. This produces a sort of ‘double-
counting’ of the confirmatory value of explanations of phenomena that generate debts in other
theories: these explanations serve to both increase the explanatory/predictive scope of the theory as
well as indicate that this theory is appropriately complementary with other theories. For example,
a parsing theory is doubly confirmed by its predictions of the failure to parse multiply center-
embedded sentences: as well as the standard mechanism of confirmation by correct prediction,
this indicates that a parsing theory and a grammatical theory work well together. This shows the
importance of the collectivist account of theory confirmation.
Perhaps the most complex relations between evidence and theory involve failures to pay off
debts created by other theories. When this happens, we have reason to think that this theory is
not complementary with the indebted theory.63 This will be particularly problematic for the theory
which may have been expected to discharge this debt if the indebted theory is highly confirmed, as
it suggests that one of these two theories is incorrect. For example, if our best linguistic theories
suggest that some unacceptable sentences are grammatical, a parsing theory which does not suggest
any difficulty with our interpretation of these sentences is in prima facie trouble. This is clearest
63These reasons are not decisive, as the debt could yet be paid off by some third theory, compatible with the first
two.
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in the comparative case: if two competing parsing theories are such that only one is able to explain
away the apparent anomalies of a well-confirmed grammatical theory, this looks like a pretty good
argument in favor of the one that can. The theory that can pay off this debt suggests greater promise
of contributing to a collection of theories capable of explaining all the observations, and so is more
likely to be true. As all the observations ought be accounted for, a failure of one theory to do so
increases the demand for such an explanation on other theories. Therefore theories that can provide
such an explanation are thereby confirmed, indicating their complementarity with other systems,
while theories that fail to provide such an account are thereby disconfirmed. Discharging debts is
not thus a mere side-effect of successful theories, but one of their essential functions.
1.10 The Explanatory Economy and the Division of Cognitive Labor
On the face of it, my proposal seems continuous with a range of work done under the banner of
‘The Division of Cognitive Labor’, stemming from Kitcher (1990). Strevens (2006, 2003, 2017)
has developed Kitcher’s picture along a variety of axes, while Zollman (2007) and Weisberg &
Muldoon (2009), among others, have developed alternative strategies for modeling the way in
which scientific aims are achieved by multiple agents. At a high level of abstraction, these projects
are similar to mine in that they aim to understand the ways in which scientific progress is furthered
by the differential behavior of multiple agents, and the ways in which the pursuit of certain sci-
entific aims depends on the goals undertaken by others. However, the theory of the explanatory
economy I have developed in this paper differs in certain key ways from these other approaches,
and even suggests certain difficulties with them. In this final major section I shall outline these
differences.
Kitcher and Strevens produce economic models aimed at determining which project particular
scientists ought to undertake, given their perceived chance of success and the social rewards accru-
ing to such success. One can see immediately that this project is quite unlike the one I am engaged
in. The explanatory economy is a picture of the epistemic dependence of some scientific theories
on others, not of the rational behavior of particular scientists, although the fact that the success
of one theory may depend on the subsequent success of another will have important upshots for
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which projects scientists may want to pursue.
Zollman’s approach instead co-opts the tools of network theory, running computer simulations
of networks of potential collaborators in order to model the effects that greater openness with
respect to the sharing of experimental results has on desirable scientific results such as successfully
answering theoretical questions and doing so in a timely fashion. Again, it is clear that Zollman and
I simply have different aims. His models assume that each scientific problem (say, the testing of the
effectiveness of a certain pharmaceutical) can be solved independently, although collaboration and
data-sharing may influence how frequently and quickly the problems are actually solved. My goal
is precisely to understand the ways in which different theories depend essentially for their success
on one another. It may be possible to model the explanatory economy in this network-theoretic
way, but it would require a substantial revision of Zollman’s models.
Finally, Weisberg and Muldoon’s models utilize modified adaptive landscape models, based
on those originating in evolutionary theory, to simulate how efficiently a collection of scientists
will uncover some set of significant truths. Instead of the simulated landscape representing a
distribution of genotypes according to their biological fitness, it represents what Weisberg and
Muldoon call ‘epistemic significance’. A collection of agents within the model move around this
landscape, seeking areas of greatest epistemic significance according to different strategies (for
example, some agents are more inclined to follow the paths of other agents, while others are
disinclined to do so). Running these simulations can indicate the effects, in terms of how likely it is
for the population to uncover the significant truths and how quickly they do so, of having different
distributions of strategies in the scientific population.
The central difference between my approach and that of those in the division of cognitive labor
tradition is that we are focusing on different kinds of structures. Kitcher, Strevens, Zollman, and
Weisberg and Muldoon aim to account for what we might call the institutional structure of science.
That is, they aim to provide idealized pictures of how actual scientists will or should behave. This is
clearest in the case of Kitcher and Strevens, who aim to show why certain behavior is explicable by
assuming that scientists are acting so as to increase their scientific prestige. Zollman and Weisberg
and Muldoon, on the other hand, aim to model the ways in which different strategies (of e.g.
information sharing, or problem-selection) are more or less suited for achieving desirable results
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such as the timely solution of scientific problems. My focus is instead on the explanatory structure
of science: the abstract dependencies between the theories and claims put forward by theorists. My
approach is thus less directly relevant to explaining and predicting the behavior of scientists. The
explanatory economy can show why it was good (for a particular theory) that some explanation
was provided (e.g. because this explanation discharged a debt incurred by this theory), but it cannot
directly explain why some scientists took the time to provide such an explanation.64
This said, given that the explanatory economy can show why certain kinds of explanation are
needed for the full confirmation of particular theories, by assuming that scientists often aim to
produce those explanations that would confirm the theories they pursue, we can leverage the ex-
planatory economy so as to predict/explain scientists’ behavior. If you think a theory is correct, one
way to contribute to the development and confirmation of this theory is to pay off the debts it has
incurred. This motivation clearly has influenced linguistic theorizing. Some of the best research
in psycholinguistics is developed precisely to account for apparent anomalies from the perspective
of generative grammar. The earlier discussed example of Miller and Chomsky’s explanation of the
unacceptability of center-embedding is one example, but there are many more.65 Prima Facie it
is not clear why these results, as interesting as they are from the perspective of psycholinguistics,
are important for theories of grammar. The explanatory economy can explain why this is. That
is, it can explain why it was beneficial for generative theories of grammar that such explanations
were forthcoming. This goes a long way to explaining why these psycholinguistic theories were
pursued: these theorists found generative theories of grammar compelling, and aimed to vindicate
them by explaining away their apparent anomalies. Of course, whether a theorist is likely to be
motivated to discharge a debt accrued to a generative theory of grammar will depend on whether
they find such a theory compelling. From the perspective of a skeptic of these approaches, sizable
debts may seem like sufficient grounds for rejecting the theory, while from the perspective of an
advocate, they will be opportunities for important research.
64In this way, my approach is perhaps more akin to work like Mitchell (2003) and Wimsatt (2007b), which similarly
focus more on the ways in which multiple distinct representations (e.g. theories or models) of complex phenomena
can complement another, than it is to the work discussed in this section.
65For just a selection of particularly nice examples, see the account of heavy-NP-shift discussed in Staub et al.
(2006), Fodor & Inoue (1994) on garden path sentences, Wellwood et al. (2018) on some ‘linguistic illusions’, and
Conroy et al. (2009) for a discussion of children’s apparent failure to follow principle B of binding theory.
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Despite the crucial difference in emphasis, I do not view the explanatory economy as irrelevant
to standard approaches to the division of cognitive labor. Rather, I think the explanatory economy
suggests that several of these models rest on a picture of scientific progress which is incomplete.
In particular, the ways in which scientific progress in one domain is conditionalized on progress
elsewhere is absent from the models. Strevens (2003), for example, discusses the ‘priority rule’,
according to which scientific acclaim is attributed exclusively to the scientists who first produce a
particular achievement. The explanatory economy, however, points to the fact that this may not be
as final as it seems: today’s achievements rely on tomorrow’s debt collection, and in the absence of
this payment what seems like an achievement may not in fact be so. The rewards for such achieve-
ments can, in some cases, be re-allocated. This sort of phenomenon is quite common in science:
some explanation is produced within a theory which later becomes discredited. In linguistics, many
proposed explanations couched in, say, transformational grammar, may have seemed like enduring
successes at the time, but are no longer viewed as such given the development of linguistic theory.
This may well have an influence on the motivational force of priority in science in general, and
in these models in particular. Given that an achievement may be overthrown, scientists may ratio-
nally continue work in alternative programs despite the target phenomenon having already been
accounted for. Again, this is a common feature of science: consider the wealth of connectionist
attempts to account for grammatical phenomena that have been explained by generative linguistics
within a symbolic systems framework. Such efforts make sense only on the assumption that the
generativists who first explained some linguistic facts will not be exclusively rewarded for this
work, on account of their explanations ultimately being rejected.
Likewise, my approach may suggest the need for an extra parameter in the models developed
in Zollman’s more recent work. Zollman (2017) presents a model in which scientists can learn
from one another so as to each solve their own problems. The aim of this model is to predict
the social conditions which will make scientific collaboration likely and beneficial. Individual
scientists are prone to collaborate when doing so increases their likelihood of achieving their goals
in a timely fashion, without imposing too great a burden. The explanatory economy suggests a
further motivation to collaborate: other researcher’s work may be needed to underwrite the debts
accrued in doing your own. My earlier example of Chomsky’s collaboration with George Miller
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seems like an example of this: Chomsky’s linguistic theory seemed unable to account for the
unacceptability of multiple center-embeddings, so he collaborated with a psychologist to show
how a parsing model could explain these data without modifying the syntactic theory.
Finally, I believe that Weisberg and Muldoon’s (W&M) models might provide the best loca-
tion for incorporating the lessons of the explanatory economy. One way to do this would be to
complicate the epistemic landscape and the agent’s patterns of moving around it. In particular,
while W&M say that they intend the peaks in their epistemic landscapes to be suggestive of the
way in which scientific results often depend on one another (p. 227-228), this dependence is not
reflected in the model. The significance of each location is independent of whether other locations
have been accessed. One reason W&M make this assumption is that the agents in their model are
superb scientists: whenever they move to a particular location they infallibly acquire the epistemic
significance of this location. Because of this infallibility, there is no room for the kind of failure
that the explanatory economy highlights. A location that seems like it provides a wealth of epis-
temic significance may do so only on the assumption that the debts engendered in reaching this
significance will be discharged. If this doesn’t happen, this significance will be illusory. These
assumptions (of independence and infallibility) would have to be replaced if one were to incorpo-
rate the explanatory economy into a W&M-style model: the epistemic significance of one location
could be conditional on the epistemic significance of those locations ‘supporting’ it (i.e. on a de-
scending path from this location to those locations with lower epistemic significance). If we were
also then to incorporate W&M’s suggestion (p.233 fn. 6) to distinguish between agent’s exploring
the landscape and exploiting it, where the former just means moving around the landscape while
the latter means spending some energy extracting the significant truths from their current location,
then we may be able to begin modeling the explanatory economy. If we populated the landscape
both with genuine peaks of epistemic significance, but also apparent peaks, resting on locations
lacking significance (i.e. false assumptions), we could then let agents explore the landscape, again
in search of epistemic peaks. An agent confronted with an upwards slope could then be faced with
a choice either to climb upwards or start mining the foothills. If they take the former strategy, they
increase the speed at which they could reach the top, but they incur the risk that they are climbing
a false peak (i.e. that their explanatory debts will not be payed). Discharging explanatory debts
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could thus be modeled as ensuring that the epistemic significance of higher apparent peaks is suit-
ably supported by the significance of the slopes below. Those at the tops of apparent peaks will
thus be dependent on the success of those further down in locating continuous paths of epistemic
significance from the floor to the peak. In this way, we could computationally model the ways that
different strategies lead to scientific progress. One strategy could involve rushing to the peaks, ex-
ploring but not exploiting the path on the way, another could involve more methodically exploiting
each step along the way. These would correspond to the approaches of those who aim to produce
the most epistemically significant theories as early as possible (the visionaries), and of those who
instead do the dirty work of ensuring that these high-level and apparently most illuminating pro-
posals are consistent with the messy observations (the normal scientists). Each strategy has its
benefits and costs. The former involves taking risks for high rewards: impressive theories can be
proposed, but they may collapse when it is realized that their debts cannot be discharged. The latter
is less susceptible to wasting time developing false theories, but is also less likely to produce the
most impressive feats of scientific theorizing. My prediction is that a landscape crafted in this way
would be most efficiently populated by a mixed population, featuring some agents looking for the
potential areas of greatest significance, and others distinguishing the real from the merely apparent
peaks, but one would have to run the models to confirm this.
This has all been highly sketchy, but I hope it indicates ways in which the understanding of
the explanatory economy might be able to inform the study of the social/institutional structure of
science.
1.11 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown why the notion of an explanatory economy is a fruitful one, espe-
cially as applied to linguistics. In linguistics, the available data are effects of a massively complex
system. This makes the task of inferring from data to underlying structure hugely difficult. The
Galilean style aims to uncover these underlying structures by treating much of the data as a noisy
interaction effect. This methodology has provoked much consternation as it seems to depart from
the empiricist maxim that data are final. I believe that the notion of an explanatory debt can show
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why this approach is not unscientific as has sometimes been alleged. This methodology should thus
appeal to the generativists seeking deep explanatory patterns as well as the more empiricist theo-
rists with greater concern for the quirks and intricacies of used language. With an appropriately
collectivist methodology, these approaches can be seen as complementary, taking in one another’s
difficulties, rather than competing.
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CHAPTER 2
Empiricism, Syntax, and Ontogeny
Generative grammarians typically advocate for a rationalist understanding of language acquisi-
tion, according to which the structure of a developed language faculty reflects innate guidance
rather than environmental influence. This proposal is developed in developmental linguistics by
triggering models of language acquisition. Opposing this tradition, various theorists have advo-
cated for empiricist views of language acquisition, according to which the structure of a developed
linguistic competence reflects the linguistic environment in which this competence developed. On
this picture, linguistic development is accounted for by general statistical learning mechanisms. In
this chapter I shall precisify the debate, provide a clearer picture of what is at stake, and show why
an intermediate picture is needed. This provides a further example of the importance of the plural-
ist strategy developed throughout this thesis, aimed at capturing both the deep generalizations and
quirky irregularities of natural language.
2.1 Rationalism and Empiricism
The terms ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ have been applied to many distinct positions. Traditional
rationalists1 and empiricists2 adopted clusters of views relating epistemology, metaphysics and
psychology, and followers of these programs extended them to other areas.3 I will be concerned
with how this debate plays out in psychology, wherein modern rationalists claim that psychological
states and capacities are innately determined, whereas empiricists claim development is a process
1E.g Descartes (1641/2017).
2E.g. Locke (1836/1996).
3E.g. the Logical Empiricists’ extension from epistemology into scientific methodology.
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of reflecting the environment.
This raises the question: what does it mean for psychological states to be innately determined?
Like ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, ‘innate’ has been used to draw many non-equivalent distinc-
tions. For this reason, Griffiths (2002) argues that we should eschew this concept entirely in favor
or more specific ones. This strikes me as an over-reaction. As long as we are careful to specify ex-
actly how we are using the term, no harm is done. In a series of papers, Mameli & Bateson (2011,
2006); Bateson & Mameli (2007), have argued similarly that the folk notion of innateness is used
to pick out a wide range of different properties, many of which are scientifically uninteresting, and
have thus urged that we may be better of eschewing this notion entirely, in favor of scientifically
better-defined notions such as canalization or adaptation. Again, I believe that, as long as one is
explicit about how the term is being used, these problems can be avoided. I am not here attempting
to provide an analysis of the term ‘innate’, nor to provide a general theory of innateness. I am using
the term merely to draw a distinction between certain classes of models of language acquisition.
As I shall use the term, a trait is innate to the extent that an explanation of its structure does not
require reference to the extraction of information from the developmental environment. Crucially,
this is not merely a causal claim. All developed states are causally dependent on both environ-
mental and internal/biological influences, and so drawing this distinction along causal lines is a
non-starter.4 Likewise, the claim is not that innate traits don’t carry information about the envi-
ronment. In the mathematical sense of ‘information’, any reliable causal dependency will result in
the carrying of information.5 The motivation for this view is that some traits seem to be molded
by the environment, reflecting the structure of environmental stimuli, whereas others, even though
causally dependent on the environment, develop structures that do not reflect the properties of
the environment. In such cases, the structure of the trait must be internally given. The rationalist
claims that aspects of the mind are structured by internal forces and thus do not, or at least need not,
4It is sometimes suggested that this fact does not show that innateness is not a causal notion. Instead, it shows that
innateness is not a categorical notion. That is, that there are degrees of innateness: traits are more or less innate to the
extent that they are caused by internal forces. However, as internal and external influences are always necessary but
insufficient for developed traits, it is hard to make sense of this graded notion of causality.
5The carrying of information (i.e. the reducing of possibilities) can however be used a a heuristic: innate traits will
typically carry less information about the environment than non-innate traits, due precisely to the fact that the latter
(function to) reproduce environmental patterns.
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reflect the properties of the environment. The empiricist, on the other hand, claims that developed
psychologies are reflective of patterns in the environment to which organisms are sensitive.
This proposal is thus intended to be consistent with approaches to development which claim to
reject a strict distinction between biology and environment, such as Developmental Systems The-
ory (as developed in Oyama et al. (2003)). These approaches stress the interdependence between
organism and environment, undermining the factorization of the explanation of developed traits
into those that are ‘in the genes’ and those that are acquired. They also stress the ways in which
whatever role genetics does play is only made possible by substantial scaffolding from non-genetic
(both organismic and environmental) structures. As I read it, the impetus behind such proposals
is that the causal relations between organism and environment are complex and dialectical. I do
not deny this, and I am not assuming that the traits I describe as ‘innate’ need be fully specified
by the organism’s genome.6 What I am stressing is that, even given this causal complexity, we are
able to distinguish between two kinds of development: one which relies on the environment purely
causally, and another which responds to patterns in this environment by functioning to reproduce
these patterns within the organism.
This notion of innateness does some have counter-intuitive results. For example, what Damasio
(2006) calls ‘acquired sociopathy’ (p. 178), cases wherein neurological damage cases anti-social
behavioral disorders, will count as innate, as the resultant states and behavior are not reflective
of their environmental cause. I’m OK with this result. In such cases, the explanation for why
certain kinds of trauma lead to these anti-social states will involve primarily an account of the
nature of the internal processes which lead, in response to this trauma, to the resultant state. That
is, the environmental stimulus, the cause of trauma, plays a purely causal role in explaining the
acquired psychological state. This distinction, between explanatory strategies focusing on structure
provided by internal processes as opposed to environmental facts, is the one I am interested in, as it
is along these lines that we can categorize approaches to language acquisition. Relatedly, it follows
from my characterization that innate traits need not be species-universal. What matters is how the
structure of the developed trait is explained: how widespread the trait is is irrelevant.
6Although they may be. See Wexler (2003) for an argument, drawing on a very wide range of evidence, that certain
features of a child’s innate knowledge of language is genetic.
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This account allows for the appropriate, if etymologically puzzling, claim that innate traits need
not be present at birth. An innate trait can develop at any time, as long as the structure of the end
product is not reflective of any external stimulus.7 It also has the nice result that it makes sense
to talk of a trait as being more or less innate. A trait is entirely innate if all of its structure is a
result of internal forces, even if it depends causally on external stimuli. A trait can also be entirely
non-innate if its structure exactly matches that of an environmental pattern to which the organism
is sensitive. Traits which partially reflect the environment, but deviate from the environmental
patterns in internally driven ways will count as partially innate. This account is thus not subject to
the worry that the debate is empty because all traits are causally dependent on internal and external
factors. Rationalists must accept that the environment plays a role, and empiricists must accept
that minds respond to the environment in particular and contingent ways. However, the rationalist
claims that the role of the environment is limited to influencing which of a limited set of options the
system will be internally driven to develop, whereas the empiricist views the mind as a system for
attuning an organism to its environment, with development involving coming to more accurately
reflect this environment. The crucial distinction, as will become clear when we look at triggering
models of language acquisition, is between, on the one hand, the environment selecting or enabling
the development of a trait, and on the other, the environment providing the details for how the trait
is supposed to be structured.
Perhaps the closest account to my own in the literature is the view that innateness should
be viewed as canalization, as defended by Collins (2005) and Ariew (1996, 1999). A trait is
canalized to the extent that its properties are independent of the variation in the environments in
which the trait develops. Roughly, we can think of canalized traits as those for which there is
a many-to-one mapping of developmental environments onto trait properties. For example, the
human skeleton, if it is able to develop at all, acquires roughly the same structure in whichever
environment it arises, and so is highly canalized. On the other hand, what sort of music one
7Note that strictly, the claim is not that, for a rationalist system, the final state doesn’t reflect the environment,
but that the system does not function to reflect the environment. Criticisms of rationalist proposals often fail due to
a misunderstanding of this point. I will often talk simply of traits reflecting or not reflecting the environment, but it
should always be kept in mind that what is meant is a functional claim about how this system develops, not merely a
feature of the end-product of this development.
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likes seems to depend greatly on the fine-grained properties of one’s environment, and so is not
canalized. This theory then says that the degree to which a trait is innate is the degree to which it
is canalized: innate traits develop broadly independently of their environments, while non-innate
traits are highly sensitive to the properties of the environment. It should be clear that my account
and this account overlap substantially. Traits which function to reproduce environmental patterns
(i.e. non-innate traits in my sense) will thereby by sensitive to properties of the environment and
thereby non-canalized. However, the notions are not equivalent. In particular, canalization is a
causal notion, unlike my own. Traits that are highly causally sensitive to the environment, but for
which the response to the environmental stimulus is not one of reflection or mirroring, in my sense,
will not be canalized but I will count them as innate. The above-mentioned example of acquired
psychopathy will be an example of this. This difference stems from the different aims of advocates
of these notions. My goal is to identify a distinction that can be used to categorize different kinds
of explanation: explaining the structure of developed traits with reference to the developmental
environment vs. the properties of the organism itself. In cases like acquired psychopathy, despite
the enormous causal importance of the stimulus (e.g. brain trauma), explaining the acquired trait
will need to focus more on internal facts about the brain than external facts about the source of the
damage. Canalization theories of innateness, on the other hand, aim to classify traits’ etiologies,
not explanatory strategies for accounting for these traits (although these will of course overlap
significantly). While the etiology of acquired pathology is more like that of acquired musical taste,
in being highly sensitive to the environment, they will be explained in quite different ways. I do
not see the canalization approach as a competitor to my own, but instead as capturing different
aspects of development.
Here is a simple example exemplifying the contrasts between rationalist and empiricist posi-
tions. Imagine two systems responding to strings of letters. One system, the empiricist system
E, uses statistical mechanisms to abstract patterns from the input string. The other, the rationalist
system R, instead produces a repeating string of the first letter of the input. Compare E and R’s
responses to the following input strings:
(1) aaaaaa...
67
(2) ababab...
(3) all the king’s horses
For string 1, E and R would produce the same output. R, however, would produce exactly the same
response to all three input strings, whereas E would differentiate string 2 from string 1, accurately
reproducing both of them. For 3, however, E would either produce something nonsensical or
nothing at all.8 There are a few things to notice here. Firstly, E is much less restricted in its
output states. E has as many possible states as there are patterns detectable by its algorithm. R
however is highly restricted. It can produce only 26 representations. Relatedly, while both R and
E’s final states are caused by their environments, only E’s are reflective of the environment. From
E’s final state, we can predict E’s environment with a decent degree of accuracy. However, for R
this is not the case. An output of ‘aaaa....’ is consistent between any number of inputs. This is
the sense in which non-innate traits carry more information about the environment. Likewise, if R
does resemble the environment, this is, from a developmental perspective, an accident: it just so
happens that of the many possible environmental patterns R could have encountered, it found one
of the few it can resemble. This is not the case for E.
2.2 The Structure of the Arguments
In the linguistic case, of course, we do not have access to the algorithms mapping input onto output.
We have access to the input/output patterns: what state the developed language faculty9 adopts in
response to what primary linguistic data.10 The goal then is to work backwards from this mapping
to discover the processes at work. Of course, the temporal order of linguistic theorizing is not this
8Obviously, nothing has been said about the details of E, whether it is, say, a bayesian or a frequentist system,
whether it responds to higher-order regularities or not, etc. which would determine its response to such strings. The
example is merely illustrative.
9The debate is slightly complicated by the fact that many involved in the debate, especially those on the empiricist
side, deny that there is a specific ‘faculty’ of language. I will continue to use the term ‘faculty’ to refer to whatever
psychological structure is responsible for adult linguistic competence, without assuming the baggage associated with
this term by the generativist tradition.
10Of course, the shape of the developed faculty is not directly observable and must itself be inferred from behavior.
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simple. Linguists do not need to wait until the final, correct grammatical theory has been proposed
before developing theories of acquisition, and often which grammatical theory is deemed best will
depend on which how competing theories interact with developmental theories. We can, however,
adopt the idealization that acquisitional theories are developed to explain the accepted input-output
patterns for the purposes of this paper.
As in the case of our machines, there are characteristic patterns of input/output behavior which
provide evidence for the competing positions. Patterns supporting rationalism will show:
1 a) Information in output (e.g. developed linguistic competence) not found in input (e.g. primary
linguistic data).
b) Few possible output states.
c) Low resemblance between input and output.
Empiricist-favoring patterns however will show:
2 a) All information in output found in input.
b) Many possible output states.
c) High resemblance between input and output.
Pattern 1a is the clearest case for rationalism. If there is information in the developed system not
found in the stimulus, this must have been contributed by the learner.
Patterns 2b and 2c constitute (less decisive) evidence for empiricism. If we observe a high
degree of resemblance between the environment and the developed states of the learner, this could
be a result of a highly structured initial state which happens to correlate with the environment in
which it developed. However, the closer the correlation is, the less parsimonious such a proposal
will be. This proposal would rely on the claim that significant correlation between the organism
and the environment is, from an ontogenetic perspective, accidental. An empiricist proposal would
not need to posit some extra mechanism to explain (away) any organism/environment correlation.
69
This is just what such systems are designed to do, and so empiricist accounts are neater when such
correlations are observed.
Note that there are plausible rationalist accounts of why, despite the correlation between inter-
nal state and external environment, the state should be viewed as innate. The most general such
account would be an evolutionary one. If environmental patterns are highly stable, it is conceivable
that over evolutionary time the reproduction of these patterns would be offloaded from ontogeny to
phylogeny. That is, if it is adaptive to know about certain features of one’s environment, and these
features remain the same over evolutionary time-scales, organisms with this knowledge innately
may acquire an adaptive benefit, in that they need not spend resources extracting this knowledge
from the environment, and so minds containing such knowledge may simply develop, rather than
needing to learn it each generation. In such a case, I would view the reflection of the environment
as innate. To distinguish such a case of innate structure from empiricist, acquired structure, we
would need to, perhaps counterfactually, see what happens when the environment ceases to be
reliable. The nativist system would continue to develop as it normally does (assuming that the
environment is not so catastrophically different that development is impossible), and thus cease
to reflect the environment, wheres the empiricist system would develop differently, reflecting the
novel properties of the new environment. Much work in Evolutionary Psychology (e.g. Barkow
et al. (1995)) assumes this sort of picture, including the claim that organisms, especially humans,
may be in trouble because our innately developing minds are structured by an environment that is
no longer present. Of course, this is not to defend this research, and there are many criticisms of
both this evolutionary proposal and the developmental processes it presupposes11, but it is at least a
possibility. This further indicates the complexity of inferring from these observations which prima
facie suggest empiricist, or rationalist, models.
Likewise, pattern 2b is consistent with a rationalist proposal. The initial state could be highly
complex, allowing for external stimuli to select one of a large number of possible resultant states.
However, if the structure of the system’s final states is fully provided innately, then as the number
of possible final states increases, so does the burden placed on innate structure. If we observe
11See e.g. Lewontin et al. (1984), Rose & Rose (2010), Buller (2006), and Lickliter & Honeycutt (2003).
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significant variation in the final state, this variation is likely to be more economically accounted
for by empiricist mechanisms which extract this information from the environment.
We can now identify the various positions in debates about linguistic innateness. A pure ratio-
nalist claims that all the structure of the adult competence is provided by internal constraints. This
view allows for language variation, but only in the sense that different environmental stimuli can
cause the faculty to develop along different lines. But the stimuli are merely causal. The developed
faculty need not resemble or reflect the properties of this cause in any substantial way. At the other
extreme, a pure empiricism will claim that all of human linguistic competence reflects, at some
level, properties of its linguistic environment.12 For example, if a language contains constraints on
movement, then such constraints must be evidenced in the input.13
Intermediate positions involve the claims that some language learning is rationalist or empiri-
cist. The weak rationalist claims that at least some of the structure of the developed language
faculty is not provided by the environment. The weak empiricist claims that at least some of this
structure is. Of course, unlike the pure positions, these positions are compatible. Indeed, if ‘some’
is read to mean some but not all, these positions will be mutually entailing. If the languages one
learns partially reflect innate structures and partially reflect one’s linguistic environment, weak
versions of both positions will be vindicated.
As mentioned in the previous section, this account allows for a graded notion of innateness.
This is, I think, a virtue, as many, if not most, traits seem partially reflective of the environment, and
partially structured by internal factors. I shall argue that linguistic competence should be viewed
in exactly this way, as a mixture of both internal and external factors. In general, this notion of
innateness should enable us to tease out exactly which aspects of a particular learning model are
innate and which are not.
12Note that pure empiricism is not the claim that no properties of the organism matter for explaining the developed
state. This position is indeed a priori false. How the organism responds to its environment will of course depend on
what the organism is like. A pure empiricist system will have some structural properties which explain why it responds
to the environment in a purely empiricist way, namely some developmental system (e.g. a learning algorithm) which
functions to precisely reproduce the environmental patterns it encounters.
13Those objecting to the perceived excesses of generative grammar tend to adopt a position something like this (e.g.
Goldberg (2006), Tomasello (2009), Onnis et al. (2008)).
71
One final feature of my proposal is that we may wish to adopt a relativized or domain-specific
notion of innateness, according to which features of some model of acquisition may be innate in an
unrestricted sense, i.e. influence the development of a trait in ways other than (rationally) reflecting
the environment, but will not be counted as innate from the perspective of the developmental task
in question. I have in mind here features of development which deviate from pure reflection of the
environment, but in ways which are common throughout developmental systems. For example,
it may be a general feature of psychological learning that learning mechanisms instantiate certain
biases, e.g. preferences for relatively regular rules. This would show that learning is not purely
empiricist, but would not show that there are any innate features of traits which are specific to
the trait in question. If language acquisition depended only on these very general biases, there
would be a clear sense in which language was non-innate. So we can distinguish between purely
empiricist systems in the widest sense, which incorporate no mechanism for deviating from the
observations, and purely empiricist systems in the narrow sense which incorporate no mechanism
for such deviations specific to the areas in which they apply. We will look in the next section at a
particular acquisition model which should hopefully make these various distinctions clear.
2.3 An Example: Bayesian Grammar Acquisition
Culbertson & Smolensky (2012) present a Bayesian model of acquisition of word order rules for
a small fraction of English, consisting of just three basic expression types: N(ouns), Adj(ectives),
and Num(eral determiners). The aim of the model is to determine, on the basis of some observed
expressions, whether modifiers (Adj and Num) are grammatical before or after the Nouns they
modify. The grammar in question is probabilistic, rather than deterministic, so technically all four
options (Adj-N, N-Adj, Num-N, N-Num) are grammatical, what needs to be determined is the
probabilities of each. That is, some grammars make, for example, Adj-N more likely than N-Adj,
and the model aims to determine which such grammar is most likely responsible for the data it
encounters.
A grammar can, in this model, be defined as a pair of conditional probabilities: pAdj: (Adj-N
| AdjP), and pNum: (Num-N | NumP): these express the probability of the modifier preceding the
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noun, given that a modifier of this sort is present. “(Adj-N |AdjP)=1” means that adjectives always
precede nouns, for example. The model estimates, on the basis of encountering some training data
(a collection of modifier/noun pairs with an equal number of pairs containing Adj and containing
Num, but with different proportions of modifiers before or after the noun), which pair of such
conditional probabilities is most likely to have produced these data. This is the grammar that is
then inferred to.
Along with the training data, the priors of the system determine which grammar is inferred to
(in line with Bayesian updating). There are two factors of the priors in these models:
A: A regularization bias.
B: A substantive bias.
The regularization bias is the degree to which extreme values (close to 1 or 0) of pAdj and pNum
are preferred. The regularization bias is encoded in the model as the shape of the prior probability
distribution over grammars. This is given as the combination of four ‘components’. Each compo-
nent corresponds to a preference for an equivalence class of grammars, namely those that favor a
particular pair of word orderings. For example, one component will favor a grammar which views
Adj-N and Num-N orders as most likely (although members of this class will assign different prob-
abilities to these orderings, they will all be greater than .5). The other components likewise favor
(Adj-N, N-Num), (N-Adj, N-Num), and (N-Adj, Num-N) grammars. An important restriction in
this model is that the degree to which these extreme values are favored is the same in all four com-
ponents. This degree is given as the shape of the probability distribution each component assigns
to its favored grammar, given as a product of two beta distributions: (αAdj, βAdj) representing the
shape of the prior probability distribution for hypotheses concerning the frequency of Adj-N vs.
N-Adj, (αNum, βNum) doing likewise for Num-N vs. N-Num. The ratio of α:β is determined by the
model.
The substantive bias involves assigning weights to each component, increasing or decreasing
the regularization in the direction of the component’s favored grammar. This is stated as a set of
four values, one for each equivalence class of grammars (γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4). These values always sum
to 1, but the particular values are determined by the model.
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The priors of the model are thus given by the four beta distributions, each imposing the same de-
gree of regularization towards the four possible classes of grammars, and four component strengths,
which each serve to increase or reduce the influence of one of these four components. Differences
in the values of these priors influence the behavior of these systems in different ways:
(1) Models with ‘flat’ beta distributions (i.e. with α=β=1) do not regularize, and so will adopt
the grammar that precisely tracks the distribution of word orders in the training data.
(2) The more uneven the distribution (i.e. the further the ratio of α:β deviates from 1), the less
variability in the data will be reflected by the selected grammar. Distributions with high
α values will regularize towards grammars with pre-nominal modifiers, while distributions
with high β values regularize towards grammars with post-nominal modifiers.
(3) The values of γ influence which equivalence class of grammar is favored. For example, a
high γ3 increases the regularization towards (Num-N, N-Adj) grammars.
Model training involves running Bayesian inferences on the training data, for a collection of
models with different priors (i.e. different regularization and substantive biases). Each model will
select the grammar which would make the training data most likely. Model testing then involves
introducing new data (‘testing data’), and seeing which of the grammars arrived at by each model,
with their distinct biases/priors, makes these testing data most likely. Those priors which resulted
in the model best able to predict the training data are then viewed as correct. In this case, a
strongly regularizing prior, biased towards (Adj-N, Num-N) and (N-Adj, N-Num) grammars, with
low weight for (N-Adj, Num-N), and zero weight for (Adj-N, N-Num) maximized the likelihood
of the training data. This distribution is in line with Greenberg’s Universal 18, which says that
Adj-N languages are usually Num-N languages, but not conversely.
This model demonstrates the various contributions of the environment and the learning system
I wish to classify. In the first place, this is a partially empiricist model. The Bayesian response to
the environmental data aims to extract enough information from these data to determine what was
the most likely source of these patterns. Clearly, different environmental data leads to different
acquired grammars, and the selected grammar reflects patterns in the data. However, the priors,
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both the substantive and regularization bias, contribute essentially to the selection of a grammar.
The regularization bias means that the acquired grammar does not merely reproduce the statistical
patterns in the environment, but instead assumes that such a pattern was noisily generated, and so
projects a simpler rule. The substantive bias means that some of these simpler (regular) rules are
favored over others, with the extreme case being (Adj-N, N-Num) towards which the model never
regularizes. The extent to which the acquired grammar deviates from the environmental pattern,
due to these priors, is thus the extent to which language is innate according to this model.
It is worth noting also that the two biases, which together determine the shape of the priors,
seem to differ with respect to how plausibly general they are. It is likely that some sort of noise-
reduction mechanism is widespread in psychological learning, and so the regularization bias may
plausibly be viewed as innate in the wider sense, but not innate with respect to language learning.
If this were the only bias in a language acquisition model, it would be fair to describe language
as non-innate. However, the substantive bias is language specific. It is stated as a preference for
some word orders over others. It is hard to imagine what it would mean for this to reflect a general
property of inductive inference. For this reason, according to this model, language acquisition is, at
least to some extent, innate in the domain-specific sense. This seems to be the intuitive description
of this model: it is explicitly designed to capture the ways in which human speakers are disposed
to favor certain specifically linguistic hypotheses over others.
While this is an impure empiricist model, it indicates what a pure model would look like. As I
said, removing the substantive bias plausibly would produce a model which is, from the perspec-
tive of language, purely empiricist: the developed state can be explained without any reference to
language-specific innate influence. While we cannot remove the priors entirely, we could remove
the bias inherent in them. This could be done by positing a flat distribution, removing the pref-
erence for regular grammars. Such as system would simply reproduce the statistical patterns in
the environment: if 80% of the observed sentences containing adjectives were Adj-N, the system
would infer that 80% of all adjectives preceded their nouns.
The explanatory power of this model essentially depends on the priors it assigns to the learner.
We can explain Greenberg’s universal 18 with reference to the substantive bias. This is in contrast
with one of the often stated virtues of Bayesian models: that the priors don’t matter. The more
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explanatory work is done by the priors, the less is done by the Bayesian confirmation itself, and
so it is often argued that the explanatory power of certain Bayesian systems does not depend at
all on the priors. This is because it is provable that under a variety of conditions, given sufficient
evidence, the priors wash out. That is, as the evidence increases, posteriors will become arbitrarily
close to one another, no matter what priors they started with. This points to another distinction
helpfully captured by my notion of nativism: while all Bayesian models must have priors, they
only sometimes play an explanatory role in accounting for development. When the priors wash
out, we do not need to make reference to them in explaining the developed trait, and thus can view
such a trait as non-innate. However, when, as in the case above, the shape of the priors plays an
essential explanatory role, the developed trait is, to that extent, innate.
As well as general worries with Bayesian models of language acquisition (See e.g. Yang
(2017)), there are worries specific to this model. In particular, it is highly restricted in scope,
focusing on the acquisition only of the word ordering of three kinds of phrases. Of course, starting
with the simpler cases is often a good methodology, but it is not always possible to scale up. In this
case, one difficulty is that the tested hypotheses (the conditional probabilities of modifiers preced-
ing/following nouns) cover the entire possible hypothesis space: all orders, with all probabilities,
are tested. One of the central insights of the generativist tradition is that this will not be the case
in general for language acquisition: some linguistic hypotheses are never even entertained, such as
hypotheses positing structure-independent rules. Relatedly, it is unlikely that hypotheses as spe-
cific as those in this model are tested. Even if there are word-order rules involved in acquiring a
language, they are likely more general than those in the Bayesian model discussed. Determining
which hypotheses are included and excluded will thus in general be a further area relevant for
claims about linguistic nativism. I discuss this model, despite these difficulties, just to provide
a worked-out case in which we can clearly apply the various distinctions about innate and non-
innate aspects of learning models. In particular, I hope that this model has shown that the question
of whether a system is purely empiricist, purely nativist, or a mixed system is not a priori. Given a
suitable definition of innateness, all of these are empirical possibilities. I turn now to the argument
that language acquisition must in fact be mixed.
76
2.4 Against Pure Empiricism
The central argument for rationalism, the Poverty of Stimulus argument (hereafter PoS), is pre-
cisely an argument for the claim that linguistic competence is innate in the sense just defined. The
logic of a PoS involves determining that some aspect of a developed language faculty (e.g. con-
straints on movement) is present even when there is nothing in the environment (the stimulus) for
it to reflect. Under these conditions, this ‘extra’ structure must be provided by the organism itself,
and is thus innate.
The logic of PoS is as follows14 :
P1: In acquiring their native language, learners adopt hypothesis H rather than distinct hypothesis
H’.
P2: The evidence available does not discriminate between H and H’.
C: Therefore, a preference for H is innate.
It is usually granted that such an argument is valid. If the evidence available to the child does not
discriminate between the two hypotheses, there must be some innate fact about the child which
does. The case for innateness then depends on finding linguistic hypotheses that are acquired, but
for which favorable evidence is not plausibly found in the environment.15
One paradigmatic example is yes-no question formation. Consider the relationship between
the indicative (1) and the corresponding interrogative (2):
(1) Xian has gone to Panama.
(2) Has Xian gone to Panama?
14See Crain & Pietroski (2001) for an excellent overview.
15As in my above account of reflecting the environment, it is worth distinguishing the functioning of the system
from the actual relationship between the system and the environment. In this case, what matters is whether the learner
uses or relies on the available evidence to acquire H over H’. If not, H is innate, even if there is (unused) evidence
available in the environment. The absence of such evidence from the environment is, of course, the best possible
reason for claiming that learners are not using this evidence.
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English-speaking children by the age of three are uniformly able to form and understand questions
in this way. The problem is that such examples of question-formation, which are plentiful in a
child’s linguistic environment, do not settle which rule is used in question formation. For example,
the rule ‘front the first auxiliary’ would correctly predict this pattern.16 However, consider the
following, more complex, sentences:
(3) Xian, who has been fired, has gone to Panama.
(4) Has Xian, who has been fired, gone to Panama?
(5) *Has Xian, who been fired, has gone to Panama?
The rule just proposed would predict that (5) would be the interrogative form of (3). But (5)
is nonsense, as every English-learning child knows. The rule in question must rather be ‘front
the matrix auxiliary’, which correctly predicts sentence (4). Premise 1 of the argument is thus
established.
The argument is completed by showing that the evidence requisite for discriminating these two
rules (e.g. sentence (4)) is not available to the language-learning child. Legate & Yang (2002)
calculate that of the 20,651 questions in the CHILDES corpus, only 14 (0.068%) are relevant to
selecting the matrix auxiliary rule over the first auxiliary rule.17
As all children learn the correct rule, and never make mistakes like sentence (5), in order to
deny premise 2 of the argument the evidence available must be robust enough that we can assume
every child will encounter it in sufficient quantity. Such low frequency suggests that this is not the
case for data like sentence (4).18 So, the argument concludes, because the child is able to select
16I am sidestepping the question of how these abstract classifications (like ‘auxiliary’ and ‘matrix’) are themselves
acquired by the learner, although this is itself part of a powerful argument for nativism.
17This is an oversimplification. Crucially, it is highly contentious whether only positive evidence of this sort should
be included in the data set from which learners generalize. In particular, Bayesian models, such as Perfors et al. (2010),
often stress that the absence of certain constructions from the learner’s experience can itself function as evidence that
such constructions are not possible. There are, however, significant problems with this kind of argument. See, in
particular, Marcus (1993) amd Yang (2015) for compelling empirical arguments that any system capable of excluding
possible expressions on the basis of indirect negative evidence is liable to massively overgenerate and exclude many
perfectly acceptable expressions.
18Various features of language acquisition can be used to strengthen this claim. For example, children must not
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a linguistic hypothesis even if she does not have the requisite evidence favouring this hypothesis
over others, the preference for hypotheses of this kind must be innate.
PoS, however, establishes only weak rationalism. Such arguments show that some structure
for the adult language system is provided by innate constraints rather than abstracted from the
environment. While this argument is not universally accepted, its logic is good and the kinds of
cases discussed above, inter alia, have yet to be sufficiently addressed by the strong empiricist.
I shall therefore assume that weak rationalism at least is correct. The next stage of the debate
involves working out whether more can be claimed for the rationalist picture. Is there reason to
say that all linguistic competence is provided in this way?
2.5 The Possibility of Pure Rationalism
‘Pure’ rationalism about language is the view that the human ability to acquire a language is very
similar to that of R’s ability to represent strings.19 A small set of possible final states of the language
faculty are circumscribed by its initial state, which also specifies which of these final states will
result when confronted with what primary linguistic data.
The central challenge for such an approach is accounting for predictable linguistic variation,
the apparent exemplification of patterns 2b and 2c above. While PoS arguments establish an im-
portant role for innate/internal forces in structuring the adult competence, prima facie the learner’s
linguistic environment plays a similar role. This accounts for the basic fact that ceteris paribus
speakers raised in England learn to speak English, and speakers raised in Japan learn to speak
Japanese. That is, just as with E above, properties of the environment are predictable on the basis
of properties of the developed competence. As mentioned, this is not a conclusive argument for
empiricism, but is strong prima facie evidence for it.
only be exposed to these crucial data, they must also attend to them. As young children have been shown to be fairly
weak at parsing complex sentences, it is not a given that even if they encounter sentences like 4 they will use them as
evidence for or against their linguistic hypotheses.
19Perhaps even R is slightly impure in that the letter which gets represented as output is always found in the input,
as the first letter of the string. R was described this way for clarity, but even this reflection of the environment could
be dropped. Say instead that R’s behavior was modelled by a set of 26 rules of the form: ‘if the first character of the
input is ‘a’, output ‘bbbb...”, if the first character is ‘b’, output ‘kkkk...’, and so on for all 26 classes of possible inputs.
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A defense of pure rationalism must thus account for both linguistic diversity (2b) and the ap-
parent reflection of the environment by developed language faculties (2c). The Principles and
Parameters approach attempts to do just this. According to this approach, we can divide the con-
straints on the human language faculty into two types. Principles are absolute constraints on what
languages humans can learn. During acquisition, languages violating these principles are not even
considered. As well as principles there are parameters, which provide a range of possible options.
Natural languages may differ in which of these options they select. The traditional picture views
parameters as principle-schemas: providing the form of a rule that a language must follow, but in-
cluding an open slot which must be filled to determine the exact content of the rule. For example,
we can think of the Head Directionality Parameter as stating: “Heads must be their com-
plements”, where ‘ ’ is filled in by the child, in response to linguistic experience, with either
‘before’ or ‘after’. By reducing language variation to the setting of these parameters, it is claimed
that much of the apparent diversity is a surface-level phenomenon underlain by deep similarities.20
The rationalist attempt to account for the apparent reflection of the environment is provided by
‘triggering’ models of language acquisition.21 According to these accounts, language acquisition
(especially the setting of parameters), involves deterministically adopting one aspect of a grammar
on the basis of a relatively small exposure to linguistic data. For example, the ‘Null-subject pa-
rameter’ (determining whether a sentential subject must be pronounced or not) may be ‘triggered’
by exposure to just one or a handful of sentences without pronounced subjects. The environment,
according to such a model, is causally significant in determining the adopted grammar, but need
not be reflected by the grammar. That is, there need not be any ‘rational’ relation between the
trigger and the result triggered. R, above, is an example of a triggering system.22
20This picture of parameters is somewhat out of date. Contemporary generative theory largely either views para-
metric variation as restricted to differences in the lexicon as in Borer (2014), or rejects the idea of parameters, in this
sense, entirely, as in Boeckx (2010). This debate is highly complex, and so I will skip the details, but note that if a
pure rationalism is to be maintained, something like parameters, accounting for linguistic variation, is necessary. It is
for this reason that Boeckx advocates for a mixed approach, with an innate (rationalist) core, and variation accounted
for by abstracting rules from the environment.
21See e.g. Sakas (2016) for a recent overview.
22Fodor (1975)’s position that (almost) all concepts must be innate can be understood analogously. Because there
is no (known) procedure by which we can learn, i.e. rationally acquire, the information stored in our concepts, this
information must come from within the system. Environmental stimuli can thus serve to trigger the occurrence or
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The general picture is captured nicely in Chomsky (2000) (p.8): “We can think of the initial
state of the faculty of language as a fixed network connected to a switch box; the network is
constituted of the principles of language, while the switches are the options to be determined by
experience. When the switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when they are set another way, we
have Japanese. Each possible human language is identified as a particular setting of the switches
— a setting of parameters, in technical terminology. If the research program succeeds, we should
be able literally to deduce Swahili from one choice of settings, Japanese from another, and so on
through the languages that humans can acquire.”
On such a picture, human languages are more similar than they initially appear. They all
exist within the narrow possibility space provided by principles, and surface variation is a result
of different parameter settings. In particular, a small(-ish) collection of parameters may, given
complex ‘cascading’ interactions between them, result in superficially radically different languages
(see e.g. Baker (2008) for a proposal of this sort). As these parameter settings are triggered
by, rather than extrapolated from, the environment, all of their structure is given by the innately
specified language faculty. This is radically unlike the pure empiricist proposal which takes surface
variation at face value and accounts for it by treating language learners as mirroring their divergent
environments.
The triggering account of parameter-setting is highly controversial due, in large part, to the
problem of ambiguous triggers.23 For many parameters, there are very few, if any, sentences in
the primary linguistic data which unequivocally show how a parameter must be set. For exam-
ple, differences in surface word-order can result from either differences in base-generation or in
movement rules.24 This means that the learning algorithm must use complicated procedures to
development of a concept, but the environment is limited to this causal role, rather than the traditional role as the
source of this information.
23I am here focusing on ‘internal’ debates about how to develop a parametric model, for which this problem is one
of the most severe. Those who reject the parametric view entirely are often motivated by precisely the observations
about language that I mentioned as favoring empiricist models: that languages display high degrees of variation, and
these variations correlate with environmental patterns. The rejection of ‘micro-parameters’, purported parameters
which correspond to these very fine-grained differences, is largely motivated in this way. See Newmeyer (2005) for
discussion.
24E.g. A sentence which seems to be SVO can either be a result of a genuinely (underlying) SVO language (such as
English), or an underlying SOV language with a rule that moves verbs into second position in surface form (such as
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determine which stimuli are to count as triggers so as to avoid setting a parameter incorrectly.
Much of the work in defending triggering approaches involves providing some story as to
how this problem is solved. The Null-subject parameter provides a clear example. English sets
this parameter negatively, while Spanish sets it positively, hence the difference between *“am
hungry” and “tengo hambre”. This parameter determines whether subjects can be dropped, not
whether they must.25 English sentences, with pronounced subjects, are therefore consistent with
both settings of this parameter. Gibson & Wexler (1994) provide a solution to this problem, default
parameters. For various parameters, unambiguous evidence is available only for one parameter
setting. By assuming that one parameter is a default, and the other parameter will only be selected
given unambiguous evidence for it, the problem of parameter setting becomes tractable. Spanish
speakers, confronted with sentences lacking explicit subjects will be forced to accept one setting of
the Null-subject parameter, while English speakers will not be given such unambiguous evidence
and will thus remain in the default, negative setting.26
The important thing to notice is the asymmetry between arguments for weak and pure rational-
ism. Whereas in the case for weak rationalism, the argument aims to show that alternative accounts
are impossible, the argument for strong rationalism involves producing complex models to show
that such an account is possible. This mirrors the difference between the observation of pattern
1a, which entails a contribution from the organism27, and that of 2b and 2c, which suggest an
empiricist algorithm, but which are consistent with pure rationalism.
The empiricist picture is thus motivated by arguing that rationalist proposals, like the triggering
accounts just discussed, are implausible. Correlation between the environment and the developed
German). There are complex empirical issues in this area. For example, if Kayne (1994) is right, then all languages are
SVO in their underlying structure. This fact would have important repercussions for a triggering account of language
acquisition, as it may make the problem of ambiguous triggers easier to solve.
25“Yo tengo hambre” is perfectly grammatical.
26Other complications to the triggering model, such as the distinction between ‘global’ and ‘local’ triggers, i.e. trig-
gers which unambiguously require a particular parameter setting no matter what other parameter settings are selected
versus those which unambiguously call for a particular setting only given other settings, can be introduced in order to
solve these kinds of issues. See Sakas & Fodor (2012) for a thorough proposal along these lines.
27Although it is an empirical question whether the contribution is language-specific or not, i.e. whether language is
innate in the narrow, domain-specific sense or not.
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language faculty is, in light of these proposals, insufficient on its own. What must be shown is that
a theory which accounts for this correlation by appealing to antecedently available information
internal to the system is less attractive than one which treats this information as originally located
in the environment and then reproduced in the psychology by some rational process.28 This can
involve claims that positing internal direction leads to bad predictions about development (e.g. the
learner is predicted to acquire a rule not reflected in behavior), or that such posits are explanatorily
surplus (e.g. the mechanisms needed to extract this information are already required in some other
aspect of the psychology).
Which way the debate about parameter settings turns out will have repercussions in the ratio-
nalist/empiricist debate. Triggering accounts like Sakas & Fodor (2012) are currently waning in
popularity, compared to more statistical proposals like Yang (2002), but this debate is far from
settled. However, there are phenomena that tell more decisively against pure rationalism.
2.6 Against Pure Rationalism: Semi-Productive Rules
Some linguistic generalizations are unrestricted in their application. For example, the rule for
forming the English progressive, ‘add -ing’, applies without exception: every progressive form in
English is formed in this way. Because these rules are so homogeneously adhered to in the environ-
ment, such cases provide little discriminating evidence between the empiricist and the rationalist.
English speaker’s developed states show no variation with respect to this state, and so the rational-
ist does not need to posit much internal structure to account for this phenomenon. They can also
explain why such a phenomenon is so wide spread: it is an aspect of one of the small number of
stable states achievable by the language faculty. The empiricists, on the other hand, can similarly
explain this with reference to the speaker’s reflection of highly stable environmental patterns.
However, some rules are more restricted in their application. Consider dative alternation,
wherein the order of the direct and indirect objects of transitive verbs is switched, and the direct
28This fact explains something puzzling about the terminological conventions in this debate: it is the empiricists
who are committed to the explanation of language acquisition as a rational activity, whereas rationalists view this
process as purely causal.
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object is marked with a preposition.
(6) I gave Maria the ball.
(7) I gave the ball to Maria.
Such pairs are semantically equivalent. However, this pattern is not universally applicable. There
are cases where the switched (8-9) or unswitched (10-11) order is not available:
(8) The water gave Maria typhoid.
(9) *The water gave typhoid to Maria.
(10) *I sacrificed God a lamb.
(11) I sacrificed a lamb to God.
While almost every aspect of language acquisition remains mysterious, the acquisition of semi-
productive rules is particularly astounding. In the case of the acquisition of the English progressive,
a child must recognize that certain utterances describe ongoing events as such. However, once this
is done, the child has a clean basis from which to induce a rule. The child can safely assume that
verb-stems followed by ‘-ing’ are progressives. Such an extrapolation will not significantly mislead
the child in either production or interpretation.29 Compare this to the case of dative alternation.
The simplest rule, move the direct object after the indirect object and mark it with ‘to’, is falsified
by (9) and (10). Nevertheless, the child is able to acquire mastery of these rules, and apply them to
novel cases in much the way that adults do.30
Yang (2016) discusses a mechanism by which these complex rules are acquired. According to
his Tolerance Principle: a rule is acquired if and only if e≤ N
lnN
, where e is the number of observed
29I am skimming over significant complications in the story here. These complications should not matter for our
purposes.
30An additional complication in this debate is how we ought apportion this linguistic competence to the learner’s
psychological system. In particular, it may be that semi-productive rules are not acquired in the same way, i.e. by the
development of the same psychological system, as the kinds of generally applicable principles and (possibly) param-
eters discussed in previous sections. I suggested a picture of this sort in Linguistics and the Explanatory Economy.
However, I take it that an account of language acquisition in general must account for all kinds of acquisition, whether
this involves the development of just one specifically linguistic system or many. More on this issue in section 2.8.
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exceptions to the rule (i.e. examples to which the rule could apply, but to which it is known not
to) and N is the number of examples to which the rule can (correctly or incorrectly) apply. The
Tolerance Principle captures a fact about cognitive economy: extracting generalizations from data
is efficient to the extent that the exceptions are few compared to the cases to which the rule correctly
applies.
A central feature of Yang’s view is the division of data into fine-grained categories for the
application of the Tolerance Principle. Based simply on an unclassified natural language corpus,
very few rules would meet the threshold required for acquisition. Yang’s clearest case of this is
German pluralization.31 Only about 4% of german nouns found in the corpora pluralize with ‘-s’.
Nonetheless, this rule is productive: novel and loan words typically pluralize with ‘-s’. How can
this be if the ‘exceptions’ to this rule (≈96% of German nouns) vastly outnumber the good cases?
Yang’s answer is that the class of constructions to which a rule could apply is not homogenous.
Instead, it is divided into multiple sub-classes (e.g. according to gender), each of which are targets
of more specific rules. N for each rule is not simply the number of expressions to which the rule
could apply, but this number minus the number of expressions covered by other rules. In this way,
Yang shows how each rule learned (“feminine nouns are pluralized with ‘-en’ ” etc.) can meet the
threshold required by the Tolerance Constraint. ‘Add-s’ is the most general (‘default’) rule, in that
it doesn’t place any special constraints on the nouns to which it applies. The fact that most nouns
are already covered by alternative, specific, rules explains why it generalizes: of the few nouns not
already covered by other rules, it applies with few exceptions.
Returning to our earlier example, the simplest rule for dative-alternation is: a double-object
construction is grammatical if and only if a to-dative is grammatical. However, due to examples
like (9) and (10), this won’t do. For this reason, Yang argues that speakers taxonomize the class of
such constructions so as to find more specific constructions for which the number of exceptions is
tolerably low. For example, if we semantically restrict the set of to-datives so as to include only
verbs of caused possession (e.g. ‘give’, ‘donate’ etc.), the ratio of e to N
lnN
drops sufficiently so as
to pass under the bar presented by the Tolerance Principle. Similar subclassification according to
31Yang (2016) Chapter 4.
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semantics, phonology, etc. enables Yang to make accurate predictions about which rules will be
adopted, and thus about what kinds of over-generalization will occur.
In this way, when acquiring rules for semi-productive phenomena, the model posits that speak-
ers extrapolate linguistic rules on the basis of how frequently these rules are attested in their en-
vironment (relative to observed counter-examples). This is a clear case of an empiricist form of
learning, in our sense. The crucial difference between this learning mechanism and triggering pro-
posals is that the latter require that certain stimuli are individually causally sufficient for a given
change in the language faculty. Yang’s model, however, treats the faculty as responding instead to
high-level patterns. This empiricist move allows for an explanation of when the faculty does and
does not induce a rule, thus accounting for differential degrees of productivity. For each (possi-
ble) class of constructions to which one such rule applies, the pure rationalist would have to posit
innate structure. Given how fine-grained these rules are, this would put serious pressure on the
innate endowment.
This sensitivity to environmental patterns also explains characteristic properties of linguistic
development, such as the ‘U-shaped curve’: the phenomenon of children’s linguistic competence
degrading before they acquire mastery. Very young speakers tend to make fewer grammatical
mistakes than those slightly further along in development. Yang explains this with his Tolerance
Condition. At a very young age, children are exposed to relatively few verbs, many of which
(e.g. ‘be’, ‘have’) are irregular. This prevents extrapolation, and so each inflection is learned
separately. As they acquire more verbs, and thus more regular verbs, they begin to project rules,
and so we see characteristic over-regularizations (‘I breaked/taked the toy’). As more evidence
becomes available, they begin the process of sub-categorization described above, eventuating in
mastery of the rules. This model thus makes linguistic competence highly correlated with the
specific evidence available, indicative of patterns 2b and 2c above.32
I hope the preceding has provided a convincing case for an intermediate position between the
pure forms of rationalism and empiricism. While PoS decisively shows that some information in
32An extra benefit is that such a proposal provides a neat explanation for historical language change. When, for
whatever reason, the patterns in the environment are modified (say by the influx of speakers of different languages as
a result of mass immigration), the children will pick up on, and reflect, such patterns. It is much more difficult to give
a triggering-based account of this phenomenon. See Yang (2000) for discussion.
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the adult linguistic competence must be provided by the organism itself, this should not lead one
to the stronger claim that natural language acquisition is purely internally driven, as generativists
have sometimes suggested. The acquisition of semi-regular rules is better explained by a model
according to which the learner reflects statistical patterns of usage in the environment in their de-
veloped linguistic faculty. This is an important way in which language acquisition is not analogous
to the development of bodily organs, as Chomsky has often suggested.33 While environmental dif-
ferences may lead to the development of cancer in different organisms’ livers, these effects do not
reflect their environment. As Yang’s model shows, linguistic competence is, unlike the develop-
ment of the liver, at least in part a rational process, involving the extraction of information in the
environment, as the weak empiricist claims.
2.7 Empiricism and E-Languages
One upshot of this discussion is that it undermines one of Chomsky’s oft-cited and puzzling claims:
that theoretical linguistics need not appeal to E-languages.34 Instead, linguists need refer only to
I-Languages. The crucial distinction for our purposes is that I-languages are internal states of a
particular speaker’s mind, whereas E-languages are public entities shared by multiple speakers.35
Chomsky claims that appeals to E-languages involve an invocation of ‘common-sense’ under-
standing of what languages are. English and Mandarin are taken to be systems shared by billions
of speakers, and linguistics is to be the study of such public systems. Chomsky claims that to bur-
den sciences with these folksy notions is illegitimate. Science progresses in large part by isolating
which phenomena are suitable targets liable to encourage deep explanations, independently of the
way laypeople conceive of the world. Insisting linguistics make reference to public languages like
English is analogous to insisting biologists make reference to paraphyletic categories like fish. If it
33See, for example, Chomsky (2000) (p.5).
34He has made this claim consistently throughout his career, but perhaps the most focused discussion is in Chomsky
(2000).
35I-Languages are also intensional, in that two distinct I-Languages could map the same sounds onto the same
meanings, as long as the algorithm implementing this mapping differs, and individualist in that speaking an I-language
does not essentially depend on any relations between the speaker and her broader environment. E-languages, on the
other hand, are extensional and anti-individualist. These latter distinctions will not matter for my purposes.
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is correct that I-languages, states of individual’s psychologies, are the only scientifically tractable
phenomena in the vicinity, then linguistics should shed the traditional notion of external language
entirely.
Chomsky’s argument works, however, only on the condition that pure rationalism is true. Ac-
cording to the pure rationalist, the human language faculty develops purely on the basis of its
internal principles. That is, all the structure of the developed system is contributed by the organism
itself. The environment enables this development, and perhaps selects one pathway of develop-
ment, but the developed structure does not reflect the environment. If this is correct, then at least in
principle we could understand the nature of the language faculty independently of understanding
patterns of language use in the environment. In particular, if E-languages serve merely as triggers
for the development of I-languages, then it is plausible that we could understand the latter with lit-
tle understanding of the former. Compare: while environmental conditions influence the fat levels
in a developed liver, it is not clear that hepatologists need detailed understanding of human diets in
order to articulate the typical workings of the kidney.
However, if, as I have argued, weak empiricism is true, then an understanding of E-languages
will be essential to an understanding of the development of linguistic competence. If the language
faculty mirrors statistical regularities in the environment, then in order to understand the faculty’s
development, we will need to understand what these patterns are. The distinction between E-
languages as explananda and as explanantia is important here: nothing I have said is any defense
of the claim that (theoretical) linguistics ought explain the properties of E-languages.36 Rather,
even accepting Chomsky’s claim that linguistics aims to explain I-languages, the extent to which
empiricist theories of I-language-acquisition are correct is the extent to which E-languages will be
needed for a proper explanation.
If all the features of a (developed) language are products of the development of the organism,
causally but not rationally dependent on the environment, then we may be able to understand the
properties of language just by looking at individuals and the way they develop. However, if I-
languages develop partially by extrapolating from observed regularities and patterns, then we will
36Of course, other branches of linguistics, such as historical or socio-linguistics, can adopt this project.
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likely need to determine what these patterns are, and how they interact with the learner, in order to
explain linguistic development. But this is just to describe features of an E-language.
For example, in Yang’s explanation of how children learn the circumstances under which dative
alternation is legitimate, he relies on facts about how these expressions are used in a community,
such as facts about the corpus.37 These are not facts about any individual’s I-language, but about the
statistical patterns in the community in which the speaker was raised. Because the model is weakly
empiricist such facts will be necessary to explain how a speaker ended up speaking the language
she did. If speakers reflect environmental regularities, then explanations for their developed states
will make essential reference to these regularities, and thus these regularities (E-language facts)
will be essentially involved in the explanatory project of linguistic theory.
2.8 Acquisition and The Explanatory Economy
This provides a further example of the explanatory economy: the ways in which different the-
ories rely on one another to explain away each other’s anomalies. Rationalist models provide
solutions to puzzles raised by the PoS argument, however, they seem ill-suited to account for
much of the variation observed between linguistic communities. Empiricist models show precisely
the reverse pattern: linguistic variation is predicted, given variation in linguistic environments,
but when developed linguistic competence displays properties absent from the environment, these
models become less plausible. Likewise, this shows that a singular focus on I-languages will fail
to capture the environmentally-driven irregularities between speakers, while a singular focus on
E-languages will lose sight of the significant internal constraints on acquisition. The explanatory
economy provides a way out of this deadlock. By pursuing both models, we can get an understand-
ing of which aspects of linguistic competence are best explained by positing internal, ultimately
biological, mechanisms, and which require reference to the linguistic environment. These mod-
els will, hopefully, be complementary, collectively providing coverage of all the linguistic data.
Linguistic behavior which seems anomalous from the perspective of an I-language approach need
37E.g. in the CHILDES corpus, 49 caused-possession verbs appear, of which only 38 are attested in the double-
object construction (p.203)
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not be viewed as indicating that these linguistic theories are in need of revision, provided it can
be shown that these phenomena are explicable with reference to the observed patterns in the lin-
guistic environment. Likewise, the ways in which human language acquisition goes beyond these
environmental patterns can be explained with reference to facts about speakers’ innate linguistic
faculties.
What to infer about the psychological systems of language learners on the basis of this method-
ological approach is, however, more complex. Two options present themselves: pluralism and in-
tegration. On the pluralist approach, these distinct strategies are required because there are distinct
systems responsible for, on the one hand, innately-driven linguistic development, and on the other,
extrapolation from environmental linguistic patterns. Perhaps the most developed version of a the-
ory along these lines is Pinker (1991), in which it is argued that language, especially inflectional
morphology, is governed by a rationalist symbolic rule system and an empiricist connectionist sys-
tem for learning exceptions working in parallel. On the integrationist approach, on the other hand
the inference from distinct methodologies to distinct underlying systems is not warranted. Instead,
we ought view these two influences on language acquisition to be properties of the same system.
Charles Yang’s model provides an example of this latter approach: language acquisition is a proba-
bilistic process of extrapolating from environmental data, but the extrapolations they make, and the
ways in which they classify environmental observations, are provided by innate language-specific
constraints (Universal Grammar). The Bayesian model discussed earlier is likewise a unified sys-
tem, but it is difficult to infer much from this, given the restrictions on this model discussed earlier.
The first of these approaches fits neatly with the explanatory economy: proceeding in this
way involves developing two distinct theories, of different targets, with the aim that they can
together account for the data. The ultimate acceptance of the second, integrationist, approach
would preclude this application of the explanatory economy. The explanatory economy relies on
the existence of distinct, but compatible, models capable of covering observations outside of each
other’s scope. If our final picture of language acquisition posits just a single system there is no
room for other accounts to explain away any anomalies.38
38Note that the claim is that integrationist approaches would preclude the debts accrued to, say, a rationalist account
of language acquisition being discharged by an empiricist account of (a distinct system of) language acquisition, and
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However, that the explanatory economy is not the approach adopted by defenders of a particular
integrative theory of language acquisition does not show that the approach is not useful, indeed
essential, in developing such a theory. It seems quite likely that consideration of the observations
handled well by current and previous pure rationalist or empiricist approaches is what enables the
development of an integrated approach. That current work in the rationalist tradition is able to
exclude, say, certain kinds of idioms from its purview on account of them being learnable on the
basis of learners’ linguistic environments, and thus not modify their claims about the state of the
language faculty in response to these anomalies, enables us to get clearer on exactly which aspects
of the language are likely innate. Any proposed integrationist model will have to provide just the
sort of division between innately given aspects of the system and learned aspects of the developed
competence that the explanatory economy is suited to provide. It may be that we can, one day, kick
away the ladder and incorporate all these insights into a single system, but the pluralist approach
is likely to be essential in getting us there.
Secondly, it is worth stressing how strong a claim it is to say that language acquisition is
entirely a matter of the development of a single system, as the integrationist approach must if it
is to preclude the need for the explanatory economy. While standard generativist solutions to the
problem of the poverty of the stimulus involve viewing language acquisition as centrally involving
the development of a distinct psychological system, it does not follow from this that language
acquisition consists exclusively in the development of this system. It seems highly likely that
alongside this innately driven process, humans learn all kinds of facts about language in the same
way they learn facts about the world more generally. This seems especially forceful in cases where
what seem to be learned are acceptable ways to violate innately provided linguistic principles,
such as constraints on wh-question formation or binding theory. A plausible account of these
phenomena is to treat them as examples of the learner applying whatever extra-linguistic learning
systems they have to the linguistic environment. As Yang stresses, the strategies of statistical
learning posited in his system are just the same as those posited by the rest of the mind, they differ
in the statement of the rules they are testing and the evidence they are using to test them. This
vice versa. It is not that the use of the explanatory economy is precluded entirely. Debts incurred by the integrated
theory may still be discharged by other, non-acquisitional, theories.
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is perfectly consistent with the idea that the learner applies these learning strategies to linguistic
data in other ways, without the constraints provided by UG. If this is the case, the explanatory
economy will still be essential, in order to show that apparent exceptions to proposed linguistic
generalizations, even semi-regular generalizations, should be viewed as products of extra-linguistic
learning systems, and thus not counter-examples to proposals about strictly linguistic development.
Overall then, the fact that neither pure rationalist nor pure empiricist proposals about lan-
guage acquisition are plausible makes the explanatory economy strategy particularly useful. While
neither of these two proposals are suitable for capturing all the observations about linguistic de-
velopment, they may complement one another in ways that make such general coverage possible.
Whether ultimately this points to the role of distinct systems, or to the complex properties of a
single, hybrid, system is a complex empirical question about which the jury is still out. But either
way, it seems that the most productive way forward will involve developing both styles of approach
and seeing how they can be mutually beneficial.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I hope to have shown that pure rationalism and empiricism are untenable. Viable
theories of linguistic development will thus need to account both for information provided by the
environment and the organism. This position thus differs, on the one hand, from those who claim
that pure empiricist (e.g. domain-general Bayesian) or pure rationalist (e.g. strictly triggering-
based parametric) theories are sufficient to account for language acquisition, and on the other
from those who claim that is is a priori that no pure approach will work. By spelling out the
logic of the arguments against these strong positions, the strategy of the middle-ground is made
clearer, as is its status as a contingent, empirical hypothesis. This also shows how a commonly
cited methodological claim of the generativist tradition, the sole focus on I-languages, depends on
adoption of an extreme view, and should thus be replaced by the methodological pluralism I have
called the explanatory economy approach.
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CHAPTER 3
Idealization in Natural Language Semantics: Truth Conditional
Semantics for Radical Contextualists
3.1 Introduction
The received view of semantics centers around the claim that the meaning of an assertoric sentence
specifies a mapping from an utterance context to the conditions under which such an utterance
would be true. Formal semantics has largely consisted in the production of formal systems wherein
the truth-conditions of formal analogues to natural language sentences can be compositionally
derived. However, theorists of many different stripes have argued that this approach rests on a
mistake.
Skeptics of truth-conditional semantics1 have argued, using a wide range of examples, that
sentences fail to provide such a mapping. While a sentence may identify some contextual features
which must be identified in order to determine a truth-condition, the influence of context on truth-
conditions outstrips this.
Standard defenses of truth-conditional semantics, such as moderate contextualism2 and se-
mantic minimalism3, aim to close this gap between meaning and truth-conditions. The moderate
contextualist aims to match the context-sensitivity of natural language with context-sensitivity in
1Such as generative linguists (Chomsky (2000), Hornstein (1984, 1989), McGilvray (1998), Pietroski (2005, 2006,
2018)), relevance theorists (Carston (2013), Sperber & Wilson (1995)), contextualists of certain stripes (Bach (1994),
Recanati (2010), Searle (1980) and Travis (1985, 1996, 1997)), ordinary language philosophers (Austin (1950), Straw-
son (1950)) and others who are more difficult to categorize (e.g. Rayo (2013) or Wilson (2008)), to mention just a
few.
2E.g. Stanley (2007).
3E.g. Borg (2004) and Cappelen & Lepore (2008).
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its formal analyses. The minimalist denies that the natural language expressions are as context-
sensitive as they seem, relocating this context-sensitivity into pragmatics.
Both proponents of this argument and defenders of truth-conditional semantics share an as-
sumption: truth-conditional semantics is legitimate only if the semantic properties of natural lan-
guage sentences are in general sufficient to determine a truth-condition in a context. Proponents
of the argument claim that they are not, and so truth-conditional semantics is mistaken. Defenders
of this approach use various means to show that, contrary to appearances, they are, and so truth-
conditional semantics is saved. In this chapter, I shall argue that this assumption is mistaken. By
viewing the formal systems of truth-conditional semantics as idealized versions of their natural
language targets, I show how truth-conditional semantics can be legitimate even though the se-
mantic values it posits do not perfectly reflect the meanings of the natural language expressions
it targets. While the semantic properties of natural languages are indeed subtly context-sensitive,
by abstracting away from this messiness we can produce approximations in the form of truth-
conditional models. These approximately true models can then enable us to better predict and ex-
plain a variety of linguistic phenomena. In particular, I shall argue that high-level generalizations
can be captured by more minimalist models, but that these generalizations will have exceptions,
and that more contextualist models enable us to predict and explain these exceptions.
This approach serves to align the methodology of linguistics more closely with that of the spe-
cial sciences. As we shall see, context-sensitivity places opposing stresses on formal approaches
to semantics. On the one hand, if the effects of context on meaning are genuinely as widespread as
radical contextualists have argued, one might feel that an adequate semantic theory must thereby
also incorporate massive amounts of complexity in order to be empirically adequate. On the other,
given the extent of such effects, one might be tempted to exclude context-sensitivity almost entirely,
with the aim of providing simple and general pictures of the determinants of meaning common to a
wide range of contexts, leaving the distorting properties of context out of the inquiry. Much of the
debate in the philosophical literature has aimed at defending one of these two extreme positions.
However, this is rarely the approach taken in other fields which aim to understand the behavior of
complex systems. Instead, the standard approach involves producing a wide range of overlapping
but distinct representations of the target, each aiming to capture some aspects, while leaving out
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others.
3.2 The Argument
The argument against truth-conditional semantics challenges the assumption that sentences provide
the requisite information to determine truth-conditions. If the goal of semantic theory is to isolate
the stable meaning properties of natural language expressions, leaving the ways in which sentences
interact with the contexts in which they are uttered to pragmatics, then the undermining of this
assumption would show that truth-conditions are not the proper target of semantic theory.
Consider sentence (1), from Travis (1997):
(1) These leaves are green.
Travis describes a scenario in which Pia has painted the red leaves of her Japanese maple green.
She is visited by an artist and a botanist. The artist is producing a collage and asks Pia if she has
anything green that she can contribute. The botanist is conducting a study of photosynthesis in
green plants and asks if Pia has any green leaves for her study. Pia responds to both requests with
sentence (1). Travis’ intuition is that Pia has said something true in the former case, but false in
the latter.4 As she has, in both cases, apparently applied the same predicate to the same entities,
it is hard to see, on the traditional picture, how this could be. Such examples aim to show that
the influence of context on truth-conditions goes beyond any facts about the semantic properties of
the sentence. On the assumption that the meaning of an expression is invariant between contexts,
this is taken to show that truth-conditions are not the meanings of sentences. Thus semantic theory
should not aim to assign truth-conditions to sentences.
The conclusion drawn from such cases is that semantic theory needs reshaping. If natural
language sentences don’t determine truth-conditions, then a semantic theory that assigns them
truth-conditions must be flawed. I will refer to advocates of this position, who take the influence
of context on truth-conditions to outstrip that specifically called for by lexically encoded variables,
4Hansen & Chemla (2013) provide experimental evidence that such intuitions are widespread.
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‘radical contextualists’. The term ‘linguistic pragmatism’ is also often used to describe this posi-
tion.5
3.3 Standard Responses
While the argument discussed above has convinced many theorists, truth-conditional semantics has
had substantial success in accounting for a wide range of linguistic phenomena. For this reason,
it might reasonably be worried that a wholesale rejection of the approach would leave semantics
in a bad place. Fortunately, many theorists have come to truth-conditional semantics’ aid and
responded to the above argument. I will now discuss two of the main ways in which this has been
done.6
The fact that certain sentences determine a truth-condition only in context is not news to formal
semantics. Kaplan (1989) provided a method for accounting for such phenomena within the frame-
work of truth-conditional semantics. He distinguished between the character of an expression, its
stable meaning, and the content, what it contributes to the truth-conditions of an utterance in which
it occurs. Once this distinction has been made, we can see how truth-conditional semantics can
account for context-sensitivity. For certain expressions, such as ‘I’, the character can be stated as
a rule for determining how a content is determined in a context. Kaplan gives the rule: “‘I’ refers
to the speaker or writer” (p.505). This tells us that the content expressed by a use of ‘I’ is the
person who used it. Generalized, semantic theory aims to determine, not truth-conditions per se,
but functions from specific aspects of contexts to truth-conditions.
The first main response to the above arguments, the moderate contextualist approach, takes this
as its lead. It is argued that, just as truth-conditional semantics is not undermined by the fact that
the sentence “I am in Paris” can be used to say something true in some contexts but not in others,
it should not be troubled by the fact that “These leaves are green” can express something true in
one context but false in others.
5See e.g. Neale (2004). Note that I am using the term more widely than is typical.
6There is a third main strategy that I will not, for the purposes of this paper, discuss. This is the strategy of
relativizing truth-conditions themselves (e.g. MacFarlane (2014) and Predelli (2004)).
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While the context-sensitivity of indexical expressions like ‘I’ is obvious, other expressions
may be more covertly context-sensitive. But, the fact that they contribute different things to the
truth-conditions of utterances in which they occur indicates that, given a proper syntactic/semantic
analysis, they will be context-sensitive in just the same way. If this is so, then the fact that sentences
containing ‘green’ can express different truth-conditions in different contexts is no more problem-
atic than the fact that sentences containing ‘I’ can. The arguments above work to the extent that
the contextual features required to take speakers from sentence meaning to truth-conditions are
extra-semantic. However, Kaplan’s character/content distinction shows how context-sensitivity
can be accounted for within semantics proper. If, like ‘I’, the stable semantic value of ‘green’
specifies specific aspects of the context needed to determine its contribution to sentential truth-
conditions, then the role of context can be accounted for within semantics proper. The moderate
contextualist thus reduces the context-sensitivity of ‘green’ to the better-understood examples of
context-sensitivity like ‘I’.
Various theorists have applied this approach to the example above.7 Szabo´ argues that the
application of ‘green’ involves two contextually determined features: part and contrast class. Here
is a Szabo´-inspired lexical entry for ‘green’:
(2) JgreenK = λcλx. green’(x, part(x,c), class(c))
This is a function that takes a context (c) as an argument, and then returns a function from objects
(x) to truth-values, which will output true iff a contextually salient part of the object is green
relative to a contextually salient contrast class. This can allegedly handle the Travis case because
when talking to the artist, the contextually salient part of the leaf is its green outer surface; whereas
in conversation with the botanist, the salient part is the red surface under the paint.
The second main strategy for defending truth-conditional semantics is semantic minimalism.
The minimalist, like the moderate contextualist, takes as her starting point a universally acknowl-
edged feature of the history of semantics. It has long been noted that native speakers’ intuitions
do not directly reflect the purely semantic properties of the sentences they are considering. In
any actual conversational context, an utterance will convey, as well as the literal meaning of the
7E.g. Hansen (2011), Kennedy & Mcnally (2010), Rothschild & Segal (2009) and Szabo´ (2001).
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expression uttered, various kinds of additional information. Pragmatic features of this kind often
confound semantic judgments. For example, most people, on reading sentence (3), will interpret it
as saying that Michelle got out of bed and then put on her shoes.
(3) Michelle got out of bed and put on her shoes.
However, many semanticists and philosophers take the temporal interpretation of ‘and’ to be prag-
matically implicated, rather than given by the semantics proper.8 Strictly, it is claimed, this sen-
tence says only that Michelle both got out of bed and put on her shoes. Utterances of (3) typically
convey temporal ordering, but in virtue of general constraints on rational communication, not the
expression’s linguistic meaning. In general, it is cautioned that semantic theory must not be too
sensitive to linguistic intuitions, so as to avoid treating a phenomenon that more properly belongs
to pragmatics as semantic.
The minimalist takes this as her paradigm. While our intuitions in the above cases suggest that
one and the same sentence can express different truth-conditions in different contexts, we should
not infer from this that the truth-conditions of this sentence do in fact vary between contexts. Pia’s
leaves are either green, in which case (1) is true whether talking to an artist or a botanist, or they
are not, in which case (1) is false in both cases.9 Our intuitions about the changing commitments of
these claims should not be taken as the final word, clouded as they are by notions of communicative
intent and cooperation. It would be so misleading and uncooperative for Pia to make this assertion
in response to the botanist that we are tempted into thinking that it is literally false. The way in
which these leaves are green is not at all what the botanist is looking for, and so communicative
norms rule out the acceptability of her saying this. But, the minimalist claims, what she said was
nonetheless true.
The problems with these approaches are well known. The moderate contextualist position ap-
pears unstable. Its main motivation is precisely the kinds of intuitive differences in truth-conditions
seen in sentence (1). However, our intuitions seem sensitive to an indefinitely large range of con-
8Although this has been challenged. See, e.g. Lepore & Stone (2014).
9For my purposes I will assume that, upon final metaphysical analysis, Pia’s leaves are indeed green, but nothing
will turn on this assumption. What matters is just that the interpretation is invariant.
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textual features. Radical contextualists love to contrive novel situations in which the correct ap-
plication of a predicate appears to depend on factors not yet incorporated into semantic theory.
Consider, for example, situations in which Pia’s leaves are unpainted but covered with green moss,
or painted with glow-in-the-dark paint, and so on.10 As the moderate contextualist is, by the logic
of her theory, committed to accounting for such data there seems to be no non-arbitrary limit to
what her theory must incorporate. The Kaplanian trick works well for indexicals like ‘I’ precisely
because the effects of context on their contributions are well-defined.11 When the influence on
truth-conditions becomes as unconstrained as it seems to be with terms like ‘green’, this strategy
leads to more and more complex theories. In order to remain moderate, this strategy requires there
to be a relatively small number of contextual influences, each of which is specifically called-for by
the semantic value of the expression. The power of the radical contextualist line consists in show-
ing just how difficult it is to non-arbitrarily draw a boundary around the genuinely semantically
significant features of context. This point is exacerbated by arguments like that in Wilson (2008)
which aim to show that context-sensitivity is not a merely synchronic phenomenon, but is also
diachronic, in that the semantic properties of a term can shift dramatically over-time as a result of
unforeseen pressures to resolve various sorts of tensions arising in our interactions with the unruly
empirical world.
Another way to put the difficulty is that truth-conditional approaches to semantics seem forced
to reduce polysemy to either ambiguity or indexicality. The context-sensitivity characteristic of
ambiguity and indexicality can be handled truth-conditionally in finite ways: simply list all the
distinct meanings of the ambiguous expression, or list all the contextual parameters to which the
extension of an uttered expression is sensitive. That these forms of variation are both finite and
specified antecedently to their role in determining semantic content in a particular context is crucial
for their explanatory role. Non-finite lists, either of distinct meanings or contextual parameters,
pose insuperable difficulties for theories of language use and acquisition. However, polysemy
seems unsuited for such finite treatment. If the radical contextualists are right, then the range of
10See Travis (1985) and Hansen (2011) for examples of the wide variety of influences on such ascriptions.
11For the most part, although see e.g. Cohen & Michaelson (2013) for a discussion of some of the complications
that arise even for these better behaved expressions.
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factors that can influence the meaning of expressions in particular contexts is both indefinite and
unspecified prior to actual usage. The moderate contextualist can approximate this phenomenon by
adding contextual parameters when observed, but this will lead to more and more complex models
which will not, in principle, capture the full range of semantic behavior.
The minimalist is beset by a much more basic worry. The truth-conditions they posit just don’t
fit with the data. Given the flexible way in which we apply the term ‘green’, what grounds could
we have for singling out a particular set of objects as the green objects? Are Pia’s utterances both
true or both false? We seem to have no way of settling this question. It just isn’t clear what it
means for something to be green simpliciter. This problem is exacerbated when the minimalist
considers other expressions like ‘tall’ and ‘ready’. The minimalist thus is faced with a dilemma:
either semantic theories are properly responsive to our linguistic intuitions, in which case their
predictions seem false, or they are not, in which case it becomes unclear how to empirically assess
our theories at all.
The radical contextualist thus puts truth-conditional semantics in a bind. The data don’t seem
amenable to an invariantist analysis. However, in order to provide a contextualist analysis, we
seem forced to accept more and more contextual parameters, with no clear stopping-point. The
proposed alternative is to reject the claim that we are aiming to account for truth-conditions in the
first place.
3.4 An Alternative Approach
What is shared by both the proponents of the argument and those responding to it on behalf of truth-
conditional semantics is the assumption that if the semantic values assigned to expressions by our
semantic theories behave in ways that are not matched by the target expressions themselves (e.g.
the former incorporate more or less context-sensitivity than the latter), this is sufficient to show
that the theory is in need of replacement. The advocates of the argument claim that there is such
a disparity: natural language sentences do not determine truth-conditions, but truth-conditional
semantics assumes that they do. Responses to the argument aim to deny this and show that natural
language sentences do in fact determine truth-conditions, either by denying that natural language
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sentences are as context-sensitive as has been supposed or by incorporating this context-sensitivity
into the semantic theory.
My approach differs from both the advocates of and respondents to this argument in rejecting
the assumption that the disparity between theory and target must be eliminated. Even if we cannot
isolate all the contextual features relevant to determining the truth-conditions of an utterance in a
context, truth-conditional semantics may still be a perfectly legitimate enterprise. The methodol-
ogy of much good science centrally involves intentionally creating disparities between scientific
representations and their targets.
Models provide an indirect way of investigating the world. By producing a model, we create a
surrogate for its real-world target. We can then study the properties of the model and, under certain
conditions, make inferences about the properties of the target.12 Of course, no model will perfectly
resemble its target. If it did, there would be no benefit to studying the model in the first place.
So this means that theorists must make a choice about which properties of the target to include in
the model. In this way, idealization and abstraction are central to model-building. A model may
thus include entities known not to exist, or attribute properties to target entities that they are known
not to have, or leave out entities or properties that are known to be found in the target system.
For example, many of the models of population genetics assume that the likelihood of a parent
passing on one allele to an offspring is independent of the likelihood of its passing on any others.
However, due to genetic linkage, this assumption is known to be, in general, false. This falsehood
is intentionally introduced in these models in order to facilitate explanation and prediction.13
Crucially, models call for a different mode of evaluation than theories. Theories may be true or
false. However, such evaluations are unhelpful in discussing models. Because models invariably
misrepresent, or at least only partially represent, their targets, they do not really aim at truth.
12For a good overview of the role of models in science, see Frigg & Hartmann (2006).
13It is important to stress, so as to avoid confusion, that my use of the term ‘model’ is not the use familiar from
mathematics, wherein a model is a set-theoretical structure (or set of such structures) used to interpret a formal lan-
guage. I am using the term in the sense familiar from the empirical sciences, wherein a model is an entity which can
be studied in order to find out about some other phenomenon. A model organism, e.g. a lab rat, will be a model in
the latter sense (my sense), but not the former. This differentiates my proposal from that of Barba (2007) who argues
that we should treat the formal languages of natural language semantics as interpretable by multiple models in the
mathematical sense.
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Instead, models are best evaluated on the basis of how useful they are. More specifically, they
are evaluated on how useful they are in solving some particular problem. Modeling is thus an
alternative to describing, not a particular way of describing. The distinction can be seen clearly
in cases in which a theory which is known to be false is helpfully utilized in a particular model.
For example, consider a computational model of, say, a bridge which is developed to determine
whether it will withstand the forces enacted upon it by passing traffic. Such a model will be useful
to the extent that it accurately reproduces the behavior of the real bridge, and is not rightly criticized
for utilizing the falsified assumptions of Newtonian mechanics
My thesis is that the assignment of truth-conditions as sentential semantic values in semantic
theory should likewise be treated as a modeling idealization. Therefore, the fact that natural lan-
guage expressions are context-sensitive in ways unlike that of the semantic values assigned to them
by semantic theory need not be seen as indicating that the semantic theory needs to change any
more than genetic linkage shows that the models used in population genetics must be replaced. In
both cases, we should think of the properties of the model as approximations introduced in order
to facilitate theoretical goals. A semantic analysis, on this proposal, is thus not a description of
the semantic properties of natural languages, but instead a language in its own right, which is in
certain ways simpler than the natural language it was designed to illuminate. Semanticists can
then study the properties of this system as a proxy for studying the complex behavior of the natu-
ral language. A good semantic model will be one which, for the purposes of the current inquiry,
adequately reproduces the behavior of the natural language phenomenon it targets, and suggests as
yet unobserved behavior of such a phenomenon which can then be tested.
According to the ‘multiple-models approach’, scientific inquiry aims at the production of a
battery of different models, each of which makes different idealizations in the service of achieving
different goals.14 An idealization is justified for use in a particular model to the extent that it
enables the modeler to fulfill these goals. As different modelers may have different goals, they
may make different idealizing assumptions in constructing their models.
The central motivation for such a picture is the existence of trade-offs. Trade-offs occur when
14For the origins of this strategy see Levins (1966). For more contemporary defense and elaboration, see Godfrey-
Smith (2006), Weisberg (2007), and Wimsatt (2007b).
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different theoretical desiderata cannot be simultaneously maximized in the same model. One com-
mon source of trade-offs is the existence of causally heterogeneous systems. That is, systems the
behaviors of which are influenced by a wide variety of different kinds of factors.15 When studying
such systems, there is typically a choice between providing a relatively simple model, which may
be able to capture general and relatively context-insensitive properties of the system; or providing
a more complex model, with more parameters, which may more accurately predict the system’s be-
havior in particular cases. Crucially, the existence of trade-offs distinguishes the multiple-models
approach, according to which a plurality of models is required to achieve our various scientific
goals, from the universally accepted claim that at a given point in scientific inquiry we are likely
to be best served by creating and comparing distinct scientific representations.16
Just such a trade-off appears to confront the semanticist. The aim of semantic theory is to un-
derstand the system within which the meanings of natural language expressions are determined.17
However, given the range of contextual influences on such meanings, it seems that empirical ad-
equacy is likely to come at the cost of highly complex, and therefore highly specific, accounts of
the behavior of particular expressions in particular contexts. On the other hand, general models,
capturing the central behavior of these expressions, as found across a wide range of situations, are
liable to make inaccurate predictions when applied to particular cases. This situation, in which
generality can be bought only at the cost of empirical adequacy, and vice versa, is precisely a
15This is, of course, a rough and ready description of the kind of system I have in mind. For a more detailed account,
see Ladyman et al. (2013).
16These distinct views of the role of multiple models in science are sometimes conflated. Wimsatt (2007a), for
example, in an often-cited discussion of the role of false models in scientific inquiry, discusses modeling practices
which support both uses. For example, he mentions the way in which an oversimplified model may serve as the
starting point in a series of more realistic models. This is of course true, but does not suffice to motivate the multiple-
models approach in the stronger sense I am advocating in this paper. For this, these simplified models must remain
useful to scientists as alternative, more realistic models are introduced, not merely act as stepping stones. I believe it
is important to keep these two views separate, as their conflation can undermine the interest of the multiple-models
picture.
17Note that what I say should apply equally to approaches which view semantics as aimed at understanding sentence
meaning (Kaplanian character) as to those that view the target as utterance meaning (Kaplanian content), or even
more fine-grained notions like assertoric content (Rabern (2012)). While I am focusing on the semantic properties
of utterances, it is an essential desideratum of a theory of sentence meanings that it be able to predict the meanings
of these sentences as uttered in particular contexts. One reason for this is that judgements about utterances are what
provide empirical evidence for or against all semantic theories. Standard approaches forge this connection by making
sentence meaning a function from context to utterance meaning.
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trade-off, and thus suitable for a multiple models approach.
For this reason, I believe that a multiple-models approach can and should be adopted in the
field of semantics.18 Natural language meaning emerges from a causally heterogeneous system.
Prima facie what an utterance of a sentence means in a particular context depends at least on
the speaker’s language-specific knowledge, general facts about that speaker’s cognitive system,
external features of the context of utterance, and the cognitive states of the interlocutors.19 Because
of this complexity, linguistic modelers face trade-offs. In order to account for the complex context-
sensitive behavior of natural language expressions, we are faced with a choice: incorporate this
context-sensitivity into our models, or (partly) idealize it away. The former approach will lead to
complex models that can accurately describe specific systems, while the latter will produce simple,
general, and tractable models, which will fail in certain cases. If we imagine plotting models on a
graph, with models ranked with respect to their empirical adequacy along the Y-axis, and generality
along the X-axis, the existence of a trade-off is exemplified by there being no models plotted in
the top right hand corner. Contextualist models will cluster around the top left-hand corner, with
minimalist models around the bottom right. Note that there is still room for evaluation here: better
models are further away from the origin. What is denied is that there is a unique best model.
The argument against truth-conditional semantics can now be re-evaluated in light of the multiple-
models strategy. The radical contextualist argument suggests that there is no finite set of contextual
features that can be invoked to determine sentential truth-conditions. The truth-conditional seman-
ticist is thus faced with a dilemma. The moderate contextualist aims to account for these kinds of
data, but seems to lack a non-arbitrary place to stop adding complexity to her theory, as has been
stressed both by minimalists and radical contextualists. The minimalist denies that her theory is
responsive to such data, at the risk of apparent empirical inadequacy. The unpalatability of these
two options drives some to reject truth-conditional approaches in general. However, viewing se-
mantics as a multiple-models discipline undercuts this dilemma. Finite semantic models can be
18Yalcin (2017) argues for a model-based approach to semantics, but does not extend this to a multiple-models
approach.
19For an argument that the mental states of both the speaker and hearer are involved in determining reference, and
therefore truth-conditions, see Heck (2014). For a discussion of the role of facts about context, see Stojnic´ et al. (2013).
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viewed as approximations of the linguistic phenomena they target. These approximations can be
more or less drastic, with the minimalist models at the most idealized end of the spectrum, and
more complex moderate contextualist models at the other end. As there is no need to select the
semantic analysis of a given phenomenon, there is no need to arbitrarily find a cut-off point. This
provides an alternative to the usual ‘elimination by counter-example’ approach: failures of a model
may indicate that the model ought be replaced, but they may alternatively reflect the idealization
which enables the model to maximize generality, or perhaps some other theoretical virtue.
According to this picture, then, a semantic model is an artificial language which bears some
resemblance to a particular fragment of a natural language. In the natural language case, utterances
of expressions have extensions, but which extension they have is context-sensitive, and which
features of the context will be relevant is highly open-ended. That is, natural language expressions
do not on their own determine extensions, or even functions from context to extensions. The overall
context of an utterance is needed for this, including the mental states of conversational participants
and extra-mental features of the context. The formal model works by stipulating that some, and
only some, contextual features matter. We can then study the behavior of such a language, and
compare it to the behavior of the natural language fragment it aimed to illuminate. This comparison
serves to generate predictions. A good model will make accurate predictions for at least some such
cases. However, due to the indefinite nature of the contextual determinants of meaning, no model
will work for every case. This creates the need for multiple models, making different idealizations
to cover these different cases. These different models can now also be compared with respect to
other theoretical virtues, such as simplicity or generality. As suggested above, minimalist models,
in which context is given a minimal role, can be quite general. Contextual-sensitivity is widespread
in that for large parts of the lexicon, context is able to influence an expression’s meaning. But in
many cases it does not. This is the core insight of the minimalist, and explains why minimalist
models can have a wide coverage. However, because context can always play a role, in many cases
a contextualist approach will fit better with our observations.
Perhaps a mathematical analogy is helpful here. Certain functions can be represented as an
infinite sum of powers of their variables. For a very simple example, 11−x can, when -1< x <1, be
represented as 1+x+x2+x3+x4+x5.... These sequences often involve simpler mathematics than the
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functions they represent, and so can be used as helpful proxies. But, as these sequences are infinite,
the precise values of the function cannot be finitely computed in this way. So applied mathemati-
cians truncate these sequences, summing the values of the first n members of the sequence and
ignoring the rest. Under certain conditions, this procedure can be used to generate an arbitrarily
accurate estimate of the value of the function, with proximity to the true value increasing with
n. We can think of the relationship between semantic values as posited in semantic theory and the
real semantic properties of natural language expressions as standing in the same sort of relationship
that truncated series stand in to the functions they represent. If the radical contextualist is right,
real-world intensions, incorporating all the ways in which extensions depend on context, are not
finitely statable, just like these infinite sequences. In the mathematical case, there is no question
of what the right point for truncation is, in general. This will depend on how accurate we need to
be. My claim is that semantic analyses should likewise be viewed as approximations, and so the
question of how many contextual parameters the true semantic theory should posit likewise doesn’t
arise. Just as in the mathematics case, this depends on what we want our semantic theories to do.
The dispute between the minimalist and the contextualist (radical and moderate) stems from a
tension between two ostensible facts about language. On the one hand, language is amazingly sys-
tematic. With little explicit instruction, speakers within a linguistic community coordinate on the
semantic properties of a huge range of expressions. This systematicity seems necessary to account
for the ability to correctly interpret and produce indefinitely many utterances and to communicate
successfully across different contexts. On the other hand, one can only be amazed by the subtlety
with which language is put to use. What people are able to communicate with a particular utterance
can vary significantly depending on the conversational context. In proposing general pictures of
semantics, the minimalist seems to focus on systematicity while contextualists are more impressed
by subtlety.
This tension is dissolved by locating these phenomena at different levels of granularity. At a
high level of abstraction, we see natural language’s systematicity. Broadly accurate, but excep-
tional, generalizations express dependencies between different linguistic expressions. The exis-
tence of such generalizations is a precondition for the acquisition and use of language. However,
when we shift our attention to the lower, more fine-grained, level(s) of actual communicative be-
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havior, the exceptions to the rules become apparent. Subtle contextually-driven deviations from
the general rules start to appear as a result of the fact that communication is a rational activity,
and thus sensitive to all the complex intentions of human speakers. The minimalist and the mod-
erate contextualist assume that there is some unique level of granularity at which semantic theory
applies, and for which any causally more complex levels involve strictly pragmatic effects. They
differ in where they draw this line, with the minimalist claiming that semantics proper is fairly ab-
stract, and almost all contextual influences are properly speaking pragmatic. The challenge to the
moderate contextualist is finding a principled way to draw the line so as to let in more factors than
the minimalist, but without opening the floodgates and letting in just any contextual factors, a` la
the radical contextualists. The radical contextualist agrees that this can’t be done, and so rejects the
existence of this privileged level, claiming that there is no finite set of factors relevant to genuinely
semantic, truth-conditional, properties. I argue that this does not undermine the truth-conditional
methodology, but calls for a re-evaluation of its assumptions. Crucially, by denying that there is
a privileged level at which truth-conditional content is determined, we must view descriptions at
each level of granularity (i.e. with varying degrees of contextual-sensitivity) as each providing
imperfect approximations of the target.
This meshes nicely with certain radical contextualist pictures such as that proposed in Recanati
(2010) and Neale (2004) according to which interpretation is guided by a relatively stable compo-
sitional system operating on default lexical entries, but which is susceptible to top-down influence
(modulation) along the way.
Models in line with the minimalist approach capture the structural properties of language,
which enables them to account for its systematicity. At a coarse-grained level, we can see monadic
predicates, such as ‘is green’, and ‘is a prime number’, as playing a particular role in the determina-
tion of truth-conditions. Minimalist-inspired approaches explicate just what this role is. However,
once we pay attention not just to the structural facts, but also the influence of context, we notice
differences in these expressions’ behaviors. The exceptions to this systematicity involve the influ-
ence of contextual factors that are excluded from simpler models. Contextualist-inspired models
incorporate these influences, making better predictions in specific cases. However, by incorporat-
ing this context-sensitivity, we lose the ability to capture some of these structural dependencies.
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The multiple-models approach enables us to switch between focusing on the high-level invariances
and the lower-level complexities.
3.5 Entailment: A Case Study
As an example of the different strengths and weaknesses of these strategies, consider the expla-
nation and prediction of entailment patterns. One central task of semantics is discovering the
structural properties of sentences that account for relations of entailment between them. As entail-
ment is essentially a matter of truth-preservation, it is far from clear that radical contextualists will
be able to make use of this notion. If natural language sentences don’t have truth-conditions, it is
difficult to see what is supposed to be preserved in valid arguments.20 My aim in this section is to
show how we can throw out the bathwater of a simplistic view of natural language meaning, while
retaining the baby of a theory of natural language entailment, and with it the ability to utilize en-
tailment data in evaluating theories. I shall do so by arguing that entailment itself should be viewed
as context-sensitive, and that a multiple-models approach can capture some basic facts about this
context-sensitivity in ways that standard defenses of truth-conditional semantics cannot. To give a
very simple case, consider the following sentences:
(4) This apple is green.
(5) This is a green apple.21
Intuitively, the inference from (4) to (5) and vice versa is valid. A semantic theory should capture
such facts. However, if ‘green’ is context-sensitive, this entailment will not be predicted. If ‘green’
is context-sensitive, then it may contribute different things to these different sentences. This has
the same effect as positing an ambiguity: the inference is no longer valid. Unless the semantics
20This is not to say that making sense of entailment is impossible within such an approach. An account of natural
language entailment given strictly in terms of provability could be offered. But, this is against at least the spirit of
many radical contextualist approaches.
21I am assuming that ‘green’ here is acting as a purely intersective adjective in both cases. If ‘green’ does not
work this way (i.e. being green-for-an-apple does not entail being green simpliciter) then I would need to change my
example. But the issue of whether ‘green’ is intersective is orthogonal to the issue of whether it is context-sensitive,
and the point could be restated using another predicate which is the latter but not the former.
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of ‘green’ guarantees that its occurrences contribute to truth-conditions in the same way, then we
cannot be sure that (4) and (5) will be true in the same contexts. The minimalist model, by treating
‘green’ as invariant, ensures this, thus enabling the explanation and prediction of such entailment
patterns.
Of course, as with all simplifying idealizations, the minimalist strategy breaks down when
the factors idealized away play a significant role. By assuming that ‘green’ contributes the same
property to any sentences in which it occurs, we fail to predict the apparent fact that sentence
(1) can express different propositions in different contexts. By focusing on the general, structural
properties of language, we ignore the ways in which context does matter. By developing the
relatively simple idealized models of natural language provided by the minimalist approach, we
can understand compositional structures and dependencies. We can then use these as scaffolds
onto which we can attach more complex (e.g. context-sensitive) machineries in order to account
for deviations from these general patterns.
Consider sentence (6):
(6) This is a green apple, but it isn’t green.
Sentence (6) is predicted, if the above inference pattern is indeed valid, to be contradictory. How-
ever, there are contexts in which it can be truly uttered. Namely, those in which the two uses of
‘green’ express different contextually-determined properties. Consider a situation in which we are
sorting through a barrel of Granny Smith and Red Delicious apples. We are cutting them open to
see if they have been infected with a fungus that turns their flesh green in order to test the hypoth-
esis that this fungus affects all and only the green (Granny Smith) apples. I can utter (6) to note
that I have found a counter-example to this hypothesis: a green(-skinned) apple which isn’t green
(inside).
We can see the contextualist strategy as that of de-idealizing the minimalist models. While
generalizations are found by abstracting away from some kinds of complexity, in cases where
this complexity ‘makes a difference’, we must re-incorporate it into our models. By introducing
contextual parameters, we can precisify our models so as to handle the context-sensitivity evinced
by the earlier examples.
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I anticipate that people may balk at the idea that entailment patterns have counterexamples.
However, it is worth keeping in mind that I am claiming only that certain inference patterns in
natural language are not perfectly general. There are two ways of interpreting this. Firstly, one
could think that the logic that best captures natural language inference is a traditional system
wherein entailment is defined strictly so as to have no exceptions. If we maintain this picture
of logic, my claim would be that natural language is only imperfectly captured by such a logic.
This view was basically universally accepted by philosophers of language in the early-to-mid 20th
Century (e.g. by Strawson (1952) and Carnap (1962)).22 It is less popular now although the
optimism sparked by Montague, Chomsky, Grice, and others seems now to be wearing off, and this
proposal is looking more plausible. Alternatively, the best logic for natural language could be one
in which entailments do have counter-examples, as in Default Logic (e.g. Reiter (1980)), wherein
derivations are not necessarily truth-preserving. These proposals show that the idea that linguistic
entailments have counter-examples is not untenable, although of course more development of the
picture, and how it could be integrated into linguistic theory, is needed.
The standard way of ensuring that inferences like that between (4) and (5) are valid treats
entailment as defined only when the context remains constant.23 However, this will not, in general,
account for our intuitions about when entailments do and do not hold in natural language. Consider
the following utterance, made by Pia to the artist:
(7) This leaf is green, and this chair is green too.
This utterance appears to entail the following:
(8) There are two green things.
22In some sense, my view is an inversion of some of these traditional views. On one reading, Carnap viewed natural
language as an approximation of an idealized formal language. This way of putting it makes it seem like we are
expressing opposite views, but in fact I believe they are based on the same sets of facts. My view, like this traditional
view, stresses the gap between natural and formal languages. The difference depends on what we aim to achieve.
My goal, or the goal of natural language linguistics, is descriptive: to investigate and explain the properties of natural
languages. From this perspective, disparities between natural and formal language can only be viewed as cases where
the latter deviates from the former, and so I describe formal languages as approximating natural language. Carnap,
on the other hand, was interested in the normative project of working out how people, especially scientists, ought
reason. From this perspective, the formal languages of mathematics and logic were viewed as ideal systems, which
were imperfectly mimicked by natural languages, which ought therefore be improved by explication.
23E.g. Soames (2010) (p.101)
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However, if this restriction on our definition of entailment is enforced, this will not be licensed
by a Szabo´-style contextualist semantics. Presumably, the salient contrast classes for leaves and
chairs are different, and they have different salient parts, and so context must change in order for an
utterance of (7) to be true. If this is so, semantic theories which restrict the definition of entailment
in the way just described will simply be silent on the relation between (7) and (8). But this inference
is intuitively a good one. Relatedly, as context must shift mid-sentence in utterances of (6), theories
of entailment which adopt this restriction will be silent on the semantic properties (e.g. whether
it is trivial or contingent) of this sentence. A minimalist model, by abstracting away from the
context-sensitivity of ‘green’ is able to apply standard logical inference rules to account for these
inferential phenomema. In our idealized minimalist model, (7) says of two distinct objects that
they are within the (invariant) extension of the predicate ‘green’, and so existential generalization
licenses (8). By excluding context-change scenarios, the standard approach makes the explanation
of such cases impossible.
Here we have exactly the kind of trade-off that motivates a multiple-models approach. The
contextualist cannot account for the above general inference patterns. If ‘green’ is context sen-
sitive, inferring from (4) to (5) or (7) to (8) is illegitimate, little more than equivocation. If the
extension of ‘green’ depends on the context of utterance, and this context has shifted between ut-
terances, there is no guarantee that this extension has not also shifted, undermining the validity of
the inference. Restricting our notion of entailment so as to apply only in stable contexts simply
ignores the problem. But the minimalist can’t account for the truth of certain utterances of sen-
tence (6). The multiple-models approach, however, can make perfect sense of this. By ignoring the
context-sensitivity of ‘green’, one kind of model (simple, general, minimalist) can validate these
intuitive inference patterns. By re-incorporating this context-sensitivity, another (complex, spe-
cific, contextualist) model can account for this inference’s failures. At a certain level, entailment
can be given a purely formal analysis: the same symbol (e.g. ‘green’) in one sentence contributes
in the same way to truth-conditions as it does elsewhere. Minimalist models provide a framework
for such an approach. However, given that natural language is context-sensitive in more complex
ways, we oughtn’t focus only on this level. Moderate contextualist models serve to de-idealize
in order to explain the cases in which these more abstract models fail, but do so at the cost of no
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longer explaining the original entailment pattern.
This reflects a popular view of the relationship between theories of a higher and lower gran-
ularity.24 In the special sciences, generalizations can be found. However, these generalizations
have exceptions. These exceptions are accounted for by moving to a more fine-grained level of
description. At this level, exceptions to generalizations can be explained. But, for precisely this
reason, at this level the generalization can no longer be truly stated. Levins (2006) provides a beau-
tiful example of this approach in population ecology.25 He considers how one would calculate the
dynamics of a population of ants, and shows how to begin with fairly simple dynamical models (in
this case, a differential equation with one variable and one parameter), and gradually and system-
atically de-idealize them, incorporating extra parameters such as abundance of food, prey-predator
interactions, temperature, etc. His point is that there is no end to the kinds of information that
one could incorporate in this way, but that the more that is in fact incorporated, the more specific
and complex the model will be. He says “But the kinds of observations and the specific questions
we can ask [about different models] are different. Our work depends both on generalization and
respect for specificity.” (p. 747).
I believe that examples like sentence (1) do indicate a gap between meaning and truth-conditions.
Because context is able to influence the semantic content of an expression in subtle ways, it is
unlikely that many general claims about sentential truth-conditions or inference patterns will be
exceptionless. What is novel about my position is the rejection of the inference from this radi-
cal contextualist metaphysics to the rejection of the truth-conditional methodology. Despite the
counter-examples to the truth-conditional proposals, the best strategy for semantics is to continue
pursuing such proposals. The multiple-models approach shows how to make sense of the combi-
nation of these two positions. While aspects of our semantic theories are not perfectly aligned with
the natural language expressions that are our targets, this does not motivate the rejection of these
approaches. These disparities are the result of idealizations introduced to bring some order to the
messy phenomena. By abstracting away from the complexities of natural language meaning, we
24E.g. Fodor (1974).
25See also Wilson (2008) (p.180-1), for a similar case from classical mechanics, involving the range of parameters
that could be invoked in accounting for the behavior of billiard ball collisions.
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can produce simpler models which capture broad generalizations. When we wish to focus more
on the subtleties themselves, we are able to de-idealize, producing more complex models in which
counter-examples and anomalies can themselves be explained. Semantics involves the prolifera-
tion of such models, each of which should enable us to understand some different aspect of natural
language meaning, viewed at various different levels of granularity.
3.6 What is Semantic Theory About?
This approach suggests a re-analysis of what semantic theory is about. Linguistic theory in general
is usually described as aiming to discover what one knows when one knows a language.26 Seman-
tic theory then aims at uncovering the meaning-related aspect of this knowledge: what does one
know when knows what linguistic expressions, simple or complex, mean? The usual assumption
is that this knowledge can be fully stated in finite form. That is, one’s semantic competence in-
volves specifying, in advance, something like an axiom system which determines how each lexical
item contributes to the meaning of utterances in which it occurs, including identifying the set of
contextual parameters to which each item is sensitive. Moderate contextualists and minimalists
alike accept this basic picture, but differ on the nature of this knowledge. Some critics of truth-
conditional semantics (e.g. the generativists mentioned in fn. 1) accept this picture as well, but
accept the radical contextualist argument that there is no stable, antecedently known, set of facts
which determine truth-conditions, and so infer that natural language meaning does not determine
truth-conditions in contexts.
I believe that the strength of the radical contextualist argument is in showing that the question
(what does one know when they know what expressions mean?) exhibits presupposition failure.
That is, there is no well-defined thing that corresponds to the traditional notion of semantic mean-
ing. The traditional picture relies on there being a principled way to separate endogenous from
exogenous influences on meaning: i.e. distinguish those influences of context which semantic
competence “anticipates”, from those merely pragmatic factors which do not target an element in
the lexical entry for the expression and therefore cannot modify literal meaning. For example,
26Or, if the intentional idiom is deemed inappropriate, what states one is in when one knows a language.
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in Szabo´’s entry for ‘green’, comparison class and part play a role endogenous to the semantic
system, and so utterances of ‘green’ can express different contents in contexts in which different
object parts or contrast classes are salient. However, this complete lexical entry rules out any other
possible influence. For example, Hansen (2011) notes the ways in which observation conditions
influence our willingness to apply color terms (e.g. something may look one color when seen
from afar, but a different color when up close). On the traditional view, at least one of these pro-
posals must be incorrect. There is some fact of the matter as to whether our knowledge of the
term ‘green’ literally expresses something different when applied to distant and nearby objects,
and either Szabo´ or Hansen (or, according to the minimalist, both) has misdiagnosed this fact.
The radical contextualist argument suggests that this whole debate is mistaken. There simply is
no principled exogenous/endogenous distinction to be drawn. Many things can influence what we
mean when we speak, and our knowledge of language does not involve cleanly determining which
influence literal meaning and which influence only what is conveyed, in advance of actually pro-
ducing or encountering the particular utterances we make. In such a circumstance, all we can hope
for is a collection of more or less complex models, each of which takes some subset of the possible
influences on meaning into account. These models include some of the features of an utterance in
a context which determine truth-conditions, but as these features may vary indefinitely, no model
will include all such features.
Note that this is not the same as claiming that there is no semantics/pragmatics distinction. The
radical contexualist picture just developed denies that there is any antecedently determined set of
influences on what is said (strictly, literally, etc.), but it doesn’t follow from this that there is no
distinction between what is said and what is implicated, implied, conveyed etc. When I say “Those
leaves are green.” there is one question of what property I have attributed to the leaves, i.e. what
is the set of entities such that I am claiming that these leaves are in this set, and there is another
question of what I was doing by making such a claim, i.e. was I offering the leaves as an example,
or suggesting that the leaves ought be removed, etc. We can get at this distinction in the normal
ways, by asking whether what is said could be true while what was conveyed was false, and so on.
On this picture, utterances have literal truth-conditions, and these truth-conditions are what they
literally mean, but what determines these truth-conditions is not itself specified in advance by the
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meanings of the constituent expressions.
The question “What does one know when one knows a language?” may, if this picture is
correct, have no unique answer. Semantic competence may be describable at multiple levels of
abstraction, and each level of description may be apt in some ways and inapt in others. To know a
language would be to both understand the high-level regularities and systematicities and to know
how and when such generalities may fail. When we describe our linguistic competence we will
then have to choose either to highlight one or the other of these aspects of knowing a language, but
no model will incorporate both the regularities as well as all of the exceptions.
This picture of semantics is more in line with the ontology of other special sciences dealing
with complex objects. Models of ecosystems, weather systems, economies, etc. can be produced
which are tractable in virtue of keeping causal parameters to a minimum. There will be various
advantages to abstracting and idealizing in this way, but there will also be costs. Because of these
costs, especially in predictive accuracy, other models can be produced which make explicit refer-
ence to these other causal factors. However, to ask, for example, “Which of these really represents
the ecosystem?” would be simply confused. They all do, at different levels of abstraction. If the
above picture of semantic competence is correct, then such an answer may similarly be plausible in
the semantics case. It is a contingent empirical proposal that knowing a language is having a fully
modular faculty consisting of an axiomatic description of the truth-conditions of this language. If
this assumption is incorrect, as the radical contextualists claim, and the semantic values of expres-
sions can be influenced in this top-down way, then there will arise the question of how much of this
influence should be included in our models. The multiple-models approach answers this question:
it depends on what we want our models to do.
These issues in semantic theory suggest an interesting analogy to the historically central ques-
tion in developmental biology: are developed traits a product of biology (nature) or environment
(nurture)? Debates about this topic assume that causal factors can be more-or-less straightfor-
wardly categorized according to whether they are biological or environmental. For example, one
can ask whether a trait like height is to be explained with reference to the genetic inheritance
from an organism’s parents, or to environmental factors (e.g. an abundance of food). The debate
within semantics assumes an analogously clean-cut picture, asking whether particular linguistic
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effects are best accounted for by antecedently determined context-sensitivities in the lexicon, or by
extra-semantic influences of speaker intention etc. The analogy is instructive in that this picture
of biological development has come under serious attack in the latter half of the 20th Century, to
the point where a rejection of this picture is the majority view. Among others, Lewontin (2001,
2006) has insisted that the separation of nature and nurture, or biology and environment, as distinct
causes of biological development, is itself an artifact of our theorizing, not a distinction found in
the world. That is, we can talk about genetic and environmental causes of developed traits, but
this gives the false impression that we might be able to factor out these contributions, thereby
determining which traits are innate and which are acquired, or to what extent a particular trait is
dependent on these independent sources.27 Instead, Lewontin argues, each trait is a product of
the entanglement and interaction of the biological and the environmental, to the point where it
becomes impossible to draw any sharp boundary. This critique is strengthened by work in the
evo-devo tradition, stressing that what an offspring inherits from its parents goes far beyond ge-
netic material.28 This of course doesn’t mean that models in which organismic development is
factored into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ influences are of no use, just that they introduce distortions.
Whether these distortions are worth it depends on the other benefits of these models. What is
interesting is that, while this ‘factorization’ approach to biology is unpopular, it is still almost uni-
versally assumed within the formal semantics tradition. The argument in this chapter is aimed at
suggesting an alternative approach, accepting that there is no sharp line to be drawn around those
contextual influences that genuinely matter for literal meaning and those that merely matter for
conveyed meaning, and thus adopting the multiple-models approach which allows us to artificially
draw such a boundary in whatever places it happens to be useful. This allows semantics to both
fit better with the observations put forward by the radical contextualists, and the methodology of
the special sciences more generally, without excluding the significant evidential base of linguistic
judgements about truth and entailment.
27Note that this critique is aimed at a causal notion of innatenes: innate traits are caused in a particular way. This
does not show that there is no non-causal distinction to be drawn here. See Empiricism, Syntax, and Ontogeny.
28See e.g. Oyama et al. (2003).
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3.7 Syntax and Semantics
This proposed methodology for semantic theory thus differs in important ways from the account of
syntactic methodology I described in Linguistics and the Explanatory Economy. Both focus on the
need for multiple representations of the target system, but these distinct representations serve dif-
ferent functions. In the syntax case, the target is the internal grammar of a competent speaker. The
role of other theories was in explaining away apparent counter-examples to the grammatical theory
in question. For example, while the grammar notes no important distinction between singly center-
embedded sentences (e.g. “The mouse the cat chased squeaked.”) and multiply center-embedded
sentences (e.g. “The mouse the cat the dog hated chased squeaked.”), these sentences were treated
quite differently by competent speakers: the former are unremarkable while the latter typically
cannot be parsed/interpreted. This apparent anomaly for the grammatical theory was accounted
for by a theory of a distinct psychological mechanism: the parser. This enabled syntacticians to
retain their theories of the grammar which posited no distinction between the grammaticality of
singly- and multiply-embedded constructions.
In my account of semantic theory, on the other hand, the role of distinct representations (mod-
els, in this case, rather than theories) was slightly different. Again, models of one sort are utilized
to capture observations that are anomalous from the perspective of other models, but these models
do not have different targets. The contextualist and minimalist models I discuss are all models of
the same semantic system. They differ in the level of abstraction at which they aim to capture this
system.29
This difference in methodology is motivated by different properties of the target systems. In
particular, I view grammar/syntax as a modular system. That is, an expression’s grammatical
properties are determined without reference to the broader psychological context in which such
properties are computed. In Fodor (1983)’s terms, syntax is informationally encapsulated. Perhaps
29I believe the approach I advocated for syntax, in which subsets of the observational data are apportioned to
different psychological theories according to explanatory power, is similarly applicable to semantics. For the same
reasons as in the syntactic case, it is likely that a variety of different systems influence intuitions about semantics, and
so the mapping from data to theory will be complex. The clearest case of this is the influence on semantic intuitions of
pragmatic factors, as discussed earlier. The argument of this chapter is that semantics, given its non-modular nature,
requires an extra, theory-internal, pluralism.
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the best indications of modularity/informational encapsulation are examples wherein a subject has
background beliefs which would, if relevant to the workings of a particular system, motivate par-
ticular interpretations of a stimulus, but for which no such interpretation is available. In the case
of vision, optical illusions like the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion are frequently used to make this point:
no matter how confident the subject is that the lines are the same length, they continue to ap-
pear different. Likewise in the grammatical case, autonomous grammatical rules seem to force
readings of particular sentences, even when there are nearby readings which would make these
sentences much more plausible in light of our background knowledge. Classical examples of this
phenomenon include constraints on auxiliary movement. Consider sentence (9):
(9) The hiker who was fed granola fed the parking meter.30
This semantics of (9) involves perfectly natural relations: the granola was fed to the hiker, who
fed the parking meter (coins, presumably). However, if we form a polar question by raising the
auxiliary ‘was’, we get:
(10) Was the hiker who fed granola fed the parking meter?”
(10) can only have the bizarre reading that involves asking whether the hiker, who fed something
to granola, was herself fed a parking meter! This obstinate immunity from the influence of back-
ground knowledge about plausible feeding situations is indicative of the workings of a system
which operates independently from the rest of the mind. This is one of the phenomena alluded to
by the thesis of ‘the autonomy of syntax’. In the semantics case, however, at least in the lexical
cases I have discussed, our background assumptions seem to play an essential role in our inter-
pretations. It is precisely because listeners know that Pia’s artist friend is interested in the surface
appearance of the leaves, whereas the botanist cares about the natural pigmentation of these leaves,
that we interpret Pia’s assertions in different ways in the different situations. This indicates that
the interpretation of lexical items is non-modular.31
30From Berwick et al. (2011).
31This is a controversial claim, for which I am not here arguing. I am merely noting that I agree with it, and
showing how this assumption relates to my methodological proposals. For a good overview of the debate, and a
dissenting argument that semantics is indeed modular in the face of these kinds of examples, see Borg (2012).
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It is precisely this distinction, between modular and non-modular systems, that motivates the
different strategies I advocate in the semantics and syntactic cases. The need for a pluralism of
representations is motivated by the complexity of the target system. The behavior of complex
systems cannot be captured by simple representations. Rather than attempt to develop highly
complex representations, which are typically impractical for theoretical purposes, I have argued
that this complex behavior can be broken up and captured by a range of distinct representations.
However, this decomposition applies differently to complex systems composed of modular parts,
on the one hand, and complex non-modular systems on the other. The driving force in generative
grammar since its inception has been the thought that the underlying grammar is itself relatively
simple, and that complexity in observed behavior is thus a product of the interaction of this simple
system with many others. The role of multiple representations in theorizing about syntax is thus
to divide up these observations, and show how some subset of them is explained by the workings
of this simple, modular grammatical system. However, if semantic interpretation is non-modular,
more is needed. Non-modular systems allow influence from a wide range of factors, and the role
of a multiplicity of semantic models is thus to divide up these causal factors. Minimalist models
home in on the core, relatively stable, semantic properties of expressions, excluding the external
factors that make this system non-modular. Contextualist models, describing this same system at a
finer level of granularity, incorporate these influences, thus making them better able to capture the
observed behavior of the system in particular contexts where these influences matter. This division
of labor is required to make sense of the workings of this single complex system.
This distinction makes clear the fruitfulness of the general pluralism in linguistics I have ad-
vocated for in this dissertation. The complexity of linguistic behavior poses problems for linguists
in all kinds of ways, whether it be in the influence of non-target systems (as in syntax), or in the
causal complexity of a particular system (as in semantics). Producing theories in the face of such
complexity is difficult because of the highly messy data such complex systems generate. Deter-
mining just how to confirm a theory in the face of this messy data is thus a central methodological
problem for any linguistic theory. The strategies of pluralism here described suggest ways of deal-
ing with this data, and striking a balance between explanatory depth and empirical adequacy. But
as always in empirical science, how exactly to apply these strategies depends on the nature of the
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object of one’s theory, as I hope these contrasting discussions of syntax and semantics has shown.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that semantics is best served by the multiple-models approach. Because
of the wide range of factors that can be relevant to meaning, semantics should proceed by producing
simple and general minimalist models, as well as moderate contextualist models that account for
the exceptions to generalizations stated at this coarse-grained level. This approach enables us to
accept the radical contextualists’ claim that the truth-conditions of an utterance are not determined
by the sentence uttered, while also using the powerful tools of truth-conditional semantics. By
treating the truth-conditions assigned in semantic theory as approximations of the messy semantic
properties of natural language, we are able to incorporate the advantages of both styles of response
to the argument against truth-conditional semantics, without paying the high costs associated with
complete adoption of either. This approach shows how to account for both the systematicity and
subtlety of language.
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CHAPTER 4
Compositionality and Inference to the Best Explanation
4.1 Introduction
A language is compositional if and only if the meaning of every complex expression within it
is determined by just two things: the meanings of its simple constituents and the way in which
these constituents are arranged. That natural languages are compositional is widely accepted in
linguistics. One argument for such a claim has the form of an inference to the best explanation.
The thesis that language is compositional ought be accepted because it provides the best way of
explaining how a finite being can have the infinite capacity of linguistic productivity. In this paper,
I shall examine this argument and find it lacking. I will argue, drawing an analogy with similar
arguments in evolutionary biology, that such inferences are legitimate only under certain circum-
stances, which are not met in this case. Thus, the standard argument for compositionality fails.
After making this argument, I shall respond to two possible objections: the claim that compo-
sitionality provides the only explanation for productivity, and the claim that compositionality is
required to explain linguistic systematicity. I will conclude by arguing that the standard argu-
ment, despite not providing confirmation for compositionality as an empirical hypothesis, instead
suggests viewing compositionality as a methodological principle, guiding how linguists should
theorize. Analogous to methodological adaptationism in biology, I believe compositionality can
take the role of a default assumption: see how far we can get by assuming compositionality, but be
willing to provide non-compositional analyses when need be.
Compositionality is a constraint on determinants of meaning. The argument from the previous
chapter relied on radical contextualism: the claim that there are very few such constraints on
possible determinants of meaning. It is for this reason that the question of whether languages are
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compositional or not is important for the proper methodological understanding of semantic theory.
We will look later on at examples of semantic theories, which I will view as non-compositional,
which involve the influence on utterance meaning of things like speaker communicative intentions.
This is precisely the kind of causal influence that the multiple-models approach aimed to combat.
If it is accepted that languages are compositional, such motivation may be undercut.
Strictly, there is no contradiction between compositionality and a very large set of determi-
nants of meaning as long as these determinants of meaning influence the meaning of a complex
expression only via influencing the meanings of its constituent expressions. However, as we shall
see throughout this paper, the primary interest of compositionality is in the strong constraints it
places on semantic theory. When it is weakened so as to make room for these kinds of proposals,
it ceases to play the methodological and empirical roles which motivate our focus on it. For this
reason, I view the spirit, if not the letter, of compositionality as a problem for my approach, and in
this paper I aim to solve this problem.
4.2 The Principle of Compositionality
While most linguists and philosophers of language accept some form of the principle of composi-
tionality (hereafter PoC), there is much debate as to how such a principle is best formulated.1 In
particular, linguists offer versions of this principle which vary significantly in how strong they are.
The strongest proposal is ‘direct compositionality’2 which states that each syntactic (i.e. structure-
building) operation is mirrored by a semantic operation, and so each syntactic constituent receives
an interpretation. Much work in formal semantics involves investigating various empirical phe-
nomena which purport to tell against such a strong version of compositionality in favor of another,
weaker, interpretation of PoC. However, as my interest is in whether we are warranted in accepting
any version of this principle, I shall adopt a much weaker interpretation, according to which:
PoC The meaning of every syntactically complex expression is determined by the meanings of its
1Szabo´ (2008)’s entry on compositionality in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy categorizes principles of
compositionality with respect to five binary parameters, resulting in 32 (logically) possible principles.
2See, for example, Barker & Jacobson (2007), Partee (2004), Montague (1970), Janssen & Partee (1997).
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syntactically simpler constituents and the way in which these are combined.
That is, the meanings of an expression’s constituents, plus rules for how these meanings are to be
combined according to the syntactic structure in which they are found, are sufficient to determine
the meaning of the complex expression. This version commits one only to the claim that noth-
ing other than lexical semantics and syntactic and semantic rules of combination determines the
meaning of complex expressions. Stronger versions of PoC place further constraints on the ways
in which these simpler constituents are able to combine in determining the meaning of the whole.
If my argument is good, it should show that, even on this weak reading, we do not have reason to
accept PoC. This should therefore apply also to any logically stronger interpretations purportedly
justified by the same argument.
Assessments of whether a language is compositional are always dependent on a specification
of the syntactic and semantic properties of the simple elements of the language. Because PoC says
that only these play meaning-determining roles, in order to evaluate claims about compositionality,
we must know what the rules of combination and interpretation are. Only with such information
can we determine whether more is needed to calculate the meanings of complex expressions.
Determining whether linguistic phenomena such as ambiguity and indexicality are problems
for compositionality likewise involves getting clear on various more basic linguistic facts. For
example, one could argue that ambiguity poses a problem on the grounds that “I went to the bank”
can express different propositions in different contexts. However, to make this argument work, one
would need to show that while the sentential meaning differs, this difference cannot be traced to a
difference in the meaning of the simple constituents (i.e. that ambiguity resolution is not a matter
of determining the meaning of a specific word, which can then be compositionally combined to
determine the meaning of the sentence as a whole). If, as seems correct, ‘bank’ has one meaning in
one sentence and another in another, then the fact that these sentences as wholes differ in meaning
is not a genuine counterexample to compositionality.
The point of this example is to bring out the fact that claims about compositionality are con-
strained by work in other parts of linguistics. Semantic theories are constrained by syntax to at
least the extent that whether two sentences should be viewed as having been formed according to
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different combinatory rules will influence whether these sentences raise worries for compositional
theories. Structurally ambiguous sentences (e.g. “Put the money in the bowl on the floor.”) pose
no immediate problem for compositional semantics as long as their different interpretations can be
traced to differences in the ways their terms are put together. Relatedly, lexical semantics provides
the theory of what the simple expressions mean, and so compositional theories must show how
these meanings can be composed in order to determine the meaning of the whole. That ‘bank’ is
viewed as contributing different meanings to different sentences in which it occurs enables compo-
sitional explanations of differences in the meanings of whole sentences featuring this expression.
This influence can, of course, go in both directions: if a certain view of lexical semantics or con-
stituent structure is required by a compositional semantic theory, this may be a reason to adopt
such a view.
With this in mind, it is worth briefly discussing a worry that is often raised with respect to PoC.
It has been argued (e.g. by Janssen (1986) and Zadrozny (1994)) that PoC is trivially true. That is,
no matter what a language is like, it will be possible to provide for it a compositional semantics.
Given this, it is suggested that the claim that a language is compositional is so weak as to be of no
interest, and thus cannot play the explanatory role it is taken to.
Such proofs rely on a lack of constraints on what can be taken to be the meanings of simple
expressions and the rules of combination. Zadrozny’s argument, for example, relies on assigning
counter-intuitive (and empirically unmotivated) semantic values to simple expressions.3 If there
are no substantial constraints on what can serve as the meanings of our syntactic simples, or what
can be included in our compositional rules, then for any language we can provide a compositional
semantics.
As Duhem (1908/1991) argued, no single hypothesis is connected to any specific empirical
observation. Rather, we can make empirical predictions only by conjoining our hypothesis with
many background assumptions. The converse of this point is that no empirical result can falsify
any particular hypothesis.4 Rather, an empirical result shows that some set of hypotheses, back-
3Janssen’s argument works by modifying the syntactic rules.
4I am here using ‘hypothesis’ in the sense standard in the sciences, such that a hypothesis is a fairly specific
statement about the world. If ‘hypothesis’ is interpreted more broadly, as in some branches of philosophy, to mean
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ground conditions etc. cannot be jointly true. No single hypothesis is ever directly contradicted
by evidence. When we make a bad prediction, we have a decision to make about which member
of a set of hypotheses to reject. Zadrozny has shown that there is always some way of retaining
PoC, given freedom to tinker with other linguistic assumptions. But it is not clear what the import
of this result is for practicing linguists. If we would need to adopt a radically implausible syntax
or lexical semantics in order to give English a compositional semantics, it is likely that the best
empirical hypothesis is that English is non-compositional. It is true that there is always some set
of auxiliary hypotheses (in this case, some set of syntactic and lexical semantic claims) that, in
combination with PoC, will avoid making the wrong predictions. But this is just what Duhem and
many following him argued is true for any hypothesis. If the triviality worries are just instances of
the general point that any hypothesis can, provided we are free to modify our auxiliary hypothe-
ses, be consistent with any data, then how easy it is to retain PoC will be inversely proportional
to our commitment to our background hypotheses. As just shown, syntactic and semantic theo-
ries provide strong constraints on what kind of compositional semantics will be acceptable, and
thus the triviality objection does not, on its own, show that producing an empirically adequate
compositional semantic theory would not be a substantial theoretical achievement.
4.3 The Argument for The Principle of Compositionality
I shall be examining what I take to be a typical justification for this principle.5 I will follow Fodor
& Lepore (2002) in calling this argument ‘the standard argument’ (p.1).6 The argument can be
any proposition, this claim will of course be false. If the conjunction of (what I am calling) a hypothesis and all
the necessary background assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses is itself a hypothesis, this could be falsified by an
observation.
5For the purposes of this paper, I am concerned exclusively with the claim that languages are compositional. The
question of whether thoughts are compositional, and the analogous version of the standard argument for this, would
require a different discussion.
6While this isn’t the only argument given in support of PoC, to justify this name, here are just a few examples from
the linguistics literature: Dowty (2007) argues “Since the meanings of all sentences obviously cannot be memorized
individually, there must be some finitely characterizable procedure for determining these meanings, one shared by all
English speakers.” (p. 24). Jacobson (2014) says “There has to be some set of systematic principles that speakers have
that allows speakers to learn [the meanings of complex expressions] on the basis of the meanings of the smaller parts
(ultimately words) that make them up.” (p. 5). Partee (2004) states the argument similarly. Goldberg (2015) notes
that “It is assumed that people would be unable to glean meaning from new combinations of familiar words unless
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constructed as follows:
P1: Human beings have finite psychologies.
IC: Therefore, natural languages have finitely many primitive expressions.
P2: Natural languages are productive.
P3: PoC best explains how P2 can be true despite IC.
C: Therefore, PoC is true.
Premise 1 is assumed by all naturalistic psychology. To have a finite psychology is simply for
there to be limitations on what can be mentally stored and processed. The intermediate conclusion
IC follows pretty much immediately from premise 1. A primitive expression is an expression
that is interpreted directly by a speaker’s lexicon. If, by definition, a finite psychology has a
limited storage space, and a primitive expression requires its own lexical entry, then a being with
a finite psychology cannot speak a language with infinitely many primitive expressions. Since
human beings do speak natural languages, natural languages must have finitely many primitive
expressions.7 Note that this same argument can be used to show that the construction rules used
by speakers must also be finite in number.
‘Productivity’ is used in the literature in two related ways. It is sometimes used to refer to the
property of languages that allows them to generate infinitely many expressions. Competent speak-
ers of such a language will thereby be able to produce and interpret infinitely many expressions.8
there exist predictable ways in which meaning is derived from the words and the way those words are combined.”
(p. 419). Larson & Segal (1995) argue “Since our brains are finite objects with finite storage capacity, it is clear
that this competence [to produce and interpret infinitely many systematically related novel sentences] must have a
finite form. The compositionality hypothesis accounts for this in a straightforward way.” (pp. 11-13). Philosophers,
such as Davidson (1967), Soames (2003), King & Stanley (2005), Fodor (1998, 2001, 2008) and dating back to Frege
(1914/1997) have made roughly the same argument.
7See Davidson (1965) for a classical discussion of this point.
8I am assuming here a very tight connection between a language and the competence of a speaker. This has been
standard in linguistic theory since Chomsky (1965). Theorists, like Wiggins (1997), who distinguish sharply between
a language and that which a speaker of a language knows, will have more difficulty inferring from the compositionality
of language to claims about the capacities of a speaker.
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It is also used to refer to the property of language that allows speakers of these languages to un-
derstand and produce novel expressions, i.e. expressions they have not encountered before. The
important point is that linguistic competence enables speakers to extrapolate from the finite stock
of expressions and combinatory rules that they have encountered to an unbounded set of unfamiliar
expressions.
Premise 2, then, states the empirical fact that there are infinitely many expressions that a com-
petent speaker of a natural language can, in principle, produce and understand.9 The puzzle is
that speakers are capable of producing and interpreting infinitely many expressions, while they are
capable of storing entries for only finitely many.
Premise 3 is the claim that the best way to solve this puzzle is to accept that these finitely
many primitive expressions can be combined, by a speaker, in a recursive fashion, using finitely
many known rules.10 This process explains how to bridge the gap between the finite mind and
the infinite capacity. If the meanings of complex expressions are determined by the meanings of
their simple parts, and these simple parts’ rules of combination, both of which are finitely statable,
then a finitely statable system can be grasped from which the infinitely many meanings of natural
language expressions can be derived. A human who had internalized this system would be able, in
principle11, to produce and interpret infinitely many expressions. The conclusion is then reached
by inferring to this explanation.
It is important to note at this point the constraint on a theory of meaning that must be met in
order for this argument to work. What PoC is invoked to explain is a certain capacity of human
speakers: the capacity to produce and interpret indefinitely many expressions. To explain this
capacity, a semantic theory thus must show how a finite mind could assign to indefinitely many
expressions the meanings that human speakers actually do. A gap between the semantic properties
9Pullum & Scholz (2010) raise worries about the justification for this claim. Although ultimately I find their
argument unpersuasive, for reasons I don’t have space to get into here, I agree with them that the infinity claim is
not strictly needed for this argument. What is needed is just that the set of interpretable/producible natural language
expressions is vastly bigger than the set of expressions actually produced or interpreted. I will continue to use the term
‘infinite’, but nothing should turn on this difference.
10The nature of this unconscious, or tacit, knowledge is discussed at length in Chomsky (1980).
11I.e. such a capacity is bounded only by limitations on performance, rather than competence.
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posited by the theory and those assigned by speakers12 indicates that this theory is, at best, insuf-
ficient to account for this productive capacity. For example, a variety of theorists, such as Sperber
& Wilson (1995) and Pietroski (2018), have argued that the intuitive truth-conditions of sentences
are not determined compositionally, but are the product of certain complex psychological oper-
ations acting upon an underlying non-truth-conditional meaning which is itself compositionally
determined. Such approaches have much to be said for them, but note that compositional theo-
ries of this sort are not sufficient to explain human linguistic productivity. The standard argument
aims to justify PoC on the grounds that it can explain some readily apparent properties of our
linguistic competences, including our ability to determine the truth-conditions of sentences in our
languages. By positing distance between the products of our semantic theories and the ability to
determine sentential truth-conditions, such approaches thus do not explain the capacities in ques-
tion. These theories explain how some psychological subsystem is able to interpret indefinitely
many expressions, but the outputs of this system are just one determinant among many of the
interpretations that speakers actually provide for the sentences they encounter. But the explanan-
dum of the standard argument is a personal-level capacity. To explain this personal-level capacity,
these theories must be supplemented by a theory of how speakers get from the compositionally
determined semantic values of utterances to the intuitive meanings, e.g. truth-conditions, of these
utterances. Positing an underlying system which itself displays productivity may be an important
first step in explaining the observed productivity of natural languages, but is on its own insuffi-
cient, whereas truth-conditional semantic theories seem capable of explaining the productivity we
observe in actual human speakers. For this reason, I shall focus on truth-conditional approaches
for the remainder of this paper.
The standard argument has the form of an IBE. The general form of such arguments is:
(1) P.
(2) Q explains P better than any rival hypothesis.
12Note that ‘the semantic properties assigned by speakers to expression E’ and ‘the intuitive meaning of E’ are not
synonymous. It is perfectly possible for speakers to misjudge the semantic properties of any given expression. This
will be the case when, for example, speakers confuse pragmatic phenomena such as implicature with literal meaning.
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(3) Therefore, Q.
Everyday examples of such patterns of reasoning abound. When I look in the fridge and see that
the beer that I bought yesterday is nowhere to be found, I quickly infer that my housemates drank
it. This is of course not a deductive inference; I could have drunk the beer and forgotten about
it, it could have been burgled, etc. However, such an inference seems perfectly reasonable. I am
justified in believing that my housemates drank my beer, even though I did not see them do so,
because this hypothesis best explains the fact that my beer is gone.
As well as these everyday instances of IBE, such reasoning appears to play a central role in the
sciences. The justification for believing in scientific theories, and particularly for believing in the
unobservable entities, processes, and laws posited by such sciences, appears to be dependent on
such inferences. Seminal work such as Harman (1965) and Lipton (2003) has placed the under-
standing of this process as one of the central topics in the philosophy of science.13 While there are
various competing proposals about the role, structure, and justification of IBE’s in this literature,
what I say should not depend on the specifics of any such view.
I will not argue with the premises of the Standard Argument. Nor will I deny that IBE is,
in many cases, a legitimate form of reasoning.14 I will argue instead that inference to the best
explanation is not as generally licensed as this argument takes it to be. That is, I will argue that
the inference from P3 to the conclusion is illegitimate. In the natural sciences there are fairly strict
constraints on when such a move is licensed. In the case of PoC, these constraints are not met, and
so the argument fails.
13See Poston & McCain (2018) for a selection of contemporary issues surrounding this topic.
14There is an argument in the literature, stemming from Van Fraassen (1989) that aims to show that IBEs cannot
provide confirmation for an empirical hypothesis, as doing so would violate the Bayesian norms of rationally ap-
portioning one’s beliefs to one’s evidence. If such arguments are successful, then the standard argument is radically
undercut. In order to give the standard argument its best shot, I will be assuming the standard realist view that IBEs
are, at least sometimes, genuinely confirmatory.
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4.4 Merely Possible Explanations
While the inferential power of IBE has long been touted by philosophers for a wide range of
purposes, there is a tradition in the philosophy of science of skepticism about the legitimacy of
this form of argument. As I said, I am not assuming skepticism about IBE in general, but rather
questioning the assumption that the best explanation can always be legitimately inferred to. In
particular, a number of criticisms have been made against the idea that merely because some hy-
pothesis could explain the observed phenomena, we have grounds for believing this hypothesis. A
variety of arguments have been made that view independent, non-explanatory, evidence in favor
of a hypothesis as a necessary condition on its acceptance. IBE may perhaps increase the confir-
mation of a proposal for which we have such non-explanatory grounds for acceptance, but it can’t
be all we have to go on. In this section, I shall canvas some of the reasons to view explanatory
considerations as insufficient for accepting a hypothesis.
The general worry about IBE is that potential explanations can often be proposed a priori,
while legitimate scientific reasoning essentially depends on providing empirical support for one’s
hypothesis. The point is stated clearly, in the context of a critique of inferring to adaptationist
hypotheses in evolutionary biology, by Gould & Lewontin (1979) and has been further argued
for by these authors in numerous places. For example, “Biologists are always able to provide
plausible scenarios for evolution by natural selection. But plausibility is not science. True and
sufficient explanations of particular examples of evolution are extremely hard to arrive at because
we do not have world enough and time” (Lewontin (2010)). These authors are arguing that, though
a proposal can be made which could explain a particular biological trait, even if this proposal
seems plausible, the belief that this hypothesis in fact explains the observed phenomena requires
further empirical corroboration. I will use the term ‘(merely) possible explanation’ to refer to any
hypothesis which could explain the observation, and the term ‘candidate explanation’ to refer to
a possible explanation which has some degree of non-explanatory empirical support. Crucially,
candidate explanations are not all true explanations, so the claim that we can only infer to the best
candidate explanation says more than that we ought only accept the hypothesis that in fact explains
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our observations.15
Related claims have been made in Novick (2017) and Novick & Scholl (2017)’s discussion of
‘the vera causa ideal’. Novick argues that IBE is capable of justifying the claim that some cause
is responsible for some effect only when the existence and competence of this cause is justified
independently. This is reflected by Darwin’s methodology. In The Origin, Darwin spends the
majority of the book showing that selection is a real phenomenon which could in principle account
for speciation. It is only after establishing this that he turns to the argument that selection actually
did account for the variation we observe, and he recognized that the prospects for inferring to
his explanation relied crucially on both steps. Establishing that selection could account for the
existence of some phenomenon provides a possible explanation. But such an explanation cannot
be accepted until independent evidence is provided for the existence of the proposed cause.16
The ease with which we use IBE in everyday life belies the importance of these additional
sources of evidence. In daily life, the best explanation for some observation typically involves en-
tities and processes we antecedently know to exist and to be capable of explaining the observations
in question. My earlier example of my housemates drinking my beer provides a clear example.
Given that I know my housemates are more than capable of acting in this way, it is perfectly le-
gitimate to infer on the basis of the missing beer that they drank it. In these cases, the kind of
explanation to which we are inferring is known to be legitimate; what is unsure is whether it ap-
plies in this case. However, often in science the proposed explanation is not like this: scientific
hypotheses often involve the positing of novel entities or known entities acting in novel ways. In
such a case, Novick claims, these explanations are not to be inferred to. On this view, IBE plays
the role of selecting between candidate explanations, but does not directly justify the acceptance
15I am deliberately not using the terminology of ‘how-possibly’ vs. ‘how actually’ explanations, stemming from
Dray (1957). While this is a closely related distinction, it comes with substantial baggage that I would like to avoid.
In particular, as Dray introduced this distinction, how-possibly explanations served to “rebut the presumption of im-
possibility of the event to be explained” (Dray (1968). p. 391). It is not a condition on a merely possible explanation
that it serve such a function. Possible explanations for, say, the existence of particular biological traits need not be
proposed in a context in which it is presumed to be impossible that this organism have this trait. My distinction is
perhaps closest to that of Brandon (1990), who views how-possibly and how-actually explanations as ordered along a
spectrum according to how much empirical support they have.
16While Novick’s discussion is focused on explanations that more directly involve causal hypotheses, I believe
that the motivation is the same. Independent empirical support is needed to make a proposed explanation worthy of
inferring to.
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of a merely possible explanation.
We can also see the importance of this critique by looking at the way that scientists respond to
the charge that they have not sufficiently established some particular evolutionary proposal as the
explanation of some particular trait. In Tooby & Cosmides (1997)’s response to Gould (1997)’s
charge that evolutionary psychology is merely a collection of just-so stories, Tooby and Cosmides
do not say that providing such stories (possible explanations) is itself a legitimate way to explain
contemporary psychological traits. Instead, they provide a list of independent sources of evidence
(comparative modeling, neural dissociations, etc.) of just the sort suited to transform the hypothesis
generated by a possible explanation into a candidate explanation. Whether this evidence is suffi-
cient to justify their project is, of course, not the issue. What is important for my purposes is just
that the need to discuss such evidence is admitted by all parties. Arguing that the social-cognition
modules posited by evolutionary psychologists would explain certain features of human behavior
is one thing, showing that they in fact do so is another. It is exactly this independent evidence,
beyond the claim that PoC would explain productivity, that is typically absent from justifications
of this principle.17
4.5 Merely Possible Explanations in Biology
Since Darwin proposed his theory of evolution by natural selection, opponents of this theory have
raised alleged counterexamples. The standard method by which to do this is to find a trait the
existence of which is deemed inexplicable by evolutionary theory. Darwin (1859/2004) was deeply
concerned with such traits, or ‘organs of extreme perfection and complication’ (p. 140) as he called
them. An organ of extreme perfection and complication is a biological structure with a sufficiently
high level of complexity and inter-dependence of its parts such that it is only through the collective
17A wariness of inferring to hypotheses purely on the grounds that they could explain some phenomenon is also
found in Hacking (1983). His discussion about realism, leading up to his dictum that “If you can spray them, then they
are real.” (p. 23), suggests that it is intervention and manipulation which really justifies the acceptance of scientific
proposals, not merely their ability to explain observations. That some theory is able to explain a given phenomenon
may leave open the question of whether this theory is true, but once we are able to manipulate the entities of this
theory, we seem to have no option but to believe in them. Again we see the view that independent, non-explanatory,
evidence is needed to promote a possible explanation into something we ought accept.
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functioning of many distinct mechanisms that it can perform its function at all. Such organs pose
problems for the theory of evolution by natural selection on the assumptions that
(1) The adaptive benefit they provide is only available when all these constituent mechanisms
are present, and
(2) These mechanisms arise independently.
The first assumption means that when only some of the mechanisms that contribute to the func-
tioning of the whole organ are present, no adaptive benefit is accrued to the organism. The second
means that the introduction of one of these constituent mechanisms does not guarantee the in-
troduction of the others. Together, they entail that multiple individually non-adaptive traits must
be acquired before any adaptive benefit is accrued. This makes evolution of the trait via natural
selection highly implausible: either multiple independent mutations must simultaneously occur,
producing the complex trait in one go (saltationism), or a series of non-adaptive (and likely mal-
adaptive) traits must successively reach fixation ultimately resulting in the complex adaptive trait
(akin to teleological causation). Both options seem inconsistent with standard evolutionary think-
ing. The historically central examples of such organs are eyes and wings, but recent arguments by
intelligent design advocates, such as Behe (1998), have discussed many more such traits.
The important point about these examples, for my purposes, is that responses to them in de-
fense of evolutionary theory have two stages. Firstly, one provides a possible explanation to rebut
the claim that the existence of such a phenomenon is genuinely deemed impossible by Darwinian
evolutionary theory. Secondly, one gathers empirical data in the attempt to transform this explana-
tion into a candidate explanation, and if we are lucky a true explanation. Forber (2010)’s discussion
of the difference between global how-possibly, local how-possibly, and how-actually explanations
argues for such a picture, wherein how-possibly explanations delimit the search space by showing
which explanations are to be taken seriously, and then evidence is sought which can distinguish
between these different ‘live options’.
The claim that the existence of wings is not explicable within a theory of natural selection
goes back to Mivart (1871/2017). In his famous critique of Darwin’s theory, Mivart argued that
natural selection is “incompetent” to account for the “incipient stages of useful structures” (p.
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23). The transition from creatures without wings to creatures with functioning wings must, he
claimed, go via a series of intermediate wing-like structures. These incipient stages of wings
(‘proto-wings’), he argued, cannot produce the propulsion required for flight. On the assumption
that the only adaptive benefit of having wings is provided by the ability to fly, this is problematic
for natural selection, as all stages must provide adaptive benefit in order to be selected. If these
proto-wings are not adaptive, they will not be selected for and fully developed wings will never
evolve. Accounting for the development of wings seemed to require sudden radical changes to
phenotypes (saltations) or ‘forward-looking’, teleological views according to which the presence
of incipient traits is explained with reference to the adaptive benefit that is made available by them
to their descendants. For well known reasons, neither of these proposals was available to Darwin.
The standard response on behalf of selectionist theories is to come up with a story about how
these incipient stages could be adaptive after all, even if the adaptive function is not full-fledged
flight. That is, such an argument can be rebutted by denying assumption (1) above.18 This was
Darwin’s response. Such a story must, if this charge is to be successfully avoided, be given for each
lineage in which these complex traits evolved. Wings suited for flight appear to have developed
at least four different times in evolutionary history. I shall focus on the case of insect wings.
Many different functions for insect proto-wings have been posited, including the proposals that
they serve respiratory, thermo-regulatory, stabilizing, or aerodynamic functions. The two most
popular accounts have been that proto-wings served to regulate body temperature or to alter the
descent of a falling organism, reducing impact and making it more likely that it lands on its feet. If
this is correct, organisms in the insect lineage with these proto-wings could be better adapted than
those without, even before these structures enabled them to fly. Thus assumption (1) need not be
accepted by evolutionary theorists.
These are merely possible explanations. They show how wings could evolve, and thereby rebut
the argument that evolution is ‘incompetent’ to account for these traits. However, these explana-
tions are not thereby confirmed, even incrementally. Empirical work to discover which of these
18Recent work in the evo-devo tradition (see e.g.Theißen (2009)) has argued that the rejection of assumption (2) is
also sometimes appropriate. Profound, but not catastrophic, phenotypic changes can occur relatively quickly, espe-
cially when there are changes to the functioning of regulator genes. The existence of such alternative strategies make
inferring to standard, gradualist explanations even more difficult.
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explanations is correct, including a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms, processes,
and historical contingencies involved in the evolution of such traits is required for this. This may
involve, among other things, modeling work to show that the purported adaptive benefit can ac-
tually be provided by these intermediate stages19 and investigation of the fossil record to confirm
that such intermediate stages were actually present.20 In Novick’s terminology, the former investi-
gation provides independent evidence for these proto-wings’ competence, while the latter provides
independent evidence of their existence. It is only after acquiring both of these kinds of evidence
that we may legitimately view this possible explanation as a candidate explanation, and thus debate
whether one ought accept that these selective benefits are indeed responsible for the development
of wings in the insect lineage.
In summary: in evolutionary theory the existence of organs of extreme perfection and compli-
cation appear to conflict with the core commitments of the theory. Two assumptions are at work
here. Firstly, that mutations drastic enough to make the transition from no-wings to fully function-
ing wings in one generation are too unlikely to feature in a legitimate evolutionary explanation.
Secondly, that a long sequence of non-adaptive mutations achieving fixation is similarly too im-
plausible, especially given the cost of maintaining such useless structures. Given the apparent
complexity of developed wings, and the alleged non-adaptiveness of proto-wings, these two con-
straints on evolutionary explanation make it difficult to see how fully-fledged wings could come to
exist. The Darwinian strategy involves providing a possible explanation. However more must be
done to justify the acceptance of this explanation. Independent reason to believe that the proposed
adaptive benefit can indeed be achieved by these intermediate stages in the lineage, and to believe
that these intermediates stages actually did occur, are still required.21
19See, for example, Kingsolver & Koehl (1985)’s work, involving placing wire models of insects with wings of
different sizes in wind tunnels, showing the relative benefits with respect to thermo-regulation and aerodynamics
provided by wings of different sizes.
20See the summary in Ross (2017).
21Note that this is a much weaker claim than Rosenberg (2008)’s view that evolutionary biology only provides
possible explanations, until it is supplemented by a reduction of the processes involved to micro-biology. One need
not accept this stronger claim in order to agree with his diagnosis that merely proposing an evolutionary story is
insufficient to explain how some trait actually evolved. The question is what more is needed to turn such a story into
a candidate explanation.
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I take the preceding example to show why merely possible explanations are not suitable for
IBEs. Darwin proposed that proto-wings were extensions of breathing apparatuses, tracheae.22,23
These extensions may have enabled more efficient extraction of oxygen from the environment, and
may thus have been adaptive even though they provided no benefit to mobility. This serves to rebut
the assumption that, because these proto-wings did not enable the insect to fly, they were non-
adaptive. This may have been the best available possible explanation, in that of all the assumptions
that would solve Mivart’s problem, this seemed most plausible. However, it was still not empiri-
cally supported well enough to be inferred to, as Darwin recognized. Possible explanations serve
to show how something could happen. Thus, utilizing them in inferences to what did/does happen,
without further support, is illegitimate.
4.6 Reconsidering the Standard Argument
It should now be clear what I take to be wrong with the standard argument. This argument moves
from the claim that PoC could explain human productivity, to the claim that it in fact does so. But
this is precisely the move that the work I have discussed from the philosophy of science objects
to. Purely explanatory reasons are not sufficient for the acceptance of an empirical hypothesis.
Practicing scientists operate under a collection of strong constraints on when a hypothesis can be
inferred to. Crucially, empirical, non-explanatory justification must be provided. Skepticism about
PoC is not simply an instance of a general scientific anti-realism. Rather, it is motivated by the
thought that it doesn’t meet the high standards of realism in other disciplines.
Linguists/psychologists have not independently established that natural language is composi-
tional and then leveraged this property in order to explain how finite beings can have an infinite
capacity. The motivation for believing that language has this property, according to this argument,
22Darwin (1859/2004) (p. 143). Interestingly, over time Darwin became more confident in his proposed explanation,
likely due to the zoological work of Hermann Landois. In the 1st edition of Origins, he says that the proposal that
wings evolved from respiratory organs is ‘probable’, but by the 6th edition this has been changed to read ‘highly
probable’.
23Note that ‘trachea’ is used in entomology differently than in vertebrate anatomy. Tracheae in insects are chitinous
tubes distributed throughout the body to allow environmental oxygen to flow through holes (‘spiracles’) in the abdomen
directly into the cells.
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is just that it is able to explain this phenomenon. This establishes an important first step of the
process of inferring to an explanation, but it neglects the crucial subsequent steps of gathering in-
dependent evidence. Existence and responsibility are assumed purely on the basis of competence,
in a manner unlike that found in the biological cases we have described. The mathematical prop-
erties of compositional systems may show that organisms which internalized such systems would,
provided this system was integrated in the right way with various performance systems, be able to
produce and interpret infinitely many expressions. Thus the competence of this hypothesis may be
established. However, the existence of this system has not been independently verified. Thus, the
standard argument fails to meet the standards applied in other sciences.24
One common thought at this point is that the wealth of linguistic examples which do seem
to be compositional provide precisely this independent evidence. Given that we have plausible
compositional analyses for many linguistic phenomena, it may seem like mere inductive skepticism
to deny that all complex linguistic expressions work in this way.25 It is one thing to be skeptical
about IBE in the standard argument, but if this reduces to skepticism about induction in general,
this will not be compelling. An analogy to Gould and Lewontin’s discussion of adaptationism may
help to show why this is not the case.
Gould and Lewontin don’t deny that there are many traits which ought be explained in the
adaptationist fashion. What they deny is that all or most traits ought be so explained. Each case
must be assessed on its own merits, in line with the methodological constraints discussed earlier.
As they point out, there are many traits that don’t appear to be best accounted for as adaptations.
Assuming otherwise would simply be accepting the adaptationist hypothesis in virtue of its ex-
planatory power, without assessing its independent empirical grounds. Likewise, in the linguistic
case, there are certain classes of complex expression for which their semantic properties are ade-
quately accounted for without reference to anything beyond their arrangement and the meanings
24It is possible that the standards of evidence in linguistic theory are unlike those found in evolutionary biology.
However, this would need to be argued for.
25One could suggest a kind of ‘debunking’ explanation here: so many compositional explanations have been found
precisely because linguists illegitimately assume PoC. This is particularly plausible in cases where surprising revisions
are made to our linguistic theory purely on the grounds that they are needed to retain compositionality. Partee’s
appendix to Janssen & Partee (1997) provides a nice discussion of this phenomenon. I will, however, assume that at
least many compositional semantic analyses cannot be ‘debunked’ in this way.
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of their simple parts. An inductive argument for PoC would involve inferring from the claim that
all observed linguistic phenomena are accounted for compositionally, and so all the as yet unob-
served phenomena can be handled likewise. But this is not what we see in linguistics. There are a
range of observed linguistic phenomena that suggest non-compositional analyses (to be discussed
in the next two sections). To assume that these phenomena must be accounted for compositionally
is precisely to adopt PoC purely in virtue of its explanatory potential, rather than for genuinely
empirical reasons.
I will look now at what I take to be the strongest objections to my claim that PoC provides a
merely possibly explanation, and thus that accepting PoC on the basis of an IBE is illicit. Firstly,
the claim that IBEs aren’t licensed for merely possible explanations depends on the claim that we
are inferring to just one possible explanation among many. The empirical support for a particular
explanation is needed in order to distinguish the true explanation from the merely possible expla-
nations. But if there is only one possible explanation, no extra evidence is needed. It may seem that
this is the case in the standard argument: if PoC is the only possible explanation of productivity,
then independent evidence showing that it is what actually explains productivity will be redundant.
I shall argue that in fact PoC is not the only possible explanation of productivity. PoC, even in the
weak version assumed for this paper, is stronger than is needed. Crucially, PoC insists that noth-
ing but constituent meanings and rules of composition are needed to determine the meanings of
complex expressions. However, there are various theories on offer which allow for a wider range
of determinants of meaning, and so are not in line with PoC, but which can account for compo-
sitionality. I shall then look at an argument that, even if productivity alone does not require PoC,
as I have argued, another property of human linguistic competence, systematicity, does. I agree
that systematicity, the predictable relationships between complex expressions under permutation
of constituents, does require PoC, but I shall argue that there is good reason to doubt that human
languages are systematic, in the strong sense required for this argument.
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4.7 Inference to the Only Explanation?
So far, I have argued that the IBE step in the standard argument for compositionality fails to meet
the standards imposed on such inferences in other scientific inquiry. PoC explains how finite
human minds could produce and interpret infinitely many expressions. But, if merely possible
explanations are not the kind of thing one can infer to, then the standard argument fails.
One potential response to this argument would be to claim that PoC is the only possible ex-
planation.26 If there is only one explanation of how something could happen, then it must be (at
least part of) the explanation of how it did/does happen. If we lack any alternative to composition-
ality in explaining how a human mind can produce infinitely many sentences, we should infer to
the PoC. In this way, we could turn the IBE in the standard argument into an eliminative induc-
tion27, wherein all competing explanations are ruled out. This would then be a deductively valid
argument: if there must be some explanation for the ability of finite human speakers to speak pro-
ductive languages, and PoC is the only thing that can explain this, PoC must be true.28 This would
undermine my worries about the legitimacy of the inference in the standard argument.
The problem with this argument is that it is simply not clear that PoC is the only possible
explanation.29 The explanation of productivity relies on there being systematic and predictable
ways of determining the meaning of novel complex expressions. PoC provides one account of
what the materials are from which such properties are computed: lexical semantics and syntax.
However, the claim that only these two determinants of meaning matters is not essential to account
for productivity. The inclusion of additional factors, as long as they are reliably exploitable by
26Szabo´ (2008) claims that “Many linguists and philosophers have suggested that the explanation of these phenom-
ena that presupposes compositionality is not only the best, but also the only one imaginable.”
27See Kitcher (1993).
28In this section, I will be focusing on specific reasons to doubt that PoC is the only possible explanation of pro-
ductivity. However, there are also general reasons to be skeptical of scientists’ ability to discern whether the currently
available hypotheses are collectively exhaustive. Stanford (2006) provides a general argument, backed up with histor-
ical examples, that we should be very skeptical of such claims.
29In fact, as Pagin & Westersta˚hl (2011) show, computability, what is strictly needed for productivity, and composi-
tionality are orthogonal: neither entails the other. However, it is unclear how important this formal result is for natural
language semantics. The existence of computable but non-compositional languages is only relevant to semantics if it
is plausible that natural languages might be within this class.
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speakers, will not undermine this explanation. I will briefly discuss several styles of proposal that
seem able to account for productivity, but which allow the influence of extra factors on meaning,
and are therefore non-compositional.
Firstly, the positing of unarticulated constituents involves attributing semantic properties to a
complex expression which do not ‘originate’ with any simple constituent.30 The paradigmatic ex-
amples here are meteorological assertions, e.g. “It’s raining.”. The literal meaning of utterances of
this sentence, it is claimed, at least typically makes reference to a specific location (i.e. they are
true if and only if it is raining at the location of utterance), but neither the verb ‘rain’, the progres-
sive marking, nor the expletive subject, contains in its semantics such a locative expression. For
a particularly clear example, Recanati (2002) defends what he calls the ‘syntactic interpretation’
of unarticulated constituents, according to which contextual features can influence the syntactic
structure of an utterance, adding modifiers to various predicates. This proposal violates composi-
tionality: aspects of the meaning of the whole seem to be unpredictable based just on the meaning
of the lexical parts and their syntactic combination.
Of course, whether unarticulated constituents should be allowed into our semantic theories is
highly controversial. The point is not to defend such a view.31 Rather, the point is that if such a
view were to turn out to be correct, it is far from obvious that our explanation of human linguistic
productivity would be under threat.
Various processes have been proposed for allowing unarticulated constituents to enter into the
truth-conditional content of our utterances. Recanati (2010)’s process of free enrichment and Sper-
ber & Wilson (1995)’s relevance theory are perhaps the most well-known. According to these the-
ories, the meaning of an utterance is constrained to a significant degree by its syntax and the lexical
semantics of its constituent expressions, but this meaning can be influenced by various pragmatic
processes. On both of these views, the determinants of meaning according to PoC (constituent
meaning and syntax) provide clues as to what a sentence means, when uttered on a particular occa-
30At least in the classical proposal (Perry (1986)). Later proposals (e.g. Crimmins (1992)) have been moderated
slightly saying that the simpler constituents do not ‘overtly’ contribute the semantic feature in question, leaving open
the possibility that they do so covertly.
31For criticisms, see Stanley (2002).
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sion, but these clues can be supplemented by various other kinds of information about the context,
especially the (assumed) intentions of the speaker. In our above case, the fact that the speaker
intends to convey information about the weather at her location can be obvious to the listener, and
this information may also be highly relevant to the hearer. Given these facts, the speaker does not
need to include explicit reference to the location at which it is raining for this information to be
conveyed by her utterance. On such a view, productivity can be explained by the fact that one’s
understanding of language, when supplemented by general knowledge and various cognitive ca-
pacities for reasoning about relevant contextual information, enables human speakers to more or
less accurately determine what is meant by an indefinite range of possible utterances.
An alternative proposal could be based on Jackendoff (2002) and Culicover & Jackendoff
(2005)’s parallel architecture. According to this picture, traditional aspects of linguistic compe-
tence (phonology, syntax, semantics) are each provided with their own ‘component’, which pro-
vides analyses of linguistic expressions at different levels. These components are related, and
sentential analysis involves determining mappings between them, but they are autonomous. In
particular, not every constituent at one component must be correlated with constituents at others.
In a pre´cis of their view Culicover & Jackendoff (2006) say that “phrase and sentence meanings
are composed from the meanings of the words plus independent principles for constructing mean-
ings, only some of which correlate with syntactic structure.” (p. 413). This allows for mismatches
between the levels: expressions with phonology and syntax but no semantics (e.g. expletive ‘it’ in
“It’s raining.”) and semantics without syntax or phonology. Unarticulated constituents would fit
neatly into this latter category. That one’s utterance of “It’s raining.” involves reference to the lo-
cation of utterance can be interpreted as saying that the semantic/conceptual representation of such
an utterance includes a location. But this need not be reflected in the syntax or the phonology. In
this theory, there are systematic rules governing the construction of, and correspondences between,
these different levels of representation. These rules can then provide an account of productivity.
These independent semantic rules supplement the syntax and lexical semantics allowed by PoC. As
PoC says that only these latter features of expressions play a meaning-determining role, systems
which incorporate additional semantic rules are non-compositional.
Keep in mind that my argument does not depend on the truth of such proposals. What is crucial
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is just that the adoption of these views is not inconsistent with explaining productivity. Even those
most committed to compositional accounts usually accept that productivity could be explained
by other kinds of theories. They argue that PoC provides the best, but not necessarily the only,
explanation. Emma Borg, one of the most forceful advocates of a compositional semantics, says
that “the recognition that any competent speaker is able to construct and comprehend an indefinite
number of novel linguistic items, despite devoting finite capacities to linguistic comprehension,
does not entail that formal [i.e. compositional] semantics is the correct kind of approach for natural
language.” (Borg (2004) p. 68). But if this is correct it makes the eliminative induction argument
for PoC unavailable.
I conclude, therefore, that the argument for compositionality fails both as an inference to the
best explanation, and as a deductive eliminative inference. The former on account of IBEs not
applying to merely possible explanations, the latter on account of compositionality not being the
only possible explanation. Productivity is explicable with reference to any reliably exploitable
resource. Syntax and lexical semantics fit this bill, but it is not clear what motivates the claim that
nothing else may be included.
4.8 Systematicity
The second objection to my argument claims that indeed only syntax and lexical semantics are suit-
able for playing these meaning-determining roles. The strongest case for compositionality depends
not just on productivity, but also on systematicity. To a first approximation, a representational sys-
tem is systematic if the interpretation of complex expressions containing specific constituents in
particular syntactic structures is predictable on the basis of the interpretation of other expressions
containing these constituents and these syntactic structures. For a system to be systematic, there-
fore, the interpretation of an expression in one context must enable one to predict the contribution
of that same expression in other contexts. For example, ‘John’ must contribute the same content
whether this NP is found in subject or object position. Similarly, different expressions must always
contribute in the same way when they are found in the same context. For example if a sentence is
interpreted so that the referent of its subject NP is taken to be the agent of the verb, then replacing
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this NP with another will force the interpretation that the referent of this new NP is the agent.
Paradigmatic examples of systematicity involve the permutation of elements within an expression,
thus keeping the constituents and the structure the same, providing a kind of limiting case.
For example:
(1) John loves the queen.
(2) Mary hates the prince.
(3) The queen loves John.
(4) The prince hates John.
(5) Mary hates John.
(6) The queen hates the queen.
Natural languages, it is argued, are systematic in that understanding some complex expressions
(e.g. sentences (1) and (2)) enables speakers of the language to understand other systematically
related expressions (e.g. sentences (3)-(6)).
The standard argument is bolstered by an appeal to systematicity as well as productivity. It
is not just that human speakers can produce and interpret infinitely many sentences that we must
account for. We must account for the specific set of infinitely many sentences that speakers can
actually produce and interpret, and this is done by requiring that various semantic relations hold
between these sentences. While I hope to have shown that allowing things other than lexical
meanings and syntax to determine complex meanings does not undermine the explanation of pro-
ductivity, it does undermine the explanation of systematicity. Systematicity, in the cases above,
is explained by appealing to the fact that the determinants of the meanings of (1) and (2) are the
same things that determine the meanings of (3) through (6). What (1) and (2) have in common
with (3)-(6) is their lexical constituents and their compositional rules. If these are all that matter
for meaning, then it is predicted that the meanings of the latter will be predictable on the basis of
the meanings of the former. However, once other determinants are allowed, there is a possibility
that such systematic relations between sentences will not hold. If something beyond these inputs
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can influence the meaning of, say, sentence (4), then it is not clear why understanding (1) and (2)
alone is sufficient for understanding sentence (4). There is no guarantee, without the constraints
on the determination of meaning provided by PoC, that the meanings of these sentences will be
computed in the same way.
I believe that the appeal to systematicity is indeed the best way to defend compositionality.
Non-compositional systems do have a very difficult time accounting for systematicities.32 The
problem with the argument is that, unlike the case with productivity, it is not clear that natural
languages are systematic, in the strict sense of this term. Various arguments have been put forward
attacking the claim that language is systematic.33
One argument comes from Prinz (2004).34 Prinz discusses the computation of the meaning of
compound nominals.35 What is interesting about these expressions is that their interpretation seems
to involve our background knowledge, as well as the meanings of the constituent expressions. For
example, the expression ‘goat taco’ is naturally interpreted as referring to a taco containing goat
(meat), even by speakers who have not encountered such a delicacy before. ‘Street vendor taco’,
on the other hand, is naturally interpreted to refer to tacos made by street vendors, not containing
them. A natural proposal as to why this is involves viewing the meaning of these expressions as
determined by the meaning of their constituents, their arrangements, and our knowledge about the
standard ingredients and means of production of tacos.
Prinz argues that we should view compositional rules as operating in the default case, but
claims that in many cases we may supplement these rules with background knowledge. For ex-
ample, consider hearing, for the first time, the expression ‘alligator tie’. In such a situation, one
may have no idea whether this is supposed to apply to a tie made out of alligator, adorned with
32See Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) for the classic argument to this effect.
33For reasons of space, I won’t discuss the very interesting arguments against the claim that language is systematic
made by Johnson (2004) and Pullum & Scholz (2007).
34Prinz provides this argument in discussing the compositionality and systematicity of concepts, but it seems that it
applies to language just as well.
35For reasons of space, I shall only discuss this case. But there is a wide range of linguistic phenomena that have
been alleged to demonstrate these kinds of ‘top-down’ effects and thus violate systematicity. The literature on this is
massive, but has included, among other examples, discussions of genitives, propositional attitude reports, conditionals,
and adjectival modification in general.
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pictures of alligators, for alligators, or whatever. In such a case, Prinz claims, these terms are
strictly compositional, and we take the expression to be non-specific, picking out ties which bear
some relation or other to alligators.36 However, in cases where background knowledge does favor
one interpretation, the default compositionality of the system is over-ridden. ‘Alligator shoes’ is
most naturally interpreted so as to refer to shoes made of a particular material. This is due to our
background knowledge: shoes made out of alligator skin are observed widely enough to motivate
such a top-down influence on interpretation. If interpretative mechanisms like this are widespread,
then we should not view language as systematic in general. Language is systematic by default,
but this default assumption can be over-ridden. This would then fit well with the response to the
standard argument I have been suggesting. While compositionality is the simplest way to account
for productivity, denying the influence of factors other than lexical meaning and structure is not re-
quired for this, and thus more is needed to motivate it than the standard argument. Similarly, while
languages display certain signs of systematicity, these may not be universal, and systematicity may
fail in particular cases. Given this, positing a purely compositional language is unmotivated. This
default view of compositionality, as applying unless there are extraneous influences from world-
knowledge etc., is capable of explaining the systematicity that we observe, without making the
apparently false prediction that language is fully systematic. If default compositional rules provide
a default meaning for complex expressions, it is not clear why the occasional influence of back-
ground knowledge, when relevant, would undermine the explanation of productivity. This would
also explain, for those cases in which systematicity is observed, why it is: namely, it is because no
other meaning-determining factors have played a role in such cases.37
Compositionality entails complete systematicity. If all that matters for the meaning of a com-
plex expression is the meaning of its constituents and the way in which they are arranged, and these
simple meanings and structural facts influence the meaning of the complex expression in the same
way, it follows that someone who understands one structure will also understand permutations of
this structure. However, when there are failures of systematicity (e.g. one interprets ‘alligator
36Sainsbury (2001) defends the view that compound nouns in general express such generic properties.
37Of course, there are alternative approaches, such as Weiskopf (2007), which provide compositional, thus system-
atic, accounts of compound nouns. The point is not to settle the issue here, but to insist that this is an empirical issue,
not to be settled on the basis of the apparent explanatory power of the standard argument.
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shoes’ using different information than when interpreting ‘alligator tie’), this is evidence that PoC
is too strong in its insistence that only constituent meaning and structure matter.
The argument for PoC then claims that compositionality is needed in order to explain two
properties of natural language: productivity and systematicity. However, it is not clear that compo-
sitionality is needed to explain productivity. Because non-compositional systems can account for
productivity, an eliminative induction is not in the offing. However, if compositionality isn’t the
only possible explanation, it can only be argued for in virtue of its being the best explanation. But
IBEs are not licensed for merely possible explanations. On the other hand, compositionality may
be the only explanation for systematicity, but there are good reasons for doubting whether natural
languages are systematic. Given this, it seems that the standard argument for compositionality fails
on all counts.
However, I do not believe that discussion of compositionality should be excluded from linguis-
tic theorizing entirely. Instead, I believe PoC should be interpreted as a methodological constraint:
linguists should look for compositional theories of particular phenomena as a default, but should
be willing to give up on this search if given compelling reasons.
4.9 PoC as a Methodological Constraint
Despite not featuring in IBEs, possible explanations play an important role in science, as we saw
in discussion of Forber and Novick. Their use consists primarily in providing avenues for further
research. Because our best theory of the development of species, Darwin’s theory of evolution
by natural selection, seemed unable to account for certain empirical phenomena, it was important
to reconcile the theory with the data. Providing a possible explanation is one way to achieve
this. Doing so shows that the data and theory are consistent, and provides a hypothesis to be
tested. If the best way to reconcile our theory with recalcitrant data involves positing a particular
hypothesis, a key area of further theorizing will involve examining and testing this hypothesis and
attempting to provide the requisite empirical data to transform this possible explanation into a
candidate explanation.
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The a priori38 work of providing a possible explanation plays the role of selecting a hypoth-
esis for the scientific community to pursue.39 This role is distinct from the subsequent empirical
work that must be done in order to justify the claim that this explanation is responsible for the
phenomenon in question. The standard argument for compositionality licenses only the former.
Godfrey-Smith (2001) defines ‘Methodological Adaptationism’ in the following way: “The
best way for scientists to approach biological systems is to look for features of adaptation and
good design. Adaptation is a good “organizing concept” for evolutionary research,” (p. 337). The
assumption of optimality in evolutionary theory is a default assumption: first look for signs that
the organism is optimally designed for its environment. When these signs are not to be found, bi-
ologists are willing to accept that the organism is not in fact optimally designed (this distinguishes
methodological adaptationism from the Panglossian approach derided by Gould and Lewontin),
but to do so requires an explanation for why there is such a deviation from the expected result.
I believe a similar view of the adoption of PoC as a methodological constraint is appropriate.
On this view, the best way for linguists to approach languages is to look for features of compo-
sitionality. Compositionality is a good “organizing concept” for linguistic research. As in the
biological case, this is not a claim about how language works, but about how linguists and philoso-
phers of language should behave. Linguists should look for compositional analyses of linguistic
phenomena where possible, but in exceptional or recalcitrant cases, they should be willing to give
up on this. This approach is particularly apposite in a field like formal semantics, which has been
so significantly influenced by formal theorizing, as compositionality is so central to most work
in formal logic. This is in line with Partee (2004)’s discussion, in which she claims that “The
fruitfulness of trying to work within highly constrained theories is well established”, and that “the
compositionality constraint [is] one of the driving forces in recent progress in semantics.” (p. 174),
38I am here leaving out the complication raised by Kripkean a posteriori necessity (Kripke (1980)). If we need
to investigate the world to determine what is possible, then we will need to do empirical work to determine which
explanations are possible. I take it, however, that there are still two distinct projects: mapping the space of possible
explanations and determining which explanations are empirically plausible. What Kripke showed was that these two
projects do not always have distinct methodologies. Producing possible explanations is an a priori investigation in the
sense that it can occur prior to the latter project.
39In the sense of Laudan (1978), who distinguishes between those theories that a scientific community pursues and
those that it accepts
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while acknowledging that in some cases it may be more elegant to reject compositional accounts.40
Continuing the analogy to adaptationist approaches in biology, we can compare the two ap-
proaches to compositionality, as an empirical hypothesis and as a methodological directive, with
empirical and methodological adaptationism. Godfrey-Smith defines ‘empirical adaptationism’ as
the thesis that “To a large degree, it is possible to predict and explain the outcome of evolutionary
processes by attending only to the role played by selection.” (p. 336). This is a testable hypothesis,
which could turn out correct or incorrect. Gould and Lewontin argue that not only is this hypothe-
sis incorrect, but further that its acceptance can lead to bad science: in particular to the acceptance
of adaptationist explanations of particular traits which are insufficiently confirmed as a result of a
failure to contrast them with non-adaptationist explanations. I believe that uncritical acceptance of
the standard argument can similarly lead to linguists forcing compositional analyses of linguistic
phenomena which may be more elegantly, simply, and coherently explained by including extra
determinants of meaning (i.e. neither lexical meanings nor syntactic structure). A methodological
approach to compositionality, on the other hand, treats lexical semantics and syntax as sufficient
in the default case, but is willing to allow in other factors when this would further some theoretical
goal.
This default assumption of compositionality seems highly reasonable. Compositional systems
consist of the bare minimum needed to account for productivity (and, to the extent that it is present,
systematicity). We simply could not account for linguistic creativity without reference to a finite
set of meaningful simple elements and recursive rules for combining them. However, in the special
sciences, the actual target system is rarely maximally simple, and so we may well be led to incor-
porate more than is minimally necessary. The default assumption of compositionality provides the
skeleton of semantic theories, generating constraints on complex meanings. But in the complex
system of human language, it may be that other factors play a role as well, leading to deviations
from the predictions of compositionality. Methodological compositionality involves the attempt
to account for as much variation as possible with the minimum of machinery, but does not rule
40As well as Partee, Groenendijk & Stokhof (2005), Dever (1999), and various others have advocated for the view
that compositionality should be viewed as a methodological tenet rather than an empirical claim. My approach is novel
not in advancing this proposal, but in re-analyzing how this proposal fits with the standard argument.
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out that sometimes this may not be possible, in which case we may deviate from this ideal. This
fits well with general assumptions about the role of simplicity in the sciences, according to which
simplicity in our models/theories is an ideal to be strived for, but which cannot always be achieved
consistent with empirical success, elegance, and other theoretical desiderata.
The analogy to adaptationism is furthered by the felt need to explain deviations in both cases.
Observed sub-optimality in organisms usually requires a special explanation (e.g. an organism
cannot maximize the benefit provided by one trait without reducing that provided by another and
so satisfices, leading to neither trait being strictly optimal). Likewise, apparent deviations from
compositionality require explanations. The accounts we looked at earlier each attempted such ex-
planations. Unarticulated constituents in the semantics are explained via a theory of interpretation
and communication. The failure to predict the meaning of a compound nominal is explained by
the importance of ‘top-down’ influence from world-knowledge, etc. This all seems to fit nicely
with the picture of compositionality as a methodological constraint on semantic theorizing. It
is likely that large swaths of language can be satisfactorily explained compositionally. But the
methodological approach cautions against the hasty assumption that it all can.
One benefit of this view of PoC as a defeasible methodological rule is that it seems to strike the
right balance between the rigidity needed to properly constrain scientific research and the looseness
appropriate for dealing with complex subject matters in the special sciences. Going too far in one
direction leads to the insistence that all semantic facts be explained using only word meanings and
syntax, which may lead to overly complicated syntactic or semantic theories, when simply appeal-
ing to a third determinant of meaning, such as unarticulated constituents or top-down influence,
would be more elegant. Going too far in the other direction leaves semantics unconstrained in ways
that make explanation seem too easy, and may lead linguists to miss out on deep generalizations
made available by the attempt to explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena with relatively few
factors.
For example, in recent work Jaszczolt (2016) has presented a “radical contextualist but never-
theless compositional outlook on meaning.” (p. 66). However, her theory does not abide by PoC
as defined above. ‘Compositionality’ for her means that the meaning of a complex expression is
determined by “(i) world knowledge; (ii) word meaning and sentence structure; (iii) situation of
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discourse; (iv) properties of the human inferential system; (v) stereotypes and presumptions about
society and culture.” (p. 80).41 Now, this notion of ‘compositionality’ is clearly far weaker than the
notion we have been discussing in this paper. On our (standard) picture of compositionality, only
(ii) is allowed in. The point I wish to make is that it may well be true that these various factors do,
at some point or other, play a meaning-determining role. However, aside from worries about the
appropriateness of the label ‘compositionality’ here, allowing such factors in right from the start
minimizes the constraints on explanation that have been so useful in providing deep and systematic
semantic explanations. Rather than beginning inquiry with such a weak constraint, I believe that
semantics is better served by adopting methodological compositionality, providing a strong default
assumption that semantic theories ought obey PoC. When particular phenomena are uncovered
which seem better dealt with by non-compositional strategies, factors such as world-knowledge,
etc. may be appealed to. But this is a last resort, not part of the general strategy.
Jaszczolt’s approach looks to find the weakest notion of compositionality that would make an
analog of PoC true. By simply listing all of the observed influences on meaning, we can make
it true that meaning is determined only by these factors, however large and heterogeneous this
list becomes. The problem with this is that it makes compositionality nearly vacuous. Of course
there is some (possibly open-ended) list of all the general factors which determine what complex
expressions mean. The interest in PoC lies in the fact that it claims this list is very short. Unfortu-
nately, as an empirical claim it is not clear that we can get away with such a small set, as Jaszczolt
notes. Re-interpreting PoC as a methodological claim enables us to utilize this short list, despite
its sufficiency not being established, to push for simple and general theories. Perhaps the set of
features Jaszczolt lists do cover all influences on meaning, but if this is the case, linguists could
still discover this by looking for compositional theories, in the stricter sense, and noting when these
extra features are required. But in this case, the standard argument would not be needed to justify
this much weaker notion of ‘compositionality’. Each contributing factor could be established in-
dependently as part of the most successful treatment of the variety of linguistic phenomena under
consideration.
41Although she does seem to admit that even more may need to be included.
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Similar remarks apply to some of the semantic proposals discussed above, which I viewed as
non-compositional. There are, of course, notions of ‘compositionality’ which would allow for such
systems. Jackendoff (2002)’s parallel architecture, discussed in section 4.7, allows the meaning of
an expression to be determined by, as well as lexical meanings and syntactic structure, autonomous
semantic rules and “conceptual structure derived from context” (p. 333). One could define a notion
of compositionality which incorporated such things. Likewise with the unarticulated constituents
of Recanati and other’s proposals. However, doing so would both weaken the empirical interest of
the hypothesis that language is compositional and reduce the methodological force of the dictum
that compositional theories are preferable. PoC, in the sense utilized in this paper, represents the
minimum absolutely necessary for productivity and systematicity. So it is a highly worthwhile
project to see whether linguistics can get by with just these. It may turn out too strong, but I
believe this is most usefully described as discovering that PoC is false, not as discovering that
compositionality involves these extra elements. If compositionality just becomes the claim that
the determinants of meaning are just whatever actually determines meaning, it ceases to be an
interesting and methodologically useful hypothesis.
This methodological view of compositionality also provides a good way to think about system-
aticity. There is clearly a huge amount of systematicity in natural languages, as examples (1)-(6) in
the previous section show. However, various linguistic phenomena point to the limitations of sys-
tematicity. Treating compositionality as an organizing assumption means that linguists will look
for systematicities, and when they are found, they can be handily dealt with by compositional the-
ories. However, when they are not found, theorists should not be constrained to force the issue by
positing compositionality, and thus systematicity, where there is none. As we saw, there are almost
always moves that can be made to retain compositionality, but they may result in overall less at-
tractive theories. The positive features of compositional systems can thus be utilized to make sense
of the data, but the importance of the claim that nothing else can influence meaning should not
be over-stated. This latter claim should provide a default assumption in semantics, to be rejected
when doing so enables neater and deeper explanations.
The standard argument, then, points to a phenomenon in need of explanation: finite human be-
ings have an infinite capacity. PoC should be viewed as providing schemas for explaining particular
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instances of the exercise of this capacity. To the extent that language is compositional, we will be
able to explain this fact with reference to PoC. Likewise, with systematicity. However, failures
of systematicity, and thus compositionality, cannot be precluded on these explanatory grounds.
The methodological approach thus treats these compositional explanations as a default, so that
non-compositional explanations are possible, but require strong empirical motivation.
4.10 Conclusion
The standard argument invokes the claim that PoC can best explain certain empirical features of
natural language. That is, PoC provides a possible explanation for our productive linguistic ca-
pacity. However, there is a broad literature in the philosophy of science suggesting that merely
possible explanations are not suited for featuring in IBEs. Rather, they provide avenues for future
research, as shown in the example from evolutionary biology. The standard argument, then, shows
us that PoC should be adopted, not as an empirical claim, but as a methodological principle. PoC
motivates linguists to find deep generalizations and regularities, by placing a strong, but defeasible,
constraint on the kinds of theories they ought produce. However, when confronted with observa-
tions that suggest greater complexity, they are able to reject this assumption and posit violations
of compositionality, and thus systematicity. This methodological interpretation thus fits in nicely
with the pluralist picture I have been advocating throughout this dissertation.
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